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FROM THE IDEAL OF UNITY TO THE PRACTICE 
OF HETEROGENEITY: 
MODERNIZATION PROCESSES 
IN THE HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE COMMUNITY 
GÁBOR TOLCSVAI NAGY 
Department of Finno-Ugrian Studies, Helsinki, 
Finland 
In recent years the history of language has meant the history of sounds, 
words and rules. We know that tremendous efforts, such as the concept of Laut-
verschiebung, have been made to interpret language as the history of regular 
changes. Meanwhile the grammar of language has meant the representation of 
language in timeless models of structures, langue or universal grammars. Both 
types create special scientific frames, or I could say narratives intentionally in-
dependent of individual speakers and communities. This independence was 
meant to be the basis of the objectivistic standpoint necessary to describe lan-
guage an sich. But in this long process language has been deprived of something 
essential, of speaking and understanding man and community. Beginning in the 
1970s and with growing influence, the necessary balance has started to be re-
stored in the works of sociolinguistics (Labov 1972, Hymes 1974, Romaine 
1982), functional linguistics (Halliday 1985, Givón 1984), and in the cognitive 
approaches (e.g. Schwarz 1992). This change has made clear the distinction 
between grammatics and linguistics as formulated by Ralph Fasold (Fasold 
1992). 
The information system, which is the basis of this latter view, not in a 
mechanistic manner but rather in a communication system where representation 
and cognitive processes of text creating and text understanding are the central 
factors always within a setting and a situation, makes evident the fact that lan-
guage can be interpreted as a functional entity in an ecosystem (Strohner 1990). 
This theoretical trend, which has its origin in the views of Humboldt, Peirce an 
Eco, was elaborated by Halliday and Givón in grammar, by Hymes, Labov and 
others in the concepts of language variety and variable, speech community, do-
main, network, and by cognitive scientists (McClelland-Rumelhart [editors], 
1986, Strohner 1995, Taylor 1995) particularly in the ideas of representation and 
connectionism. 
In this respect the self-referential and the self-reflexive nature of language 
and semiosis in general is uncovered, however not entirely as in the frame of 
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autopoetics elaborated by Valera and Maturana. Thus, the delicate balance be­
tween the community and the individual, between convention and creation, or 
self-creation, can be experienced. 
The ideas mentioned here have their historical character and significance as 
well. These primarily descriptive theories have dynamic aspects making it pos­
sible to see language as a historical phenomenon connected to setting, situation, 
general interaction, and consequently to community. When investigating the 
relation between the Hungarian language and language community on the one 
hand, and social, economic and cultural modernization on the other hand, we 
have to take these ideas into consideration. 
In the present frame by modernization I mean the metamorphosis slowly ad­
vancing from the middle of the eighteenth century in which feudal features in 
the economy, society and culture were changed into new ones. In this process of 
integration every man and woman as members of the people were declared to be 
free from all kinds of authority, to form a national society, to have a political 
state on a given territory with economic and cultural traditions (Szűcs 1974: 
205). Here, in connection with language I would like to concentrate mainly on 
social mobility, social contacts, literacy, Bildung, publicity of everyday life. 
Language community means the community of those people who speak one and 
the same language. (I do not want to discuss the questions concerning the mar­
ginal cases of such a simple definition, since these problems do not influence the 
theme presented here.) In the case of a concept with historical character the his­
tory of the concept itself gives the interpretative definition. 
Perhaps one of the main features of the history of Hungary's civilization 
(Kulturgeschichte) is that language did not become a simple means of commu­
nication in most of the influential interpretations during the last thirty years of 
the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. The era of the 
Reformation was the first crucial period when Hungarian as a language was 
considered to be a substantial part of culture; and knowledge, both secular and 
religious, and identity, as well as this early interpretation of vernacular language 
were linked with the beginnings of a kind of modernization (cf. Bárczi 1963). 
Nevertheless, another 250 years passed before language, the Hungarian lan­
guage, was again approached as something substantial (cf. Benkő 1960). 
This attention to the Hungarian language had two sources in the second half 
of the eighteenth century. The first was political: among middle and lesser no­
bility the demand was growing to declare Hungarian as the official language of 
Hungary. At that time the official language was Latin, which was still spoken by 
many people, had lingered as a relic of late medieval traditions, and stood as a 
symbol of the independence of Hungarian nobility. For nearly one hundred 
years this demand to make Hungarian the official language of the kingdom was 
repeatedly rejected by the court in Vienna. Finally in 1844 after numerous 
stormy debates and controversies at the diet Hungarian was declared to be the 
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official language. This act in itself had an important effect on the Hungarian 
language community, society, culture, and of course on the Hungarian language 
itself. Law and jurisdiction, public administration, secondary and higher educa-
tion, science and other domains were converted from a classical, not vernacular, 
privileged sphere into an everyday, vernacular and democratic sphere. Certainly 
this change was not completed in the legal act itself but came about gradually 
during the decades that both preceded and followed 1844. Nevertheless, the act 
had its significance, since the official language came to be used as a part of pub-
lic symbolism. 
Central to this process appears to be its inner structure, which reveals several 
no uncertain paradoxes. Latin was an inalienable part of the traditional constitu-
tion and the sociocultural system of Hungary. Nevertheless, Latin came into 
conflict with the national awakening, which arose within the same social strata 
and cultural circles that had themselves cultivated the use of Latin. At the same 
time, the Austrian Empire had maintained Latin as the official language in Hun-
gary, albeit German might have fit its goals much better. Joseph II had wanted 
to germanize the empire in the 1780s, but he failed. Thus, the situation in Hun-
gary departed from the typical pattern where a political and linguistic minority 
fought against the majority and against the official language of the majority. In-
stead, the Latin-Hungarian conflict depended partly on a third, external group: 
the Germans in Vienna. 
The other main source of the attention to the Hungarian vernacular was the 
process of standardizing the Hungarian language, which began in the 1770s. The 
claim to establish a standard version of Hungarian originated partly from the 
political background. It had to be demonstrated that Hungarian was good 
enough to be an official language, that it had all the features necessary to satisfy 
the different demands, especially the multifuncionality required of an official 
language (cf. Milroy and Milroy 1985, Garvin 1993). After 1790 this complex 
process embodied two main trends. The first trend included writing. Between 
1790 and 1846 more grammars of Hungarian were written than in the previous 
one to two hundred years. The grammars had a double aim. First, they sought to 
describe Hungarian to the extent that it was possible; and this included the for-
mation of modern linguistic methodology and terminology. Second, the gram-
mars described Hungarian in ideal terms and provided the norms, as well as the 
correct patterns, to be used. Seeking to find the proper basis for evaluation the 
authors of these grammars united description and prescription, ist and soil, in the 
same sphere. But the theoretical limits that completed this unification were dif-
ferent. Sámuel Gyarmathi held that there were only slight differences among 
Hungarian dialects; and thus with only a few modifications the desired unity 
could easily be achieved. The authors of the Debreceni Grammatika asserted 
that the pure grammar of the people, the vernacular, constituted the only valu-
able pattern. Elaborating a very abstract ideal, they specifically favored those 
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varieties that had not had any contact with foreign languages or with the varie-
ties of Hungarian that had been influenced by foreign patterns. Ferenc Verseghy 
also relied on the vernacular; but he put custom, or convention, at the center of 
his explanation. On the other hand, Miklós Révai, perhaps the greatest linguist 
of the age, sought the orienting patterns in the past, in the historical forms of 
Hungarian. 
Nevertheless, all grammarians tried on sociolinguistic grounds to formulate 
the basis of their judgments in the language shaping acts of selection, codifica-
tion, and elaboration (Haugen 1966, Neustupny 1970, Fishman 1974). These 
grounds were formed by theoretical considerations that referred to a set of na-
tional features attributed to the Hungarian people as an ethnic and cultural entity 
and the Hungarian community as a society, which needed to be educated on a 
more demanding level. 
Ferenc Kazinczy, the chief organizer of the movement to promote the Hun-
garian vernacular after 1805, came to elaborate the other, the aesthetical, trend. 
Although he himself contributed to their work, Kazinczy was not content with 
the efforts of the grammarians at better codification. Instead, he concentrated on 
the question of different styles and desired to create the new language of litera-
ture by following foreign, particularly German and French, patterns. Some of his 
works, primarily his translations, were rejected; but his views on taste and qual-
ity proved to be immensely influential. He concentrated on the language shaping 
problems of elaboration and differentiation. 
This process, which has been briefly outlined, took place in a society not 
completely ready for the changes. The demand for the development of an offi-
cial form of Hungarian came from and was well understood by relatively broad 
segments of the contemporary society and language community; but the need for 
standardization was recognized only in narrow circles of the middle nobility and 
lateiners. Nevertheless, the changes introduced from the top penetrated the so-
ciety relatively quickly; and in about fifty years the new standards became well 
known. Standard Hungarian was codified on the basis of the northeastern dia-
lect, but it was also based on earlier attempts at forming a written standard ver-
sion, such as the Bible and psalm translations of the Reformation era. The codi-
fiers used phonetic and grammatical forms from other dialects as well and 
created a balanced standard. Thus standard Hungarian is not a type of artificial 
language but the result of a partially self-reflexive process, which came to be 
accelerated during the first decades of the nineteenth century. 
The Hungarian language community, or the society of the Hungarian king-
dom, was both the object and the subject of the modernization processes begin-
ning at this time. This community was certainly heterogeneous. The basic varie-
ties were local dialects that formed dialect types. The dialects were the emblems 
of local identity; and they formed a coordinated system. But no variety achieved 
superior prestige, since public opinion was also being formed during that same 
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period. In everyday practice language appeared to be a completely natural phe-
nomenon. Nevertheless, reflections had been made earlier, and the basic stan-
dard omitted the most prominent dialectal features in pronunciation, spelling, 
and especially written language. The most important characteristics were very 
closely related to the sociological structure of Hungarian society in which the 
vast majority of people worked in agriculture and maintained a rural culture. 
The system of settlement reinforced these features as well. The village was the 
typical settlement and the basic sociological, economical and cultural unit of 
dialect. Thus, the number of domains (typical situations of verbal interactions) 
were relatively low; the networks (the communication systems) of native speak-
ers were transparent; a closed system of styles (formal and informal) was used; 
and since family and work were not separated, everyday activities formed one 
continuum. Mobility and migration were at a low level, and urbanization had 
just begun. However, the efforts at standardization were not clearly urban acts 
either. The intellectual and spiritual center of all these processes involving the 
development of the Hungarian language was in Széphalom, a small village near 
Sátoraljaújhely in northeastern Hungary, where Kazinczy organized the work 
through his correspondence during the two decades that followed 1805. 
At this time standardization in the cultural sense spread from the top to the 
bottom and slowly put language at the center of political and cultural thought. 
But since the formal political decision remained blocked, it became a cultural 
movement to implement the standard variety of the Hungarian language par-
ticularly in law, public administration, commerce, science, and literature, and to 
raise the cultural niveau of the population. Due the demands of political life the 
ideal of "unity in unity" explicated in the works of the grammar writers became 
more influential. It emphasized the community as a whole, as a nation, as an 
ethnic entity with a homogeneous language, and not the ideal of Kazinczy, 
which was "diversity in unity" within a heterogeneous language and concen-
trated on the individual and his relation to the community. Thus, rationalist 
views, combined with the romantic awakening of historicity, became the basis 
of recognizing language as a force that formed community, and the orienting 
patterns were relatively closed to individual initiatives. Correct (i.e. standard-
ized) language was becoming the indicator of being highly intellectual and of 
loyalty to the community, to the nation. Standard (reformed) Hungarian was 
becoming the prestigious variety primarily in formal situations, or domains, but 
later in informal ones, too. It was one way to start a modernization process in 
which members of the nobility or other social groups were able to become the 
members of the educated middle classes (Bildungsbürgertum) that were still to 
be created. 
As far as we know the debates on the standard forms and the spread of the 
codified language were engaged mostly in written forms: in correspondence, 
periodicals, books, and later newspapers, as well as at the Hungarian theater in 
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Pest. Only later did they take a conversational form. The spoken mode de-
manded a new, public, urban way of life. Beginning with the 1820s this devel-
opment came to be concentrated particularly at Pest and Pozsony, as well as 
some other towns such as Kassa. The cultural and free enterprise standardization 
changed into an academic one during the 1830s. The Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences was founded in order to maintain and cultivate the Hungarian lan-
guage; and during the 1830s, the first decade of its history, the academy pro-
duced the most important handbooks, including a German-Hungarian dictionary 
employing the reformed lexicon, an orthography, and a descriptive grammar 
demonstrating the new standard Hungarian, in order to turn its ideals into prac-
tice. In short, from that time on there was a "single unquestioned source of 
authority, which was generally recognized and obeyed" by educated people 
(Garvin 1993), whose numbers steadily increased along with the expansion of 
education and literacy. 
The appearance of a standard language created a new inner structure and in-
troduced hierarchy into the Hungarian language community. As we have seen, 
dialect had been a natural phenomenon without much reflection. Standard lan-
guage on the other hand has generally different features. It emerges as an entity 
with a minimal variety of form and with a maximal variety of function (Milroy 
and Milroy 1985). Garvin (1993) enumerates five main functions of a standard 
language. First, it has unifying function to serve as an integrating bond in spite 
of dialectal and other differences. Second, it exercises a separatist function to 
differentiate it from other language communities. Third, it enjoys a prestige 
function conferring a certain authority on a speech community that possesses the 
standard language and on the individuals who master it. Fourth, it provides a 
participatory function to allow a language community to use its own language in 
order to take part in the cultural, scientific, and other developments of the mod-
ern world. Fifth, it establishes a frame of reference function to clarify matters of 
language correctness. 
After the great debates on correctness during the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century a growing illusion spread among Hungarian intellectuals, 
later among the members of the middle classes, and finally among other social 
strata that the standard variety could be, or already was, fully developed in 
grammars, dictionaries and the rules of orthography. In folk linguistic judgments 
even today this remains one of the most common opinions. 
As a result of this change a clear, cultural and ethical institution established 
the foundation for all of the previously mentioned functions of the standard lan-
guage. The whole system had a double structure. On the one hand, since no in-
herited privileges played a role in the hierarchy, it constituted a step toward 
modernization. On the other hand, the accessibility of education and culture 
(Bildung) of course remained limited. Albeit only in restricted form, these fea-
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tures promoted social mobility and migration and helped to transform the closed 
communication system of settlements into more open ones. 
Thus the hierarchy among the varieties included a standard language with 
high prestige, codified forms, and literature. The other varieties were character-
ized by lower prestige, uncodified forms and largely restricted to the oral me-
dium. As we know from sociolinguistic investigations, which were first per-
formed by Ferguson (1959) through the concept of diglossia, this hierarchy has 
several particular features. According to Haugen (1966) and Wardhaugh (1986: 
33) the norm of the standard "is likely to be - or to become - an idealized norm, 
one that users of the language are asked to aspire to rather than one that actually 
accords with their observed behavior". 
Since the standard language is usually used by the elite, Milroy (1985) as 
well as others have noted what Wardhaugh (1986: 34) described in the follow-
ing manner, "the chosen norm inevitably becomes associated with 'power' and 
the rejected alternatives with the lack of 'power'". Also significant for the his-
tory of the Hungarian language and its language community was the circum-
stance that this elite was initially a cultural elite. During the 1830s the elite ex-
panded to include parts of the political leadership. The economic elite on the 
other hand only came to be included about fifty years later. No less significant 
was the situation that this hierarchy was maintained by an attitude of solidarity 
and loyalty. Furthermore, it was also associated with a general ideal of teleo-
logical development in which the uneducated people could be improved without 
serious conflict through education and culture (Bildung). However, we ought to 
be aware that in the case of the Hungarian language this hierarchy did not de-
velop into a clear system of diglossia in the same sense as Ferguson had out-
lined. 
The political struggles before 1848 and the revolution of that year demon-
strated the vast importance of these transformation processes and also made 
them more explicit and rapid, or more reflexive. However, the Austrian oppres-
sion after 1849 interrupted the developments and brought their first phase to an 
end. The modernization of the Hungarian language was suspended by a dictato-
rial political system, which employed German as its official language. On the 
whole language and its respective language community usually do not immedi-
ately follow political changes. Consequently the extensions of standard Hun-
garian throughout the entire society continued at a slower pace. 
The next period began with the Compromise (der Ausgleich) of 1867 be-
tween the Austrian emperor and the Hungarian opposition. During this phase we 
can observe the acceleration of the modernization in the economy, politics, pub-
lic administration, and culture. This constituted a period of extended social mo-
bility, migration and urbanization. Although it still retained some significance, 
the local dialect was no longer basic. Other domains, larger networks in every-
day speech, had sprung into existence. With the growing opportunity, indeed 
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necessity, to travel and study the communication system of the villages became 
more open. Education, newspapers, literature, theater, and everyday conversa-
tion in different domains all played a decisive role. Among the most important 
changes one can enumerate the emergence of new urban dialects, which totally 
reorganized the value system of the Hungarian language community. In terms of 
prestige they were situated, and remain even today, somewhere between the 
standard language and local dialects. The other change deserving of attention 
concerned the further elaboration of colloquial standard Hungarian, which was 
spoken typically in towns, particularly in Budapest, by the middle class. In this 
was the standard written language continued to extend from the top of the soci-
ety to the bottom and received a certain amount of feedback. 
The middle classes played a significant role in maintaining this new hierar-
chy, but the hierarchy was no longer embedded in an implicit as well as explicit 
political teleology, which aimed at national independence. Rather it came to be 
directed at achieving a state where a language community used its own language 
in order "to participate in the cultural, scientific, and other developments of the 
modern world". And although the standard language enjoyed very high prestige, 
there seemed to be a basic contradiction between the ideas of the earlier gram-
mar writers. Unity in unity might have been achieved according to those of the 
cultural elite who dealt with language, but it could only be accomplished 
through diversity in unity. After a short period of extensive German interference 
the purity of the Hungarian language again became a central question during the 
1870s, 1880s and 1890s. According to the views of the positivist linguists, pu-
rity could be found best in local dialects free from foreign influence. But these 
local dialects were not the same as the standard variety. Based on correctness, 
the positivist theory of rule, Zsigmond Simonyi, the most outstanding linguist of 
the age, attempted to resolve the dilemma through a theoretical unification of 
dialects (Folkssprache) and the standard language (Literatursprache). But his 
efforts proved to be insufficient. At the beginning of World War I, the Hungar-
ian language community still remained a very complicated structure with many 
varieties, many public and private domains, complex networks, as well as dif-
ferent but interconnected rural and urban styles. 
This modernization process was once again interrupted by the peace settle-
ments and the two revolutions following World War I. The Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy was dismembered, and Hungary lost seventy-five percent of its terri-
tory and sixty-six percent of its population. In respect to the Hungarian language 
community the most serious consequence was that more than thirty percent of 
native Hungarian speakers were forced to live as minorities in newly created 
states. Nevertheless they lived homogeneously in continuous Hungarian ethnic 
territories. The value system developed during the previous decades came to be 
replaced by the simple value of speaking Hungarian and maintaining Hungarian 
in an overtly hostile political environment. The structure of the Hungarian Ian-
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guage community changed in several ways. First, new defence strategies were 
developed to suit the new circumstances. Second, the hierarchy of prestige be-
came more rigid, particularly in academic circles and in education. By the time 
the chaotic situation concerning the Hungarian language community was eased 
to some extent, and the value system created at the turn of the century was re-
stored, the great depression struck and hindered further modernization. 
The efforts at modernization had haltingly begun again during the 1930s but 
after World War II were interrupted once again in 1949. After the communist 
takeover the bolshevik ideology tried to homogenize Hungarian society in many 
ways. In respect to the Hungarian language community this attempt was moti-
vated by the desire to extinguish all social strata along with the differences in 
property and education. The homogenization included the teaching of standard 
Hungarian to everybody, either through the school system or through the cen-
trally directed adult education program. Furthermore, between 1949 and 1989 
publishing houses operated only in Budapest, the capital. On the other hand, the 
language varieties of the middle classes and upper middle classes were con-
demned and stigmatized as bourgeois jargon. Interestingly, Hungarian academic 
linguistics assisted in this process by sanctioning the general belief in the ex-
tinction of local dialects and advocating the overall teleology of language devel-
opment as a chain of changes approaching the perfect state of language, which 
would be available to every member of the language community. Language va-
rieties different from the average standard were condemned in everyday interac-
tions as well as in literature. Again unity in unity was propagated; and language 
was thought to be grammar. The primitively planned and rudely executed ideo-
logical transformation led in the cultural sense to the relative rise of the lowest 
social layers, but also to the lowering of upper classes. As is well known, this 
kind of modernization generally failed. 
Nevertheless, the worst impact on the Hungarian language community was 
not this process in itself, which gradually turned slowly into its own opposite 
from the mid-sixties till the mid-eighties, but the fact that this ideologically 
based artificial transformation was limited to Hungarian speakers within Hun-
gary's border. The Hungarian minorities, consisting of at least three million 
people living in neighboring countries, came to be "forgotten" and were deliber-
ately not taken into consideration. According to bolshevik ideology, "socialism 
automatically solves the problem of minorities". In view of the language policy 
struggles of the last ten years, we now know that this is not the case. Even today 
Hungarian minorities have to fight for minimal language rights. Beginning with 
1949 the Hungarian language community was physically divided by the borders 
of Hungary and its neighbours and also by the borders of the neighbouring 
countries with each other, as well as by the iron curtain. Villages were cut in 
half, and families separated. While in Hungary varieties of the language and 
styles were artificially decreased, at least in the public domains, in the neigh-
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bouring countries Hungarian was forced completely back into the private sphere. 
In Czechoslovakia the use of the Hungarian language was banned in public 
places between 1945-1948. The same development could be observed in Ruma­
nia later (cf. Lanstyák 1991, Kiss 1995). These circumstances were slowly re­
laxed but have not been entirely eliminated even today. 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian language community has survived. After 1990 
it reorganized itself and has begun once again elaborating its inner structure and 
values. In this new period of modernization, the basic principle has once again 
become one of diversity in unity. When the process of self-creation and conven­
tion will possibly acquire a new balance without further interruption. 
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THE DAWN OF POLITICAL CATHOLICISM 
IN HUNGARY, 1844-1848 
CSABA FAZEKAS 
Miskolc University, Miskolc, 
Hungary 
In Hungarian historiography the beginnings of modern political Catholicism 
are usually associated with the political party debates over religious policy 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. More precisely, political Ca-
tholicism is tied to the law resulting from these debates.1 Signifying the growing 
influence of the middle class, the 1894-95 law on religion made civil marriage 
mandatory, established birth certificates issued by the state, gave equal rights to 
Jews, and provided guarantees for the free practice of religion in general. Al-
though not without considerable political disagreement, these constituted the 
achievement of long standing liberal goals; and without any doubt the repre-
sentatives of the Catholic church organized the staunchest resistance against 
them. Despite the Catholic protests, the majority of the public supported the law 
of 1894-1895, and the changes have stood the test of time. 
Nevertheless, the problems of state-church relations did not appear in Hun-
gary for the first time during the later decades of the nineteenth century. During 
the 1830s and 1840s, or the period historians usually call the Reform Era, the 
growing influence of middle class values experienced its first great test of 
strength, which touched not only on the suppression of feudal privileges, but 
also on exemptions from taxation, equality before the law, as well as the estab-
lishment of freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and 
religion. The heated debates among well-known politicians over the changes 
remained constrained within the old framework of feudal politics, where the 
main public forums were the county assemblies of the nobility and the national 
diets. On the other hand, the content of the discussions was increasingly "new." 
The opposition gradually stepped beyond the traditional grievance politics of 
the estates and, while not neglecting Hungary's uniqueness, appropriated the 
program of Western liberalism. It is important to recognize that the general ten-
dencies of modern Hungarian political life began to emerge publicly at this 
time. For example, the first political parties appeared: in 1846 the Conservative 
Party and in 1847 the Opposition Party; and the various movements based on 
ideological considerations became ever more clearly defined. The centralists 
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and the various young radical groups arising among Pest's intellectuals were 
also significant. The representatives of political Catholicism were present at this 
early date in the increasingly colorful tapestry of public life; and although they 
did not play any decisive role in the enactment of legislation, their appearance 
in Hungary's public life warrants attention and further consideration. 
Most analysts have found the roots of the religious laws of the 1890s in the 
deliberations of the last estates' diet during 1847-48, or more exactly, arising 
from the deficiencies and consequences of that diet's twentieth article. In 
agreement with the Benedictine historian Pongrác Sörös and others, I share the 
view formulated at the turn of the century, a view which has found few twenti-
eth-century supporters, that disputes over religious policy emerging at the end 
of the nineteenth century, "even in the modern sense," arose from a much ear-
lier period, at least as early as the twenty-sixth article of the diet of 1791. 
Namely, beginning at this time and throughout the century that followed, the 
essential issue in the various concrete questions affecting church-state relations 
remained basically the same: the difficulties arising from the emerging civil 
state's conflicts and attempts to find accommodations with a Roman Catholic 
church that remained wedded to feudal political structures. The ecclesiastical 
historian Gábor Salacz touched on the core of the matter when he noted, 
A cultural conflict develops when those subject to the state, or at least a 
significant portion of them, find it impossible to obey the laws and di-
rectives of the church and state at the same time. In short, the citizens in 
submitting to the laws and regulations of one unavoidably come into 
conflict with the those of the other.4 
This description is entirely appropriate for the situation of the Reform Era state 
and church. 
We can briefly identify political Catholicism as a movement that began to 
organize when liberal political forces grew so greatly in strength that they suc-
ceeded in influencing legislative and executive policy; and, based on the princi-
ples of civil society, the liberals attempted to rearrange the relationship between 
church and state.5 In opposition to these liberal forces, or in order to reduce 
their influence, the church no longer employed merely its traditional instru-
ments in the struggle. In order to achieve its aims the church also tried to adapt 
to the changing rules of public life and initiate movements, such as political 
parties or organizations associated with them, that were tailored to the norms of 
civil society. During the second half of the nineteenth century we can observe in 
opposition to liberal tendencies and the development of capitalist values the 
appearance of neo-conservatism and as a result of the "cultural struggles," 
above all in Bismarck's Germany, and political Catholicism. The most obvious 
manifestation of the latter phenomenon in Hungary before the turn of the cen-
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tury was the formation and activity of the Catholic Néppárt [People's Party] as 
a force to counter the religious legislation of 1894-95.6 In other words we can 
concur with the frequently expressed opinion that in Hungary the problems cre­
ated by the spread of middle class society were not solved in the middle of the 
nineteenth century by the Revolution of 1848, its failure and the subsequent 
dictatorial government. Consequently, according to the historian Jenő Gergely, 
political Catolicism could appear in Hungary only a few decades after its ap­
pearance in Western Europe as a "defensive reflex," when the Catholic church 
felt that as a result of the legal equality created by the civil laws, it would be 
squeezed out of public life. At the same time, it is important to realize that the 
seeds of this had appeared during the 1840s, and the "defensive reflex" was al­
ready set in motion at that time. 
We can also note that during the Reform Era not only the prelates, clinging 
to the status of Roman Catholicism as a state church and to their privileges and 
close connections with the Habsburg court, opposed the liberal political forces. 
During the 1840s a political tendency, similar in character the Catholic move­
ment of the 1890s and even bearing the marks of forming a political party, be­
gan to emerge within the Catholic church. Its representatives had come to be­
lieve that under the new circumstances of public life the clergy alone was no 
longer able to defend effectively Catholic interests, and that new organizations 
needed to be formed in order to influence and gain the support of public opin­
ion. The diet of 1843-44 played a key role in the formation of this concept. 
With the enactment of article three this diet brought to an end, at least tempo­
rarily, the increasingly passionate disputes over religious policy, which had 
been brewing since the 1830s, and gave a new direction to the subsequent de­
bates.8 We have no desire here to examine in any detailed fashion the stormy 
and animated events arising from the problem of the obligations, or so-called 
"reservations" [reverzálisok], demanded from Protestants in the cases of mixed 
marriages or the raising of children born from these marriages. Nevertheless, it 
is important that beginning with 1839, when the Bishop of Nagyvárad Ferenc 
Lajcsák in a pastoral letter instructed his diocesan clergy not to give their 
blessing to mixed marriages - the Bishop of Rozsnyó had earlier taken a similar 
step - the overwhelming protest of the counties intensified Catholic-Protestant 
discord and drew the line of opposition permanently between the liberal camp 
favoring reforms and the leadership of the Roman Catholic church. Many of 
the reformers, including István Széchenyi, Ferenc Deák and Ödön Beöthy 
were themselves faithful Catholics. At the same time, the prelates of the Catho­
lic church had no desire to yield their ecclesiastical privileges, including the 
ruler's position in the Catholic church and their rights in opposition to the Prot­
estants, or their rank and properties as great feudal lords. Consequently, under­
taking a political movement through which they hoped to represent their inter-
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ests in the public life of the counties and at the upcoming diet constituted a 
logical step. 
A few weeks after the conclusion of the diet of 1839-40 the Archbishop of 
Esztergom József Kopácsy directed the entire Catholic clergy in Hungary to 
practice passiva assistentia, in effect denying the church's blessing in cases of 
mixed marriages. The counties responded with a protest of previously unparal-
leled dimensions, which included newspaper articles and pamphlets. Appealing 
in part to the prestige of the clergy and in part playing for rime, the ecclesiasti-
cal leadership sent the Bishop of Csanád József Lonovics to Rome in order to 
obtain a papal decision for settling the dispute over the marriage policy.9 This 
step unfortunately became a source for further grief. From 1840 to 1843 the 
years leading to the next diet saw the debate over religion, which had begun 
primarily with the Protestant grievances at the diets between 1832 and 1836, 
expand beyond its previous framework and take on the possibility of a general 
rearrangement of religious issues based on middle-class values. The Catholic 
church was forced, however slowly, to respond to such a prospect. The depth 
and nature of the dilemma are appropriately illustrated by a comment made at 
the Diet of 1839^40 by one of the leading conservatives, Aurél Dessewffy. 
"Justice for the Protestants has reached the point beyond which injustice for the 
Catholic cause begins."10 
Even if we cannot pinpoint the inception of political Catholicism to any sin-
gle date, there can be no doubt that in the course of the discussions held by the 
episcopacy and other church leaders at the Diet of 1843-44, most especially at 
the meeting of 27 October 1844, one can discern distinctly the outlines of a 
Catholic political program. By taking into account the requirements of the age 
for the exercise of political influence, the ecclesiastical leadership attempted to 
promote the interests of the church. During the course of the debates over re-
ligious policy in the second half of the 1830s and the first half of the 1840s 
many individuals, especially among the representatives of the cathedral chapters 
in the lower house of the diet, became convinced that in order effectively to as-
sert the interests of the Catholic church, the mere declaration of Catholic dogma 
was insufficient. One could no longer simply and ceremonially invoke the 
authority of the church and its apostolic origins in order to condemn liberal 
ideas in general," as Pope Gregory XVI had done in the encyclicals Mirari vos 
of 1832 and Singular! nos of 1834 - in the latter declaring the views of the lib-
eral Catholic Lamennais heretical. It is important to recognize that the clergy, 
who as politically active Catholics in Hungary during the second half of the 
1840s desired to assert the interests of Catholicism in political and social life, 
differed neither in their understanding nor in the content of their arguments 
from the positions represented by Gregory XVI and his rather conservative sec-
retary Lambruschini. They were in fundamental agreement on all the major 
points, and they accepted the authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. In other 
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words they consciously opposed Lamennais, Lacordaire, and József Eötvös -
who in Hungary can most notably be included in this camp - as well as other 
representatives of liberal Catholicism, who by this time wanted to find an ac-
commodation with the middle-class movements and to come to terms with the 
social and political changes that had followed the French and Industrial Revo-
lutions. Although the differences of the political Catholics with the pope were 
very significant, they were primarily strategic. Clinging to their privileges, the 
representatives of political Catholicism during the Reform Era, just as the pa-
pacy, condemned the growth of middle-class culture in its entirety. At the same 
time (and in their own interest) the politically active Catholics did not object to 
employing the new instruments, modified to suit their "image and likeness" 
(Gen. 1:26), which had been offered by liberalism and were also employed by 
the liberals. 
Without desiring to be comprehensive, we must attempt to characterize the 
nature of the Catholic political movement that arose during the Reform Era.12 
We can obtain our best overall view from articles appearing in the press, con-
temporary publications and the minutes of the meetings, which after 1844 be-
came a regular feature of political Catholicism. Naturally, episcopal and other 
conferences had also been held earlier in the Catholic church, but after the Diet 
of 1843-1844 the proclamation and representation of the Catholic church's in-
terests in political life became the focal point of these peculiarly structured and 
designed councils. The items under discussion can be most easily divided into 
two groups. On the one hand, they involved purely theoretical discussions, such 
as the analysis of the nature of liberalism and conservatism; on the other hand 
they debated over the closely related concrete strategical problems and deter-
mined the practical steps to be utilized. Similarly to the liberals and conserva-
tives, they usually held meetings every three months when the national fairs in 
Pest generally drew large crowds. As we shall soon see, the politically active 
Catholics served as a secure bastion of the conservative camp, and consequently 
adjusted their discussions to the meetings of the "thoughtful progressives." By 
the last years of the Reform Era, Pest had become unambiguously the center of 
political life, and the Catholics also chose this major city for their organiza-
tional work. The selection of Pest as the center for Catholic politicking reveals a 
practical understanding of the emerging political realities. One of the leaders of 
the group, Mihály Fogarassy, Canon of Nagyvárad and from 1846 a titular 
bishop, became in practice the national coordinator of the group in Pest. Toward 
the end of the Diet of 1843-1844 the direction of Catholic politicking was en-
trusted to a clerical committee. In addition to Fogarassy, the members included 
the Canon of Veszprém Miklós Bezerédy, the director of a seminary András 
Lipthay, and a Benedictine monk from Pannonhalma, who later became Abbot 
of Bakonybél, Miklós Sárkány, while the prelates were represented by the 
Bishop of Pécs János Scitovszky, who had been most active in issues of public 
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life. The committee held its first meeting after the conclusion of the diet in 
September 1845. Afterwards its meetings became more regular, and the number 
of participants also grew. The committee saw itself as a type of "leading organi-
zation" [csúcsszervezet], and interestingly devoted most of its attention not to 
staged mass gatherings but to improved organization for the advancement of 
Catholicism. 
One of the dominant characteristics of the meetings held during and imme-
diately after the Diet of 1843-1844 was the negative evaluation of the events of 
the diet. Most significantly they interpreted Article Three as a serious defeat for 
the Catholic church. The participants found the causes of this defeat above all in 
the "spirit of the age," and identified with liberalism the struggle for religious 
liberty, which they deemed as anti-Catholic. It is interesting to note, for exam-
ple, that the conference of bishops held on 21 October 1844, which preceded 
the previously mentioned gathering of the representatives of the cathedral 
chapters on 27 October 1844, ascribed the unfortunate atmosphere much more 
to the Protestants; and while analyzing the injuries suffered by their church, the 
bishops concentrated on driving back Protestantism. Apparently at the same 
time the representatives of the cathedral chapters no longer hoped to achieve a 
Catholic victory merely by opposing the rival denominations but also desired to 
defeat the influence of liberalism.13 
The cathedral chapters sought from the beginning to avoid the charge that 
their actions constituted an effort to circumvent, or even oppose, the Catholic 
hierarchy and emphasized their indebtedness to the episcopate. At the same 
time, it appears that in disguised form desired to convince the bishops, most 
especially the Archbishop of Esztergom, to embrace and provide leadership for, 
or at least lend their names to the chapters' political movement. They desired to 
mobilize the entire Catholic public sphere; and the representatives wanted not 
only to win the entire clergy over to assume a role in their cause of public po-
litical action but also, however subtly, hoped to nudge their superiors in the 
same direction. The fact that during this early phase of political Catholicism the 
members of the cathedral chapters played the leading role is both interesting 
and significant. Relatively few bishops participated. The Bishop of Pécs, János 
Scitovszky, who became Archbishop of Esztergom in 1849, did, however, show 
interest and assumed a role. Unlike, the later Catholic social movements the 
lower clergy, the parish priests, also did not contribute to the same degree as the 
cathedral chapters. The representatives of the chapters sat in the lower house of 
the diet and as a result became particularly sensitive to the dangers liberalism 
posed to the privileged position of the Catholic church, which had been rooted 
in feudalism. As a result they probably also came to understand first that in or-
der to resist liberalism they would have to develop a new strategy. Later during 
the 1860s and 1870s, that is during the period of the Compromise of 1867 and 
the First Vatican Council, the leading members of the Reform Era's political 
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Catholicism often rose to the top of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. For example, 
Mihály Fogarassy became Bishop of Transylvania, János Ranolder rose from 
Canon of Pécs to Bishop of Veszprém, István Lipovniczky was promoted from 
the Esztergom cathedral chapter to Bishop of Nagyvárad and János Perger 
moved up to become Bishop of Kassa. 
In keeping with the basic stance of political Catholicism, the members of the 
movement in 1884 exaggerated the dangers posed to their church by the liberal 
proposals. They discovered the hand of devil in the demand for reciprocity by 
all the denominations in cases of mixed marriages and spoke of an effort to 
dismantle the rights of the Catholic church. The representatives of political Ca­
tholicism tended to judge any initiative directed against the Catholics as a first 
step designed ultimately to destroy the church. They spoke of frontal anticleri­
cal assaults. At the same time, despite the most strident verbal exchanges, the 
majority of the lower house of the diet held moderate liberal views. This atti­
tude was reflected by the response of the overwhelming majority of the county 
nobility at the diet and even earlier in 1841-42, when in the matter of the arch­
bishop's encyclical on mixed marriages they deemed the behavior of the clergy 
as harmful and rose in clamorous protest against it. Yet, during the second 
phase of the dispute, when more radical ideas against the rights of the Catholic 
church began to circulate - Bereg county demanded civil marriage and a Hun­
garian Catholic church independent of Rome, while Borsod suggested the 
secularization of ecclesiastical lands - the overwhelming majority of the county 
nobility refused its support to these initiatives. It is also true, however, that 
during the Reform Era the church found itself under increasing attack from 
many more directions than earlier. This was so because Catholicism was com­
ing into growing conflict in more and more areas with the reforms demanded by 
the spread of middle class values. The Catholic church suffered serious embar­
rassment when Károly Wurda, the representative of the Győr cathedral chapter, 
in unprecedented fashion at successive diocesan meetings during June of 1843 
echoed the program of the opposition and proclaimed his allegiance to the con­
cept of a "free church in a free state."14 Wurda was immediately recalled by his 
chapter, and his colleagues quickly distanced themselves from his views. The 
notebooks, letters and publications of the politically active Catholics, make 
clear that they did not reject just certain aspects of religious policy but repudi­
ated the Reform Era in its entirety. They recognized in the Reform Era anti-
church tendencies; and instead of seeking contacts with the opposition, they 
busied themselves with a complete renunciation of middle-class culture. They 
condemned the reform movement for its attack on feudalism and its assertion of 
middle-class freedoms. 
In the interest of achieving concrete results, political Catholicism in general 
borrowed many of the seemingly successful instruments of liberalism. In other 
words political Catholicism seemed to recognize that in a changing world they 
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could employ new types of organization. One of their most important discover-
ies was that wooing the public and shaping public opinion in their favor had 
become a necessity. The political Catholics realized that their opponents, by 
enlivening the correspondence among the counties, by actively participating in 
the county assemblies, and by using the press had achieved a major advantage. 
In the opinion of the canons these instruments had to be appropriated, or at the 
very least counterbalanced. 
But before taking up this matter, let us note briefly that the main goal of po-
litical Catholicism, the central aim of its organized activity, seems to have been 
somewhat anachronistic. Beginning with the Diet of 1825-27 the representa-
tives of the cathedral chapters, just as the representatives of the royal free 
towns, retained only the right to offer advice and one collective vote for each 
group. The representatives of the cathedral chapters considered the loss of their 
individual votes a serious grievance and began striving for ever greater repre-
sentation. In this undertaking they attempted to establish a common cause with 
the tows but with little success. Nevertheless, between 1844 and 1848 the ef-
forts of political Catholicism were not entirely devoid of strength. They pub-
lished a number of books and many newspaper articles in defense of their indi-
vidual voting rights; and they also managed to win the support of some conser-
vative minded county representatives. In 1846 they even produced a petition to 
the ruler. For example, the Catholic church financed conservative Nemzeti 
Újság [National Newspaper] published numerous lead articles during the diets 
in support of the representatives' voting rights; and prelates financed the publi-
cation of several pamphlets in the same cause. One need hardly mention that the 
institution of representation for the cathedral chapters at the diets was funda-
mentally opposed to the "spirit of the age" as well as the concepts of popular 
representation, modern parliamentarism, and equality before the law.15 In other 
words the organization of political Catholicism at this time was initiated by the 
desire to retain a former feudal privilege. The loss of this right was deemed a 
danger for the church. Just as later the loss of the tithe in 1848 and the estab-
lishment of civil marriage during the second half of the nineteenth century 
would be perceived as pointing toward the eventual destruction of the Catholic 
church. 
Canon Fogarassy and his allies designated as their most important task the 
encouragement of activity in public life. In its characteristic fashion, political 
Catholicism urged the Catholic clergy not to be preoccupied exclusively with 
religious matters but to become engaged in the political life of the age, to let its 
voice be heard, and to defend its interests at the various forums of public life. 
At that time this meant above all encouragement for the participation of the 
lower Catholic clergy in the county assemblies, which were considered the most 
important stage for political activity, and the regular attendance of the prelates 
in the upper house of the national diets. The effort to urge the clergy to partici-
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pate in the political life of the counties, not only in a direct manner, but also 
indirectly was not entirely new. What is significant, however, is that its form 
can be considered a new element. The political Catholics' goal was to influence 
the instructions to be given to the county representatives for the next diet. They 
could only hope to achieve this aim through actively building personal contacts. 
They considered the effort important, although they recognized that the majority 
of county representatives were liberal, and even the conservative ones were not 
particularly enthusiastic about the cause of the church. Often the political 
Catholics sought to win over the straddlers by spreading information that dem-
onstrated the danger posed by their enemies to the public. The lower clergy 
were virtually directed to emphasize and, if necessary, to exaggerate the radi-
calism of the liberals. It is also noteworthy that in order to express effectively 
the Catholic point of view and successfully participate in public life, the politi-
cal Catholics desired to study in depth the liberal arguments and publications. 
At this time political Catholicism truly discovered one of the main sources 
of liberalism's Reform Era strength: the utility of a political power, which was 
based on the massive spread of information. One important source for the ex-
pansion of liberal views and their growing influence was the formation of pub-
lic opinion through the institutional network of information exchanges among 
the counties. The political Catholics desired to transplant this form of inter-
change to the cathedral chapters. In short, through the exchange of information 
among various Catholic bodies, they sought to develop common positions, 
which would be included in the instructions for the representatives to the diets. 
The political Catholics wished to appropriate a mobilized public, which, al-
though not institutionally a part of the diet, still at that time formed an increas-
ingly important weapon in the arsenal of their opponents. 
The attempt to form a Catholic public opinion was not entirely new but still 
significant. Above all they endeavored to establish a Catholic public opinion by 
financing publications. On the main issues the political Catholics wanted to in-
fluence the publications that more or less defended Catholic interests. These 
included: the Religio [sic!] és Nevelés [Religion and Education], which primar-
ily attracted those interested in theology, the daily Nemzeti Újság [National 
Newspaper], and the Budapesti Híradó [Budapest Courier]. Nevertheless, the 
papers supported by the Catholic church could not compete effectively with the 
liberal press. The number of their subscribers did not increase, and even with 
the support of the clergy the publications barely continued to make ends meet. 
On the other hand, in 1845 the Nemzeti Újság acquired as editor the talented 
journalist Sándor Lipthay, who helped make the paper a more effective mouth-
piece for conservatism. In addition political Catholicism considered the im-
provement of religious life important. It assigned considerable significance to 
religious education, the acquisition and maintenance of intellectual influence 
over the schools, as well as the strict supervision of reading materials available 
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to the young. The council also first formulated the idea of an independent mod-
ern Catholic publishing house, which - the forerunner of today's Szent István 
Társulat [St. Stephen Society] - was formally established under the leadership 
of Fogarassy in 1848. The political Catholics also assigned a considerable role 
to the maintenance of successful boarding schools and the establishment of new 
ones. They also sought the clerical leadership of the Catholics who joined de-
votional groups and sodalities, which were intended to deepen not only the 
commitment to Catholicism but also to shape the political opinions of their 
members. Furthermore, the cathedral chapters desired to sustain good relations 
with not only the secular nobility and the prelates but also the lesser clergy. It 
was characteristic during the growth of urbanization that the Catholic church 
was able to react reasonably quickly and to employ to its own advantage other 
new developments in state and social relations. These included the laws on bills 
of exchange, the gradually expanding banking system, and the institutional en-
gagement with the newly growing money economy. 
Finally, the most interesting question could perhaps be the delineation of the 
place of political Catholicism in the development of ideology.16 We can only 
touch on this issue here, and can provide no definitive answers. During the de-
bates that engulfed ecclesiastical politics in the 1830s and 1840s only a handful 
of conservative magnates participated, and only a few secular nobles were 
willing to take up the defense of the interests of the Catholic church. Although 
some laymen wished to portray themselves as the defenders of a "tormented 
church," this stance was not typical, even of conservatives. Perhaps János Maj-
láth's lead articles in Nemzeti Újság represented these defences of Catholicism 
best. It is also true that after 1844 the nascent conservative camp, led by Emil 
Dessewffy, Antal Szécsen and Sándor Lipthay among others, expected the as-
sistance of the Catholic clergy in the formation of their party. On the other 
hand, we ought to keep in mind that although Hungarian conservatism of later 
eras considers itself above all Christian and likes to portray itself as a defender 
of the church, this was not a general characteristic of the conservatives of the 
Reform Era, especially not during its formative years. Although a few signs of a 
link between Christianity and conservatism were apparent in 1847, these were 
not characteristic of the conservative camp as a whole. It would appear that the 
Catholic church was a necessary but somewhat uncomfortable ally. The conser-
vatives appeared to need the support of Catholicism: the backing of the respon-
sive prelates and lower clergy as well as the national organization of the net-
work of parishes. At the same time, the conservatives did not automatically 
wish to represent the interests of the Catholic church. The reason for this was 
most probably connected to the situation that during the 1840s the Catholic 
church was at a low point in Hungary; and the "thoughtful progressives" did not 
want Catholic support to result in the loss of the vacillating nobility in the 
county assemblies. 
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The following episode provides a good example of the problem. The day 
after the official formation of the Conservative Party and the proclamation of its 
program on 12 November 1846, the council of the political Catholics met and 
expressed its dismay at the party's extensive program by protesting the com­
plete omission of the cathedral chapter representatives' voting rights at the diet. 
The Catholic agitation did not remain ineffectual. In 1847 and in somewhat 
veiled terms Apponyi yielded to the Catholic request and expanded the program 
of the party to include the restoration of the cathedral chapter representatives' 
votes. (The events of the spring of 1848, however, probably prevented any fur­
ther advance in this area.) In 1847 political Catholicism also succeeded in 
achieving one of its characteristic goals: it gained influence over several secular 
nobles, and gained their support for the interests of the church. A good example 
of this can be found in the lead article, "The Clergy: One of the Founders of the 
Conservative Party" [A clerus, mint a conservatív párt alkotó eleme] written by 
a layman and published by the Nemzeti Újság in the spring ofthat year.17 Al­
though the constraints of time prevented the creation of an independent Catholic 
group in order to counterbalance the efforts of liberalism to legally separate 
church and state, the political Catholics represented a faction allied with the 
Conservative Party, but clearly differentiated from it. This is hardly surprising; 
since the opposition party, which had been working together for far longer, only 
organized itself during the spring of 1847 and only published a formal program 
in June of the same year. On the other hand, the political Catholics could point 
to some serious accomplishments in the field of propaganda. In 1847, of the 600 
members of the conservative minded club of Pest, Gyűlde, one fourth were 
Catholic ecclesiasticals; and we can find these same clerical club members 
working not only in the national conservative party but also in its local organi­
zations. 
In summary, despite many peculiarities, political Catholicism appeared on 
the stage of Hungarian political life during the Reform Era and attempted to 
counterbalance the growing forces of middle-class transformation. 
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(ALLTAGSLEBEN IN UNGARN, 19. JH.) 
LÁSZLÓ KÓSA 
Eötvös Loránd Universität, Budapest, 
Ungarn 
In den späten Ständegesellschaft haben sich der rechtliche Zustand, die 
soziale und Vermögenssituation sowie der Beruf fallweise sehr unterschieden. 
Unmittelbar vor der Revolution von 1848 gehörten annähernd 5% der Bevöl-
kerung Ungarns zum privilegierten Adel, zu ihm aber zählten die einigen hun-
dert Aristokratenfamilien ebenso wie die große Masse der Unterschicht jener 
mit geringem oder ganz ohne Vermögen, die im damaligen Sprachgebrauch ein-
fach Kleinadlige hießen. Die große Mehrheit der letzteren bebaute das eigene 
Feld selbst und befand sich auf dem Lebensniveau der Leibeigenen, zum 
kleineren Teil waren sie Handwerker oder Händler. Betrachten wir allerdings 
den Beruf näher, so stellt sich heraus, daß etwa 85% der Bevölkerung Landwirte 
waren und dieser Anteil außer der Unterschicht des Adels auch die Leibeigenen 
un die freien Bauern ohne Leibeigenbindung umfaßte. Im ständischen Sinne 
Bürger waren nur die Bewohner der kleinen Zahl von privilegierten königlichen 
Freistädten, doch lebten außer ihnen viele Adlige und Nichtadlige ebenfalls von 
bürgerlichen Berufen, nicht nur von Gewerbe und Handel, sondern auch in 
Intellektuellenberufen. Als 1848 die feudalen Privilegien beseitigt wurden, hätte 
der bürgerliche Rechtszustand die soziale und Vermögenssituation auf einheit-
licher Basis umgestalten müssen. Dieser Prozeß ging in Ungarn aber nur sehr 
langsam vor sich, die bestimmende Kraft der untergegangenen Ständegesell-
schaft war sehr viel zäher, als die meisten Zeitgenossen ursprünglich angenom-
men hatten. 
In der Ständegesellschaft Adliger zu sein, bedeutete genau umschriebene Pri-
vilegien, ungeachtet dessen gab es aber zwischen einzelnen Gruppen des Adels 
erhebliche Vermögensunterschiede. Am Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts konnte man 
in Ungarn wahrscheinlich auf einen Blick den Adligen von gleich vermögenden 
Bürgen unterscheiden, weil sie sich verschieden benahmen und andere Kleidung 
trugen. In dieser Zeit vermischen sich aber schon ihre äußeren Merkmale. Ein 
Graf schrieb 1816 aus einem oberungarischen Modebad an seinen Freund, daß 
die das Bad besuchenden Bürgerfrauen aus der nahen Stadt trügen oftmals viel 
feinere und schönere Kleider als die Adligen. Zu seinem Glück - so berichtete er 
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weiter - unterschieden sie sich durch ungeschickte Bewegung und ungeschliffe-
nes Verhalten bzw. durch die Eleganz der höheren Geburt. 
In der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft verschwanden die Adels Vorrechte, jeder war 
Bürger (citoyen), doch wer im soziologischen Sinne tatsächlich ein Bürger war, 
ließ sich sehr schwer genau bestimmen. Unter den möglichen Gesichtspunkten 
treten gemischt das Vermögen, der Beruf und der Wohnort auf. In meinem 
Vortrag nähere ich mich der Frage von der das Alltagsleben formenden Menta-
lität her an. Dieser Gesichtspunkt wurde in der ungarischen Historiographie im 
allgemeinen stiefmütterlich behandelt, er wurde von den Ereignissen der Politik-, 
Wirtschafts- und Rechtsgeschichte in den Hintergrund verdrängt. Dabei wußten 
die Zeitgenossen, die die bürgerliche Umgestaltung betrieben, sehr wohl und be-
tonten es, daß um das Ziel zu erreichen, auch die Umgestaltung der Mentalität 
und der Alltagskultur nötig sei. Oder von anderer Seite her betrachtet: Die bür-
gerliche Umgestaltung wird durch die Verbürgerlichung von Mentalität und Ail-
tagskultur vollständig. Ich möchte nur auf das bekannteste Beispiel verweisen: 
Die Führungsgestalt des ungarischen Vormärz, Graf István Széchenyi, der die 
Ungehobeltheit der Ungarn so sehr geißelte, schrieb unter anderem Abhandlun-
gen über hygienische und ästhetische Fragen der modernen Wohnung sowie 
über die Sauberkeit auf den Pester Straßen und ergriff die Initiative für die Ges-
taltung der ersten Pester Promenade. 
Bezeichnend für die Kraft der Adelstraditionen ist, daß als im Juli 1848 das 
erste Abgeordnetenparlament zusammentrat, hatte man es versäumt, die 
einheitliche bürgerliche Anrede einzuführen. Die aristokratischen, (früheren) 
adligen und bürgerlichen Regierungsmitglieder und Abgeordneten behielten 
sämtlich ihre gewohnten, die Unterschiede der untergegangenen Gesellschafts-
ordnung widerspiegelnden Anreden bei. Dabei hätte man sehr wohl deklarieren 
können, daß von nun an alle feudalen Titel- und Rangbezeichnungen wegge-
lassen werden, weil sie keinen realen Inhalt mehr haben und jedermann einfach 
nur ein bürgerlicher „Herr" ist. Das wäre nicht gänzlich überraschend gewesen, 
denn in den vorangegangenen Jahrzehnten hatte man in der Presse mehrfach 
Meinungen über die moderne Sprache des Gemeinschaftslebens und die bürger-
liche Anrede ausgetauscht. Statt einer Vereinheitlichung begannen jedoch die 
Titel und Ränge, die jede Geltung verloren hatten, wie Schlingpflanzen zu wu-
chern, einander übertreffend entstanden immer wieder neue und bildeten eine 
fast nicht mehr zu überblickende Hierarchie. Es vergingen fast hundert Jahre, bis 
sie gesetzlich abgeschafft wurden. 
Die tief in der Ständegesellschaft wurzelnde Autoritätsverehrung und die 
Aufgliederung in Gruppen beeinflußten fast alle wichtigen Bereiche des Gesell-
schaftslebens im Adel. Ehe und Familiengründung waren nich einfach eine 
Institution zur Erhaltung der menschlichen Gattung, sondern dienten auch der 
Erhaltung des Namens der Familie und des Wachstum ihres Vermögens. In der 
ersten Hälfte des 19 Jahrhunderts erblickte der ungarische verarmte Adel eine 
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Verbesserung seiner Lage oftmals in einer „guten Ehe", das heißt, in einer 
großen Mitgift der Braut. Man schätzte eine ausgedehnte Verwandtschaft sehr 
und hielt nicht selten sogar die Verwandten fünften bis sechsten Grades in 
Evidenz, was eine genaue Kenntnis der vorangegangenen Generationen voraus-
setzte. Die Blutsverwandtschaft hatte einen höheren Wert als die angeheiratete. 
Diese Denkweise beruhte auf zwei praktischen Gründen. Nach dem Feudalrecht 
konnte das Adelsgut auch der entferntesten Erbe in der verwandtschaftlichen 
Hierarchie erben, ansonsten fiel es wieder an den prinzipiellen Erstverleiher, den 
König. Der andere Grund hing damit zusammen, daß es die Mitglieder der Ver-
wandtschaft für ihre moralische Pflicht hielten, ihre gegenseitige Verwirkli-
chung zu unterstützen. Dies bedeutete vor allem, daß sie einander halfen, zu 
Würden, Ämtern und sonstigen Vorteilen zu gelangen, die Studierten gaben Rat 
in Rechtssachen oder erledigten diese sogar, und halfen beim Zustandekommen 
von Eheschließungen, doch kam es seltener zur Geldleihe oder zu Schenkungen. 
Je größer die Verwandtschaft war, desto größer war auch ihre gesellschaftliche 
Kraft und Autorität. Es ist bezeichnend, daß dieses Beziehungssystem auch noch 
durch die Einbeziehung der „künstlichen Verwandtschaft" erweitert wurde. Am 
verbreitesten war es so bei Protestanten wie auch bei Katholiken, nicht die 
Bluts- oder angeheirateten Verwandten als Taufpaten zu bestimmen, sondern 
Personen aus dem Freundeskreis oder der Nachbarschaft, und dann auch nicht 
nur ein Ehepaar, sondern gleich 6 bis 8. Diese Beziehung begann mit kleineren 
oder größeren Taufgeschenken und sicherte später im Notfalle gegenseitige 
Unterstützung. 
Die privilegierten Gruppen waren um Endogamie bemüht, und deshalb kann 
man den ungarischen Adel auch als eine einzige riesige Verwandtschaft betrach-
ten. In Wirklichkeit war er eher das Gespinst großer Verwandtschaftsgruppen, 
und oft verbanden dieselben Gruppen mehrere Eheschließungen. Anschaulich 
spiegelt diese Lage, daß im archaischen Ungarisch einander völlig unbekannte 
Menschen, die aber zur gleichen Gesellschaftsschicht gehörten, sich bei ihrer 
ersten Begegnung unter Berücksichtigung des Alters als älterer oder jüngerer 
Bruder, ältere oder jüngere Schwester anredeten. Dies war vor allem beim Adel 
üblich, als Ausdruck der Quasi-Verwandtschaft. 
Zur Pflege des Verwandtschaftsgefühls standen eine ganze Reihe gesell-
schaftlicher Einrichtungen zur Verfügung. Geringfügig übertrieben kann man 
sagen, daß keine Gelegenheit ausgelassen wurde. Die kritischen Zeitgenossen 
und die Nachwelt warfen gleicherweise dem Adel seinen verschwenderischen 
Lebensstil, seine mangelnde Sparsamkeit vor. In Wirklichkeit waren die Ade-
ligen in ihrer großen Mehrheit geizig, sie schätzten es gar nicht, Geld auszuge-
ben, von dem sie im allgemeinen wenig hatten. Eine Ausnahme bildeten Gast-
lichkeit und Repräsentierung gesellschaftlicher Autorität, bei denen die keine 
Ausgaben scheuten. Beide fielen oft zusammen. In der ersten Hälfte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts gab es in Ungarn noch keinen einheitlichen nationalen Markt. Die 
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Adelsgüter wirtschafteten zum großen Teil selbständig. Da es keine Transport-
infrastruktur, keine verarbeitende Industrie und letztlich keine Investitionsmög-
lichkeiten gab, ließ sich mit einem großen Teil des Ernteüberschusses nichts an-
deres anfangen, als ihn aufzuessen, wozu die häufigen Einladungen von Gästen 
gute Gelegenheit boten. Das war tatsächlich Verschwendung. Die Gastfreund-
schaft wurde als Prestigewert behandelt und gehörte zu einem Bestandteil der 
romantischen Nationalcharakterologie, ja, sie hat diese überlebt, da sie bis heute 
andauert. Allerdings darfauch nicht verschwiegen werden, daß die Verschwen-
dung bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts ein Grund der Verschuldung der Adli-
gen geworden war und später dann, als ihre Nachkommen im bürgerlichen Staat 
nicht mehr durch Privilegien geschützt waren, sehr zu ihrer Existenzkrise und 
ihrem gesellschaftlichen Abstieg beigetragen hat. 
Die allgemeinsten Anlässe für Verwandtschaftstreffen waren die großen 
Lebenswenden, die zwar abhängig von der materiellen Situation, aber immer 
festlich gefeiert wurden. Der Geburt folgte in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahr-
hunderts auch bei den Protestanten die Taufe noch fast sofort, aber am festlichen 
Mittagessen nahmen nur die engste Familie und die Taufpaten teil. Um so weiter 
war der Kreis, der für das Hochzeitsabendessen offiziell eingeladen wurde. Die 
Hochzeit diente den betreffenden Familien auch als öffentliche Repräsentation 
ihres Vermögens und Prestiges und kostete in manchen Fällen Anstrengungen, 
die ihre materielle Situation ins Wanken brachte. Diesen Brauch ahmten vor 
allem die Bauern nach. Später wurde es unter den Dorfbewohnern allgemein 
modisch und ist es bis heute geblieben. Schließlich war es eine moralische 
Pflicht, bei Beerdigungen zu erscheinen, um dem Verstorbenen die letzte Ehre 
zu geben. Dies galt als breiteste Gelegenheit, sich im Verwandtschafts-, Freun-
des- und Bekanntenkreis zu treffen. Die den Beginn des Erwachsenwerdens 
bedeutende Konfirmation verbreitete sich bei den Protestanten Ungarns erst zu 
Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, weshalb sie nich den Charakter eines Familientref-
fens hat wie im deutschen Sprachraum und in den Ländern Nordeuropas. Ähn-
liches gilt für die Erstkommunion und die Firmung bei den Katholiken. 
Herausragende Zeitpunkte für Verwandtenbesuche waren der zweite Tag der 
drei hohen Kirchenfeste (Weihnachten, Ostern, Pfingsten), die übrigens keiner-
lei sakralen Bezug hatten. Ebenfalls Gelegenheiten für Verwandtschaftstreffen 
waren die mehrtägigen Landesmärkte in jeder Jahreszeit, die damals jährlich 3 -
4mal in einer Siedlung abgehalten und ohne sozialen Unterschied von allen 
besucht wurden. Dabei fanden Versammlungen in den größeren Gutsbesitzer-
familien statt, an denen jedes männliche Mitglied erscheinen und an der 
Behandlung und Entscheidung der gemeinsamen Familienangelegenheiten teil-
nehmen mußte. Der Hausherr bewirtete die zu Besuch kommenden Verwandten 
und sorgte für ihre Unterbringung. Unabhängig von den hervorgehobenen Ver-
wandtenbesuchstagen galt es als größte Beleidigung, das Haus eines bekannten 
oder verwandten Adligen zu übergehen, wenn man gerade auf der Durchreise 
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war. Ohne jede Anmeldung konnte man wann auch immer eintreffen, das adlige 
Wohnhaus stand prinzipiell immer offen und für den Empfang von Gästen und 
den oftmals mehrere Tage dauernden Gästeaufenthalt bereit. Mit diesem Brauch 
wehrte man sich auch gegen die Langeweile und Abgeschlossenheit des 
Provinzlebens. 
Dieser wichtige Gesichtspunkt hielt den Kult der Namenstage am Leben, der 
ganz ruhig eine ungarische Spezialität genannt werden kann. Am Namenstag lud 
man keine Gäste ein, doch gehörte es sich für Verwandte, Freunde und Be-
kannte, hinzugehen und eine Gratulation, ein Gedicht und gute Wünsche an-
zubringen, wofür zum Dank Essen und Trinken aufgetragen wurden. Anders als 
in den westlichen und nördlichen Regionen Europas mit protestantischer Kultur-
tradition hielten in Ungarn auch die Protestanten an den in den südeuropäischen 
katholischen Regionen allgemeinen, ursprünglich mit den Heiligenfesten ver-
bundenen Namenstagen fest, ja gerade der ärmere protestantische Adel am 
stärksten. Vielleicht befriedigte dieser damit sein Bedürfnis auf Festlichkeiten, 
das die Katholiken weniger nötig hatten, wegen der von ihrer Kirche vorge-
schriebenen Marienfeste und Heiligengedenktage. Das Feiern des Geburtstages 
verbreitete sich in Ungarn erst seit Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts in breiteren 
Kreisen als typisch bürgerlicher Brauch ohne konfessionellen Unterschied. Die 
Namenstagsgratulation hat sich so zäh erhalten, daß sie auch heute als einer der 
häufigsten gesellschaftlichen Bräuche in fast allen Schichten gepflegt wird. 
Nebenbei sei bemerkt, daß in kommunistischer Zeit auch die am staatlichen 
Arbeitsplatz während der Arbeitszeit gefeierten Namenstage in Mode kamen 
und als Folge einer lockeren Arbeitsmoral auch durch strenge Verfügungen 
nicht zurückgedrängt werden konnten. 
Auf zwei mit der Einbringung der landwirtschaftlichen Produkte zusammen-
hängende Gelegenheiten muß noch eingegangen werden, weil sie beide sehr 
populär waren. Die eine war die Weinlese in den Weingebieten im September 
und Oktober, die andere das häusliche Schweineschlachten von November bis 
Februar zur Sicherung des Fleisch- und Fettbedarfs für den eigenen Haushalt. 
Alle beide fanden von reichlichem Essen und Trinken, Musik, Tanz und ge-
meinsamem Singen begleitet, statt. 
Die bürgerliche Mentalität wurde im Alltagsleben fast niemals scharf mit der 
des Adels konfrontiert. Einige Andeutungen haben schon darauf hingewiesen, 
daß der Bürger dazu neigte, die adlige Mentalität in irgendwelcher Form zu ak-
zeptieren. Tat er dies nicht, so erschien eher ein Mangel als ein gegensätzlicher 
anderer Brauch. So geschah es mit der Praxis der Gastfreundschaft, die als 
nationaler Charakterzug auch das Bürgertum übernahm, nicht aber ihre an des 
Provinzleben gebundenen und verschwenderischen Formen. Heute, in der Zeit 
des weltweit zum Geschäft gewordenen Fremdenverkehr, hält sie die öffentliche 
Meinung nach wie vor für eine ungarische Eigenart, und sie ist hoffentlich auch 
nicht aus der internationalen Meinung über uns Ungarn verschwunden, auch 
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wenn wahrscheinlich kein einziges Volk in Europa von sich sagen wird, es sei 
nicht gastfreundlich, und der Fremdenverkehr ganz sicher überall Reklame mit 
der Gastfreundschaft des betreffenden Landes macht. Der Bürger verhält sich 
weniger oder anderswie zeremoniell als der Adlige. Zur adligen Bewirtung 
gehörte häufiges und zuweilen aggressives Anbieten von Essen und Trinken. 
Dennoch verlangte es die adlige Etikette des 19. Jahrhunderts, daß der Gast 
zuerst selbst dann die Speise ablehnte, wenn er sehr hungrig war. Versäumte er 
dies, machte er auf den Gastgeber den Eindruck eines unziemlich gierigen Gas-
tes. Beim zweiten Anbieten gehörte es sich, die Speisen anzunehmen, ja man 
faßte es als Beleidigung auf, wenn der Gast nicht so oft erneut zulangte, wie ihm 
angeboten wurde, ob er wollte oder nicht. In jedem Fall mußte aber auf das 
Anbieten gewartet werden - von sich aus Speisen auf den Teller zu nehmen, galt 
gleichfalls als unziemlich, ebenso wie das Austrinken des ersten Glas Weines, 
bevor der Hausherr mit seinerseitigem Zutrinken das Zeichen dafür gegeben 
hatte. Diese Bräuche sind alle aus der adligen Tradition mehr oder weniger auch 
in die heutige allgemeine Praxis eingegangen. 
Zum Aufhören der prinzipiell uneingeschränkten Gastlichkeit hat auch der 
Charakter der Bürgerwohnung beigetragen. Das Tor der Adelskurie stand 
symbolisch immer offen, in der Küche brannte das Feuer, ein Weinfaß im Keller 
war angestochen. Die bürgerliche Lebensordnung dagegen beschnitt die Zeit 
und Art des Gästeempfangs. In der Bürgerfamilie wurde eine feste Zeit für 
Visiten eingeführt, zum Essen, Abendbrot und zu gesellschaftlichen Anlässen 
wurden die Gäste extra eingeladen. Die Zimmer in der adligen Wohnung hatten 
Mischcharakter, sie waren dem Gast prinzipiell nicht verschlossen. In der Bür-
gerwohnung war das Schlafzimmer, das nur die Mitglieder der engeren Familie 
und der Hausdiener betreten durften und wo die wichtigsten Wertstücke und 
persönlichen Gegestände aufbewahrt wurden, ein völlig verschlossener, intimer 
Raum. Gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts entstand in den Großstädten der Öster-
reichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie ein Idealtyp der Wohnung der bürgerlichen 
Mittelschicht, außer den Nebenräumen bestehend aus einem Vorzimmer (der 
Halle) und drei, sich ineinander öffnenden Wohnräumen. Einer von diesen war 
das erwähnte Schlafzimmer, das andere das Eßzimmer, wo die Familie dreimal 
täglich die Mahlzeiten einnahm, und das dritte das Wohnzimmer, in dem man 
die meiste Zeit des Tages verbrachte; hier empfing man die Besucher, hier spiel-
ten und lernten die Kinder, ruhten und unterhielten sich die Eltern, eventuell 
wurde es auch als Arbeitszimmer des geistesberuflichen Familien Vorstandes be-
nutzt. Dies war die kleinste Wohnung, für die aus gesellschaftlichem Zwang und 
praktischen Gründen schon ein Hausdiener angestellt werden mußte. 
Natürlich gab es Bürgerwohnungen mit ganz verschiedenem Grundriß, klei-
nere und größere. Der Bürger des 19. Jahrhunderts ergänzte die Geschlossenheit 
und Introvertiertheit des Familienlebens durch einen Ausgleich schaffende 
äußere Gemeinschaftseinrichtungen. Der Brauch des Kaffeetrinkens war in 
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Ungarn seit dem 17. Jahrhundert bekannt und wurde außer dem öffentlichen 
Kaffeeausschank in einigen bedeutenderen Städten im 18. Jahrhundert im 
familiären Kreis gepflegt. Seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts öffneten parallel 
mit dem Erstarken des Bürgertums immer mehr Kaffeehäuser, welche die Män-
nergesellschaft zum Zwecke des Kaffee- und Alkoholtrinkens besuchte. Das 
Speiseangebot war zumeist bescheiden. Baron Podmaniczky hat im Herbst 1847 
in einer Kleinstadt nahe Pests mit großem Erfolg in der Weise um Stimmen für 
die Wahlen zum letzten Ständelandtag geworben, daß er eine Kneipe am Do-
nauufer zum Kaffeehaus umbaute, wo die armen Provinzadligen auf seine 
Kosten Kaffee trinken und Zigarren rauchen konnten. In der zweiten Jahrhun-
derthälfte nahm die ungarische Karriere des Kaffeehauses einen starken Auf-
stieg. Mit dem städtischen Rang konnte nur eine Siedlung rechnen, auf deren 
Marktplatz zumindest ein Café öffnete. Im ersten Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts 
gab es nach verschiedenen Schätzungen in Budapest 500 bis 700 Cafés. Das 
Kaffeehaus wurde zu einer der wichtigsten Institutionen der Sozialisierung des 
Bürgers, die sogenannte „Kaffeehaus-Kultur" zum typischsten Ausdruck seines 
Lebensgefühls. Ähnlich verlief die Geschichte der jüngeren Schwester des 
Cafés, der Konditorei, dem typischen Kind des sich in der nachnapoleonischen 
Periode von Wien ausbreitenden Biedermeier. In diesem Zeitraum erhöhte sich in 
Mitteleuropa der Zuckerverbrauch erheblich. Früher wurden besondere Süßig-
keiten vor allem in den Küchen der Aristokraten hergestellt, im Biedermeier 
wurde ihr Verzehr zum Bürgerbrauch. Die Konditorei besuchte die ganze Familie 
besonders am Sonntagnachmittag, aber es widersprach der Sitte auch nicht, wenn 
dort Damen ohne Begleiter saßen, und die Familienmutter konnte ihre Kinder 
mitbringen. Es gab süßes Gebäck, Erfrischungsgetränke, Tee, Kaffee und leichte 
süße Spirituosen, es spielte keine Musik, und es war verboten zu rauchen. 
Auf adlige Initiativen hin entstand eine der charakteristischen Institutionen 
des bürgerlichen Gesellschaftslebens im 19. Jahrhundert, die ersten geschlosse-
nen Klubs. Das ungarische Urmuster schuf im Jahre 1827 aufgrund seiner 
englischen Reiseerlebnisse Graf István Széchenyi gemeinsam mit Aristokraten, 
in der Absicht, eine „Werkstätte" für den geistig-gesellschaftlichen Aufstieg des 
Landes einzurichten. Dies wurde sehr schnell und an vielen Orten nachgeahmt. 
Aber diese Klubs und Vereine waren und blieben zumindest ebenso gegliedert 
wie in England. Sie entstanden getrennt nach Gesellschaftsschichten, Vermö-
gens- und Berufsgruppen, ja sogar nach der Herkunft der Mitglieder. 
Hinter den unterschiedlichen Formen verbarg sich die Verschiedenheit der 
adligen und bürgerlichen Auffassung von Arbeit und Ausruhen. Der Adlige 
kannte den Begriff der Freizeit nicht; sie ist eine Erfindung des Bürgers, die für 
uns heutige einer der größten Schätze ist. Auch der Adlige hatte freie Zeit, aber 
wurde ihm nicht so bewußt wie in unserer heutigen Auffassung. Vor dem 18. 
Jahrhundert hatte den Lebensrhythmus des europäischen Menschen der sich von 
Jahr zu Jahr genau wiederholende Wechsel von Wochentagen und Festen 
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bestimmt. Die Feste - einschließlich selbstverständlich der Sonntage - waren 
ausnahmlos an die Kirchen gebunden, wir wissen, daß auch die Familienfeste 
eine unzweideutige sakrale Bindung hatten. Die National- und staatlichen 
Feiertage wurden erst später üblich und haben großenteils bürgerlichen Cha-
rakter. Die Festentweihung galt im Mittelalter als schwere Sünde, auf wen sich 
aber das Arbeitsverbot bezog, wurde bereits unterschiedlich gedeutet. 
In der Neuzeit hielt der wohlhabendere Adlige die Arbeit für seiner unwür-
dig; unter dieser verstand er vor allem die physische Arbeit, weshalb er die sich 
mit ihm in gleicher Rechtsstellung befindlichen armen Adligen verachtete, die 
sich mit Ackerbau oder Handwerken beschäftigten. Als niedrigerrangig galten 
ihm auch jene Adelsgenossen, die in einem Vertragsverhältnis arbeiteten, etwa 
als Verwalter von Großgütern, und die Priester, weil er sie wegen ihrer An-
stellung für Knechte hielt, welcher Stand nicht zum Adelsethos paßte. Falls er 
ein Landes-, Komitats- oder städtisches, eventuell auch ein kirchliches Amt 
übernahm, bewog ihn moralisch dazu die Amtsfähigkeit aufgrund der Abstam-
mung, für die er einen Ehrensold oder Spesen empfing. Der Adlige war also 
nicht untätig, er erledigte nur fast alle Dinge als freiwillige Pflicht- und Auf-
gabenerfüllung, nicht nur die Amtsführung, sondern auch die Teilnahme an den 
Anlässen des Gesellschaftslebens und den Festen, die Pflege der Verwandt-
schafts- und Freudschaftsbeziehungen, die Jagd, die Wirtschaftsleitung, die 
Beschäftigung als Lokalpolitiker und vieles andere. Für uns ist hier wichtig, daß 
er keinen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen der in den Augen der Nachwelt 
amtlichen oder nich amtlichen Beschäftigung und der Ruhe bzw. dem Aus-
spannen machte. 
Völlig anderts denkt der Bürger, der erkannte, daß gesteigerte Mehrarbeit 
das bewußte Ausruhen und Ausspannen verlangt. Hier sollen nicht die Metho-
den der Jagd nach Profit im modernen Kapitalismus und die Ausbeutung weder 
der eigenen noch fremder Arbeitskraft behandelt werden. Es geht um den Bür-
ger, der Arbeitszeit und Freizeit voneinander trennt. Er verwendet die Freizeit 
im Tages-, Wochen oder Jahreszyklus auf das Kräftesammeln, die Ruhe und 
Lockerung, beispielsweise für den Familienkreis, das Gesellschafts- oder öffent-
liche Leben, später für Touristik, Sport, Reisen und unter vielem anderen viel-
leicht für das typischste, den Urlaub. Selbstverständlich war für den Urlaub ma-
terielle Sicherheit und eine entwickeltere Arbeitsteilung nötig, man mußte also 
sein Geschäft, seine Werkstatt oder Unternehmung für gewisse Zeit einem 
Vertreter oder Mitarbeiter überlassen können. In Ungarn begannen nach öster-
reichischem Vorbild in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts Badeorte in grö-
ßerer Zahl zu entstehen. Diese besuchte auch der Besitzadel auf der Suche nach 
Gesellschaft und weil es gesellschaftlich Mode war, aber ganz typischerweise 
reiste er heim, wenn im Juli die Ernte und der Drusch begannen, um bei diesen 
wichtigen Wirtschaftsarbeiten anwesend zu sein, selbst wenn die persönliche 
Lenkung nicht nötig war, weil diese der Gutsverwalter inne hatte. 
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Der Bürger beschäftigte eingearbeitete Fachleute. Das brauchte nicht betont 
zu werden, wenn dies ebenso unbedingt auch der Adlige getan hätte. Die Adels-
mentalität mit ihrer hohen Bewertung von Familie und Verwandtschaft neigte 
dazu, von Sachverstand und Eignung abzusehen, wenn ein Familienglied zu 
unterstützen war, denn man meinte - etwas zugespitzt formuliert - , der 
Betreffende sei genügend qualifiziert, wenn er zum Verwandtschafts- oder 
Freundeskreis gehörte. Das Weiterexistieren der Protektion hat besonders viele 
Konflikte im bürgerlichen Staat verursacht, als sich die Nachkommen der 
früheren Adligen bewogen von der Familientradition um die Übernahme von 
Ämtern bemühten. Einer Anekdote nach wurde ein sich um ein Amt bewerben-
der junger Mann gefragt, was er für einen Beruf habe. Seine selbstsichere Ant-
wort lautete: „Daß ich der Sohn meines Vaters bin". 
Wir würden uns gegen die Wahrheit vergehen, wenn wir ausschließlich diese 
Festellungen verallgemeineren würden. Es wäre ein schwerer Irrtum zu meinen, 
die Adligen seien keine professionellen Fachleute gewesen. Es genügt, darauf zu 
verweisen, daß die moderne öffentliche und Fachverwaltung im bürgerlichen 
Staat gerade von den Nachkommen des seiner Privilegien verlustig gegangenen 
Adels organisiert wurde, der Generationen hindurch die Ämter besetzt hatte. 
Andererseits gab es offensichtlich ebenso auch Bürger, die sich entweder nach 
dem Adelsmodell richtend oder einfach aus menschlicher Schwäche die Pro-
tektion unterstützten. Auch der Bürger liebte seine Familie und hielt die Ver-
wandtschaft in Ehren. Den Kreis seiner Gefühle engte aber auf der einen Seite 
ein, daß er sein mit eigener Arbeit erworbenes Vermögen höher achtete als die 
einfach ererbten Güter und mit der Geburt verbundenen Vorteile, und auf der 
anderen bedeutete die Verwandtschaftsgröße kein Ansehen für ihn. Deshalb 
hielt er nicht über viele Generationen zurück seine Vorfahren und demzufolge 
auch nicht seine entfernteren lebenden Verwandten in Evidenz. 
Bei den politischen Reformprogrammen fiel das Hauptgewicht auf die 
gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Umgestaltung, und dem liberalen Denken 
der Zeit war es fremd, direkt auf das den Alltag der Menschen gestaltende Den-
ken Einfluß zu nehmen. Vielleicht ist dies auch die Erklärung für die gewisse 
Gleichgültigkeit der Historiographie fur diese Fragen. Im ersten Jahrzehnt des 
20. Jahrhunderts kommt es in Ungarn erstmals zu so bedeutenden Reformen der 
Lebensweise, die wichtige Bereiche des Alltagslebens durch zentrale Lenkung 
mit Hilfe von Presse und schulischem Unterricht umgestalten wollen, die als 
Bestandteil internationaler Tendenzen die gesunde Ernährung und Bekleidungs-
mode verkünden. Diese gehören jedoch nicht in unseren momentanen Interes-
senkreis. 
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Hungarians are proud of their educational system which, as various surveys 
proved time after time, has been among the best - at least until recently. In the 
light of this justified pride, it is amazing how little is known about the history of 
Hungarian education. I leave aside the valuable former publications gathering 
dust on library shelves, or university notes of the boring "History of Pedagogy" 
courses which were compulsory parts of the curriculum during the past decades. 
More regrettable is the lack of information on education in volumes that claim 
to survey Hungarian culture, past and present. Information Hungary a thor-
oughly communist propaganda volume (1967), nominally edited by Ferenc Er-
dei, printed a few pages about the history of education, and many more about 
the institutional structure of education after World War II. Other pre- and post-
war publications in which education would have had a logical place, such as Mi 
a magyar? (1939) and, recently, the Pannon enciklopédia (1993), have no 
chapters about this subject. The most interesting and timely ideas of our educa-
tors are hard to find in concise summaries, even harder to locate in the original 
texts. 
While education is admittedly an important social issue that almost every-
body has some opinion about, it is also conceived as a field of practical activity. 
It shares an assumed historical irrelevance with the advancement of technology. 
While hundreds of millions of people around the world have computers, it is 
doubtful that many would be interested in the evolution of the computer, from 
the room-size monsters of the nineteen-fifties to today's laptops. This pragmatic 
outlook hardly explains, however, why so many outstanding educators are better 
known for other abilities. Baron Loránd Eötvös lives in our memory as a scien-
tist, Countess Blanka Teleki a patriot, Count Kunó Klebelsberg a member of 
István Bethlen's government. Very few Hungarians would know anything about 
the pedagogical ideas of these three, not to mention many other educators who 
have enriched Hungary's culture. 
The goal of this paper is to survey the contribution of some educators of the 
previous century to Hungarian and world civilization. There was no shortage of 
great pedagogues: this was the age of Herbait, Humboldt, and Spencer, the old 
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Pestalozzi and the young Montessori. Our Hungarian educators have not been 
recognized as equals of these world-famous men and women. It is time to settle 
this debt. 
By 1887 Loránd Eötvös had been professor of natural sciences for fifteen 
years, which had given him ample opportunity to gather observations about 
higher education. In that year, the need to share these observations and find al-
lies for an educational reform led Eötvös to address Ágoston Trefort, the min-
ister of religion and education, in an "open letter," which was printed in the 
April issue of the monthly journal Budapesti Szemle (Budapest Observer). Four 
years later, Eötvös became president of the university and his inaugural speech, 
printed in Természettudományi Közlöny (Journal of Natural Sciences) continued 
the quest for new ideals.1 Interestingly, he did not continue publishing about 
this subject in subsequent years, although pertinent remarks can be found also 
in his later writtings. Probably the seven short months of his ministership of 
religion and education, a position from which he resigned early in 1895, made 
him realize how enormously difficult it would be to put his ideas into practice. 
Nevertheless, some of these ideas are even more timely now than were a cen-
tury ago. 
First, the dream. What does Eötvös have to say about the goals of an ideal 
university education? The double goal is: to develop leaders of society and the 
church, and, to educate scholars in different sciences (to which, according to 
Hungarian and German terminology, also the study of the arts and literature 
belong; p. 173). Long ago, the prestige of knowledge made young people follow 
scholars of intellectual eminence in order to learn from them. Thus, universities 
were formed by a spontaneous search for knowledge, not by administrative de-
crees (as Eötvös adds sarcastically). Society appreciated learning and made 
practical use of it, while the leaders of society - such as popes, emperors, and 
kings — appointed scholars to high positions by making them bishops, counsel-
ors, and so on. "This relationship between university and society has guaranteed 
the prestige and freedom of this institution from the beginning until our times" 
(195-7). Thus, the duties of the university include conveying not only knowl-
edge but also values. "A nation entrusts us with the best of its sons," who can be 
impressed and guided only by the eminence and good personal example of their 
teachers (206). 
At this point Eötvös makes a not entirely novel distinction which, however, 
cannot be emphasized enough. What are the criteria of true scholarship as op-
posed to bookish knowledge? 
We can call one a true scholar only if he has acquired a general ability 
of reasoning by the thorough study of one discipline. In addition, he 
should have acquired a wide range of knowledge, so that he can solve 
problems of both scientific and practical nature, albeit perhaps only af-
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ter a long deliberation and much research. A good judge or lawyer is 
not one who can immediately quote some article pertinent to the case 
on hand. Likewise, the good physician is not one who just casts a 
glance at the patient and immediately decides which fashionable treat-
ment to use. 
To solve the many complicated cases in any social activity or scholarly dis-
cipline, "one has to possess an integrity of thinking which cannot be replaced by 
already existing rules" (175). Elsewhere, Eötvös continues the argument. The 
independence of thought can be taught only by educators who think independ-
ently. Therefore, the standard of any university depends primarily on the per-
sonality of its professors. A university course cannot offer as complete knowl-
edge as a handbook, yet the teacher can arrive at a synthesis, and can focus on 
the essence of a subject, more successfully than any book (202-4). As a matter 
of fact, university teachers should not be expected to enhance their lectures by 
writing textbooks, argues Eötvös (179). 
Next comes reality. Eötvös finds much to criticize about the Hungarian uni-
versity system of his time, that is, universities before the turn of the century. In 
the first place, he ostracizes the increasing priority of administration and bu-
reaucracy. "Bad regulations can cripple the activity of the most outstanding 
teachers," he wrote in 1887. He blames the slavish application of foreign rules 
which were borrowed from universities of other countries without regard to the 
Hungarian conditions (173). In Germany, for instance, the freedom of choosing 
one's courses makes students elect fewer courses which they take seriously, 
while their colleagues in Hungary take a large number of courses which they 
never attend (176-7). The tradition in Hungary is not knowledge-oriented but 
performance-oriented: students register for less demanding courses, or those 
taught by lenient professors (181). 
A Hungarian student is happy to enter the university. [...] He is enthusi-
astic about everything that is beautiful and good, he loves freedom and 
nation, and aspires to become a famous person due to his service per-
formed for his country. There is one thing that he is not enthusiastic 
about: scholarship. Should we blame him? We Hungarians have had 
brave soldiers, great statesmen, famous orators, but who can mention 
one Hungarian who became famous and great purely as a scholar? (180) 
Eötvös establishes four types of Hungarian university students. The first one 
despises knowledge since his family is prestigious and so will he be, by virtue 
of his inherited name. The second group's aim is not knowledge but to get a 
diploma. The third type will eventually choose a practical field such as law or 
medicine, and criticizes both theoretical studies and anything else that does not 
serve his narrow career purpose. Only a small group of idealists study for the 
sake of knowledge, without considering how it may further their career (181-2). 
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The result of the heterogeneous motivations and expectations is a frustrated 
teacher who realizes that his knowledge and synthesizing mind don't appeal to 
most students. Instead of visiting his lectures, absentee students use notes from 
the past, or some convenient summarizing booklet, to prepare for their examina-
tions. Eötvös writes: "... after his carefully structured, intelligent and scholarly 
series of lecture, [the professor] has to ask questions at the high-school level, un-
less he decides to be absurdly consistent and flunks ninety-nine percent of his stu-
dents" (172). After a while professors become cynical: realizing that they cannot 
influence the development of their students, they either lower their standards or 
lecture at such level that their students don't understand half of it (183). 
In order to remedy the bitter realities of Hungarian universities, Eötvös pro-
posed far-reaching reforms. Two of these targeted the traditional attitudes of 
Hungarian students. In the first place, Eötvös wanted to make course attendance 
compulsory (176). Next, in order to counter the pragmatic nonchalance toward 
scholarly theory, he suggested that those intending to pursue a professional ca-
reer should be required to take theoretical courses pertinent to their field in the 
first two years of their studies. Furthermore, Eötvös planned to introduce regu-
lar examinations in all such courses, which remind the North American reader 
of the tests and quizzes that are given here (184-5). Naturally, this new system 
would put an increased work load on the professors, which should be alleviated 
by hiring "repetitors " - that is, in "our" language, teaching assistants (187). (As 
Eötvös informs us, compulsory exams and the repetitor-system were already in 
effect at the technical university of Budapest at that time; 188.) 
There are also other aspects of what we know as a North American univer-
sity tradition that Loránd Eötvös liked. He spoke with appreciation about people 
of good fortune who, whether scientists or at one time humble craftsmen, have 
offered millions to establish new universities or support existing ones (205). 
This system of endowments may have appealed to him as a sign of the social 
appreciation of knowledge. 
At the same time, Eötvös also professed other ideas which are entirely con-
trary to the American and, by now, also the European concept of a socially open 
university system. He brazenly attacked the sacred cow of our times: that every-
body has the "right" to higher education. He praised in German universities the 
fact that students represented overwhelmingly the educated and well-heeled up-
per middle class, consequently they did not have to worry about high tuition 
fees and other study expenses. He found many more people from the lower so-
cial strata at Hungarian universities: young men whose families knew little 
about scholarship, and themselves had to live in crowded, unheated rooms, 
worry about fees and textbooks, and spend much of their valuable time tutoring 
for meager compensation (178, 181). In order to demonstrate the controversial 
character of Baron Eötvös, we have to add that he also founded an elite college 
in 1894, named after his father, to help talented lower-class students to worry-
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free university studies. Of course, this was not the only goal of the renowned 
Eötvös College. It is typical, however, that the college admitted only young 
men. We learn from Klebelsberg that as late as 1928 there was no comparable 
college for women.3 
If university studies were a matter of luxury, the same held for university 
teaching. Eötvös refuted the arguments of critics - arguments that sound famil-
iar to us once again - that professorial salaries should not come shamefully 
close to those of high-ranking statesmen (190). If the comfortable life of profes-
sors is not secured, how can they devote all their time and energy to their schol-
arship? (191) Should they perhaps quit teaching and practice their knowledge in 
various professions for more lucrative compensation? (193) All this sounds as if 
we were listening to a public debate of our time. Also, Eötvös suggests that for 
every outstanding young scholar a university chair ("cathedra") should be cre-
ated so that they don't have to wait disappointingly long till professors already 
occupying the few existing chairs retire or die (203-5). In other words, he re-
garded individual excellence as a quality more important than the balance 
among the disciplines. 
At first impression, the upbringing of young women seems to be a matter 
entirely different from university education. Not so! What Countess Blanka 
Teleki and Mrs. Pál Veres strove for, was actually the establishment of a 
women's college to educate Hungarian girls to be mothers and wives knowl-
edgeable about culture, good patriots, and, if they so chose, prepared for univer-
sity studies. It is worth noting that the first European university that admitted 
women was the university of Zurich in 1869-70. In Hungary, the faculties of 
art, medicine, and pharmacy opened up for women in 1895-96 - as the Révai 
Lexikon modestly adds, "with some restrictions." In fact, Count Klebelsberg 
reported that as late as the 1920s the medical school of the university of Buda-
pest still managed to avoid admitting women.4 
Countess Teleki, Mrs. Veres, and other pioneers of the liberation of women 
(such as Countess Teréz Brunszvik, or Teréz Karács, daughter of an engraver) 
did not make much secret of the fact that the access of women to higher educa-
tion was part of the general struggle for emancipation. Their goals went beyond 
those set by eminent men of the reform era, notably András Fáy,5 whose pro-
gram consisted only of educating girls to become mothers and wives of refined 
culture. The emancipators admitted the crucial role of women in the family, but 
regarded education as something that also opened various fields of social activ-
ity and provided options for women - options comparable to those available for 
men.6 In 1848 Teleki's students compiled their own proclamation of what Hun-
garian women expected from the revolution. Two of their demands were: un-
conditional equality with men, and, in particular, availability of university edu-
cation for women.7 When the Austrian administration tried Teleki in 1853 and 
sentenced her to ten years in prison, the indictment mentioned in three instances 
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her struggle for emancipation as a crime just as severe as her activity in favor of 
the revolution.8 In a more permissive period, between 1865-71, Mrs. Veres 
stated the same need for emancipation, at the same time reminding women also 
of their duty as human beings to aspire for self-perfection through education,9 In 
short, rights also mean responsibilities. 
Blanka Teleki's and Mrs. Veres's activities centered around the establish-
ment of a women's college. Teleki's was a short-lived enterprise, operating only 
for two years (1846-48). Mrs. Veres had more success: after years of prepara-
tion her institution opened in 1869 and, having survived numerous twists of 
educational policy, it still exists as a Budapest high school named after its foun-
der. 
Countess Teleki's educational principle was mainly patriotic. She wanted to 
bring up young women well-versed in Hungarian history and literature. She rec-
ognized that due to a lack of qualified teachers, mainly foreign tutoresses were 
hired by well-to-do families to teach their female offspring. The result was an 
entirely cosmopolitan upper-class youth that usually didn't speak Hungarian. 
Ironically, to this youth belonged also Hermina Beniczky, young wife of deputy 
lord lieutenant Pál Veres, who still spoke German better than Hungarian in the 
early 1840s. 
Mrs. Veres blamed the conventional division of labor for the intellectual 
backwardness of women. Unlike men, girls were deprived from education after 
the age of sixteen, were expected to get married by eighteen, and the only ex-
pectation they were facing for the rest of their life was to be mothers and 
housewives. Without intellectual stimulus and enlightening company, women 
could not be expected to show any spiritual advancement (131-5). At the same 
time, technology gradually rendered void such arguments as those referring to 
women's more delicate physical makeup. Mrs. Veres listed the fields of finance 
and commerce, education, pharmacy, and medicine as naturally suited ones for 
women (158), emphasizing especially the importance of training woman physi-
cians, "since it is embarrassing to consult a man in the matters of our ailments." 
(182). She also thought that the list of occupations available for women would 
grow in the future (206). As for the past, she pointed out the vicious circle that 
the division of labor created: legislation was in the hands of men who could 
thus keep women away from education and legal reforms (180). 
With the division of labor there came a division of values. Preceding Lev 
Tolstoy and August Strindberg by at least two decades, Mrs. Veres condemned 
the tradition of assigning only external values to girls to be married (137). Less 
attractive girls brought up with such values would always feel unwanted and 
unhappy (140). On the other hand, educated women found value and strength in 
their intellectual interest and were less inclined to think of their appearance only 
(137). 
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With all her zeal to open up the horizon of employment for women, Mrs. 
Veres knew well that the basis of society was the family. The special role of 
women is to conduct the education of their children from the day of their birth. 
Women are the most influential teachers. Mrs. Veres did not want to see all 
women undertaking various jobs, but regarded a knowledgeable mother, who 
could teach her children and be intellectual partner of her husband, as the 
ideal." She commented on what a pitiful sight it was to see young mothers who 
had no information about the physical and mental needs of their children (179). 
Echoing Countess Teleki, she too pointed out that, since uneducated women 
soon recognize their inability to raise children, they find tutoresses abroad who 
know nothing about Hungarian customs and values (162). She also believed that 
guarded from the vanities of social life young women should continue their 
education until the age of eighteen (138). Generally, however, she recognized as 
early as 1867 that women had to solve the problem of their own higher educa-
tion themselves, since there was no indication that the existing political and so-
cial establishment would be willing to further this cause (141, also 159). 
As already noted, Mrs. Veres (like earlier Countess Teleki) campaigned for 
the establishment of a model college for young women, which was also in-
tended to educate teachers for the future. In 1869 the college was inaugurated 
with one class of fourteen students. Excellent teachers, all of them men, were 
hired to teach the different subjects - among them the famous Pál Gyulai, who 
had always supported the cause of women's education (191). A great boost to 
the prestige of the school occurred in 1871 when Queen Elizabeth visited the 
college and addressed teachers and students in Hungarian (200). 
The scope of the studies was ambitious. Already Blanka Teleki's program 
included the teaching of history, geography, the abstract and empirical sciences, 
Hungarian language and literature, French, German, religious studies, dance, 
music, feminine handcraft, and physical education.12 Most of the above became 
part of Mrs. Veres's educational plan, with some additions such as aesthetics, 
logic, psychology, hygiene, and certain practical skills such as the basics of 
business and bookkeeping (143, 163, 173, 190). One notices, however, the ab-
sence of social skills such as dance, music, handcraft, and physical education. 
Mrs. Veres despised the first three subjects as the only skills traditionally taught 
to young girls (172), while one may question her indifference toward the physi-
cal development of young women (save hygiene). It is also worth noting that 
she must have understood by literary education something different from the 
romantic and sentimental novels that further separated young girls form the re-
alities of their life (139—40). Everything considered, it was a comprehensive and 
practical curriculum that entirely ignored such traditional fields as philosophy, 
theology, and the classical languages. 
All great ideas of the past are parts of our own time in one way or another. 
Elite education may not sound attractive nowadays, yet, should we not recon-
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sider the present trend of the open university by weighing its shrinking advan­
tages against its growing disadvantages? Asserting the personality and central 
role of the teacher is another timely idea today, when education via internet, and 
a parasitic claim to make university professorship more or less dispensable in 
the sense as we have known it, are in vogue. Among the comments of woman 
educators we should notice the absence of a call for coeducation. Equal access 
to education; yes, but through the establishment of colleges for girls. Leaving 
the highest stage: university education aside, one may ask: can adolescents be 
taught their sex roles together? Are they educated for sex roles at all? This was, 
namely, one goal of our contemporary feminists. 
While only individuals or a small group of educators have been scrutinized, 
we can derive some observations from our study. Striking is the pragmatic char­
acter of the stated pedagogical ideas, not with regard to their goals but due to 
their connection to the operation of institutions. While the social function of 
education is never left out of focus, it is not exaggerated either. Nevertheless, 
Eötvös was more of an idealist than Mrs. Veres. As has been mentioned, one 
may hypothesize that it would not be easy to find consistent writings about 
higher education in the Western tradition that keep a precious balance between 
lofty philosophy and a narrow administrative perspective as successfully as 
some of the modern classics of Hungarian education. Indeed, the nineteenth 
century also brought other extremes, such as Herbart's assumption of a meticu­
lously planned education, which was supposed to work as a clock, and 
Spencer's liberalism that calls into question the possibility of setting uniform 
goals. Obviously, perennial ideas both supersede such dogmatism and find a 
balance between extremes. Above all, they still can be appreciated and enjoyed. 
Such are the ideas of the Hungarian educators whom we have scrutinized. 
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The two or three decades preceding the First World War are often referred to 
as '^he happy times of peace" in Hungary. This label is not entirely unjustified. 
No wars took place on Hungarian soil between 1867 and 1914, even though 
armed uprisings engulfed the Balkans during the same period. Economic growth 
in the era was also impressive. The per capita GDMP tripled between 1867 and 
1913, which meant, in other terms, an annual increase of 2.5 percent. In spite of 
this, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the importance of what had been 
accomplished. The rapid development notwithstanding, on the eve of the Great 
War Hungary still belonged to the group of relatively underdeveloped countries. 
Its per capita national product was only 69 percent of the European average, or 
37-38 percent of the English, 48-51 percent of the German and 72 percent of 
the corresponding Finnish figures. The process of embourgeoisement in society 
had not been completed either. The relative number of those employed in agri-
culture did decrease gradually, but it still stood at 62 percent in 1910. Also, parts 
of the old, quasi-medieval social structure persisted. Many of the conditions and 
norms characteristic of a traditional society survived and existed side by side 
with emerging social groups and their new outlook on the world. This duality, 
coupled with the scarcity of national wealth, a multinational population and the 
precarious position of the country within the Habsburg monarchy gave rise to a 
host of problems. Some of these grew to proportions and represented dangers 
great enough to justify calling ïïizfin de siècle the "unhappy times of animos-
ity," rather than the happy times of peace. In the first part of my paper I propose 
briefly to discuss these problems, while in the second part I would like to ex-
amine their legacy following the war. 
1. The Antinomies of the Pre-War Years 
At the dawn of the twentieth century five great questions antagonized Hun-
garian society, political parties and Parliament. The first one of these was the 
legal debate between the supporters of the 1867 compromise and its opponents 
who adhered to the traditions of 1848. The second conflict arose out of the dif-
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ferences of values and interests of the Christian and Jewish middle classes, usu­
ally called the gentry and the Jewish question. The third antinomy pitted the 
poor peasantry and the owners of large estates against each other. This social 
struggle is usually referred to as the agrarian question. Opinions were also di­
vided over the possible reform of the political system, especially that of suf­
frage. This fourth area served as the battleground for conservatives wishing to 
uphold the status quo and their reformist opponents, the radicals. The final, fifth 
great antinomy pertained to the conflicts between Hungarians and non-
Hungarians, usually called the nationality question. 
The first controversy, which divided those in support of and those in opposi­
tion to the Compromise of 1867, manifested itself primarily in matters concern­
ing military affairs and the economy. The pro-Compromise groups supported 
Viennese plans of developing the common army, accepted the division of labour 
between the two parts of the Empire, and argued for developing home industries 
by relying on internal resources. These policies represented the interests of the 
great estate owners and of the great bourgeoisie, which was continually gaining 
in influence during the era. Their opponents, who stood for the principles of the 
1848 revolution, criticized the economic policy of the government, labelling it 
disadvantegous for Hungary. They also opposed the customs union with Austria 
and the community of financial institutions such as the unified currency and 
banking system. As far as the military was concerned, the so-called "48-ers" 
were either opposed to generous funding of the common army or made their 
support dependent on the fulfillment of certain national demands. Such condi­
tions were for instance the use of Hungarian flags and national symbols in the 
military, and the use of Magyar as the language of command in Hungarian units. 
Viewed in a wide historic perspective it can hardly be doubted that the inter­
ests of the country were better served by the pro-Compromise camp. Some na­
tional and nationalistic slogans, however, had such a popular influence, that, by 
the eve of the Great War, the 48-ers had managed to effectively paralyse the 
government and political life in general. These opposition groups hoped that an 
eventual victory in the war would move the emperor-king to recognize the val­
iant efforts of the Hungarian nation by granting her further attributes of inde­
pendence. Meanwhile, some personalities in support of the compromise, such as 
Gyula Szekfű, were predicting Hungary's final and complete integration into 
"Christian-German civilisation," or, in plainer terms, were mapping out the 
country's place in the German-dominated Mitteleuropa of the future. None of 
the parties, however, made preparations for a possible defeat. 
The second conflict, which antagonized the Christian and the Jewish middle-
class, arose out of a gradual social change that involved the slow decline of the 
gentry and the rise of the Jewry who made up five percent of the population. 
Previously there existed an informal understanding between the liberals of the 
Hungarian nobility and the Jews who were emancipated in 1848. This entente in 
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effect recognized the nobility's dominant position in running the state and con-
trolling the political life, while guaranteeing legal equality and virtual freedom 
of action for all non-nobles, including Jews, in realizing the program of eco-
nomic modernization. The gentry, however, when faced with the prospects of its 
relative downfall interpreted the situation not as a sensible division of social 
tasks, but rather as the aggressive expansionism of the Jewry, which offended 
national interests. This conflict of power was further aggravated by the different 
cultural backgrounds of the two sides. The outlook of the Christian middle 
classes was dominated by a romantic view of the past, and sometimes by stub-
born nationalism. Parts of the gentry even seemed to live up to the old saying 
according to which a Hungarian nobleman need neither write nor read too much. 
The attitudes of the Jewish bourgeoisie and intelligentsia were radically dispa-
rate. They were more rationalistic, material and more open to the world, some-
times to the point of being truly cosmopolitan. Much like in Austria, Germany 
or France these incompatibilities led to the appearance of political anti-semitism 
in Hungary during the 1870s. The trend temporarily seemed to lose momentum 
in the 1890s, but regained its strength after the turn of the century, and espe-
cially during the First World War. The controversy prompted Oszkár Jászi, one 
of the most prominent figures of the radical wing of Jewish Hungarians, to de-
vote a whole issue of his periodical, The Twentieth Century to an in depth dis-
cussion of it. In answering his query, thirty-seven of fifty contributors recog-
nized the so-called Jewish question as an acute problem of Hungarian society. 
As far as the possible solutions were concerned, the majority of those asked still 
voiced their optimism with regards to the conflict-solving potential inherent in 
assimilation and democratization. The number of anti-assimilationist and anti-
liberal anti-semites nonetheless rose considerably, as did that of Jewish nation-
alists who, as a reaction to attacks against them, started to promote a separate 
Jewish consciousness, with the claim to nationhood as the final, though distant, 
goal.1 
The unhealthy distribution of arable land lay at the core of the third antin-
omy, the agrarian question. This meant that a small minority held disproportion-
ally great estates, while the number of landless or sub-landed peasants who nei-
ther benefited from modernization nor could produce for the market amounted 
to several hundred thousand. The only country in Europe where a comparable 
anomaly in the distribution of land could be found was Romania. As a result of 
this, a process of emhourgeoisment was observable only among the minority of 
peasants who held a considerable area of land. The lower strata of the peasantry, 
especially the day-labourers, had to face poverty and often even severe depriva-
tion. As a consequence, certain socially deviant tendencies appeared among the 
peasants, such as adherence to religious sects and having only one child per 
family. The spread of strictly evangelical Christianity and egalitarian, revolu-
tionary socialism also had their roots in the feeling of hopelessness over the pet-
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rifled structural anomalies of Hungarian agriculture. The ever more frequent 
strikes, demands for wage raises, and political demonstrations were inspired by 
these ideas. Unrest was usually met violently by the police or the military. Re-
peated clashes and the use of arms by the authorities resulted in several dozens 
of demonstrators being killed, and hundreds of them wounded or imprisoned. 
At the same time, it cannot be said that the conservative-liberal government 
and the ruling elite in general remained completely insensitive to the social 
troubles of the lower strata and the peasantry. Some restricted attempts were 
made to raise the standard of living for the urban working classes, but in the 
countryside their extent remained even more limited than it had been in the cit-
ies. Resettlement or the division of land on a larger scale was out of question. 
István Tisza, the most influential politician of the era, held views that rested on 
the ideology of classical liberalism in unambiguous terms. He declared that 
one cannot be firm and unyielding enough in asserting that the question 
of the working classes shall never be remedied by putting theories 
about resettlement and the division of lands into effect. [...] We cannot 
change the order of the world, an order according to which not every 
man can possess capital, financial or landed.2 
During the war this typical orthodox approach changed only negligibly. So-
cially more sensitive conservative politicians such as Ottokár Prohászka, a 
Christian-Socialist bishop, proposed rewarding service on the front by small 
plots of land, but no serious reform plan could be conceived. 
The stipulations of the 1874 electoral law meant that about 25 percent of 
adult men, or 6-7 percent of the total population had the right to vote. This re-
flected the nineteenth-century liberal notion that believed in legal, but not politi-
cal equality. Opposing all privileges by birth, it proposed instead the principle of 
political equality only for the wealthier or learned groups of society. Until the 
tum of the century not even the total exclusion of women was perceived as un-
usual, as they were considered to be subject to the influence of their husbands. 
Neither these restrictions, nor open balloting, however, were compatible with 
the more democratic notions of the 1900s, and this anomaly became the fourth 
area of tension in Hungarian society. 
Members of the conservative camp did not substantially revise their position 
during the first years of the century, and contemplated insignificant changes at 
most. Opposed to them stood those emerging social groups that were looking to 
increase their influence in the country's life: the bourgeois middle classes, the 
workers and the peasantry. Their main demand was universal and secret suf-
frage. The unresolved conflict grew into a long-lasting and intense political 
strife, which culminated in a 1912 street battle between the police, the military 
and the demonstrating masses. Nevertheless, in spite of popular activism, the 
conservatives managed to uphold their privileges and made only minimal con-
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cessions. The new electoral bill, which was passed in 1913 but never enacted, 
raised the number of voters from 1,162,000 to 1,838,000 a 74 percent increase. 
In addition, it introduced secret ballotting in the municipalities. In 1918 the 
heated political situation induced a second reform aimed at reducing tensions. 
With it the number of eligible voters rose to two million sevenhundred thousand, 
or 15 percent of the total population. At the same time, in Great Britain, Norway 
and Denmark about 40, in France 30 and in Spain and Greece approximately 25 
percent of the population had the right to vote. 
While the four above-mentioned antinomies (the Austro-Hungarian rela-
tions; the gentry- and Jewish-question; the plight of the peasantry; and the ques-
tion of democratic suffrage) were grave problems, their solution by no means 
represented a challenge to historic Hungary. The political aspirations of the non-
Hungarian peoples, however, grew to endanger the continued existence of the 
millenary state. These nationalities made up almost half of the country's popu-
lation, excluding Croatia. If one considered Croatia too, their share actually rose 
to above 50 percent. The Hungarian elite, which had negotiated the terms of the 
Compromise of 1867, attempted to defend itself by granting equal citizenship 
and legal status to every individual without any regard to race, language or re-
ligion, and by offering limited cultural autonomy on the one hand, while on the 
other refusing to acquiesce to the Romanian, Serbian and Slovak claims for rec-
ognition as political nations and equal partners within the state. This also meant 
rejecting the propositions of the nationalities for instituting territorial autonomy, 
and a determination to make Hungarian the official language in accordance with 
the West-European and North-American concept of the nation state. This view 
was reflected in the nationalities law of 1868 which declared that "politically, all 
citizens of Hungary form a single nation, the indivisible and unified Hungarian 
nation, of which every citizen is an equal member regardless of his nationality." 
The leaders of the nationalities refuted this argument claiming that one 
cannot attribute to Hungary the characteristics of a national state, for 
Hungary's character is exactly the aggregate of the peoples which make 
up the state. The nature of the Hungarian state does not allow that a 
single people, which does not represent even half of the total popula-
tion, assert itself as constituting the state. It is only together that the 
peoples of Hungary can identify themselves as the state/ 
Based on this argument they requested in their 1895 assembly that "non-
Magyar peoples in Hungary be given full liberty, according to language bounda-
ries. The national character of a given region should be reflected in the adminis-
trative language of autonomous districts, be it a county, a town or a village." 
The two positions were never to be even partially reconciled. In fact, despite 
of the efforts of mediators on both sides the gap only grew wider. The leaders of 
the nationalities demanding territorial autonomy pinned their hopes on the 
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eventual election victory of the democratic Hungarian opposition, which ap-
peared more flexible on the issue, and the enthronement of archduke Franz Fer-
dinand. Sympathies for their ethnic brethren or relative, however, strengthened 
during these years, and with them grew separatist sentiment, which was partly 
fuelled by propaganda from Bucharest, Belgrade and Prague. When Hungary 
entered the war in 1914, the nationalities made up approximately half of the 
population. Their loyalty, or at least that of their intellectual elites, was highly 
questionable. 
2. Attempts at Conflict Management during the Revolutions 
of 1918-1919 
The tensions that arose around the turn of the century and were aggravated 
during the harsh years of the war represented a problem both for the liberal 
democratic régime of 1918-1919 and for the short-lived Soviet Republic. With 
the de facto dissolution of the monarchy and the abdication of Charles IV on 18 
November 1918, the conflict between the pro-compromise and pro-1848 parties 
seemed to have been solved. It soon became apparent, however, that Charles' 
stepping down from "interfering in matters of the state" could be understood in 
different ways, and that the country's public was still divided by pro- and anti-
Hapsburg sentiment. To make matters worse, even the anti-Hapsburg groups 
were divided into royalists and republicans. The act of the National Council 
which proclaimed the People's Republic of Hungary on 13 November 1918 was 
supported neither by a referendum nor by the decision of a regularly elected 
legislative body, and so its legitimacy could easily be questioned. 
The revolution did not directly address the conflict between the gentry and 
the Jews. Both members of the National Council and later those of the govern-
ment, however, belonged to the opposition of the ancien régime and were 
mostly bourgeois radicals or social democrats. The changes in personnel at all 
levels of government indicated that the aristocracy and the gentry were losing 
most of their influence, as they were being replaced by representatives of the 
bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the working classes, and the peasantry. This 
transformation had been heralded by the membership of the National Council. 
Nearly one half of which was made up of Jewish Hungarians. In provincial 
towns, too, intellectuals hitherto excluded from power mobilized politically, and 
came into the forefront. 
The leaders of the October revolution wished to solve the agrarian question 
by expropriating all estates over 500 yokes (705 acres) and all Church holdings 
over 200 yokes (280 acres). These estates were to be turned into farming plots of 
5-20 yokes (7 to 28 acres), which were thought sufficient to ensure the liveli-
hood of a peasant family. Similarly radical changes were planned in the question 
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of suffrage. The decree of 3 March 1919 gave every literate man above the age 
of twenty-one and every woman above the age of twenty-four right to vote. The 
share of voters within the total population rose to 50 percent, a figure similar to 
that of the Scandinavian democracies. The implementation of these two acts 
would have meant the end of the economic and political privileges held by the 
prewar elite. 
In the handling of the nationality question the government's position rested 
on the doctrine of preserving the territorial integrity of Hungary. At the same 
time, the nationalities were offered territorial and political autonomy, which 
would have included local governments and assemblies, as well as the right to 
delegate a minister to the central government. These concessions exceeded those 
demanded by the leaders of non-Hungarians before 1914. Among the latter, 
however, secessionism had become a dominant force by the autumn of 1918, 
and the majority of them were hoping for unification with their co-nationals. 
They found additional support in the program of the victorious powers, which, 
by 1918, had agreed upon dissolving the monarchy and forming nation-states in 
its wake. By the end of 1918 or early 1919 historic Hungary - even without the 
sanctioning of a peace treaty - had de facto disintegrated. 
Summing up the program of the 1918 revolution, one could observe in it an 
attempt to put the democratic reform agenda of the prewar years into practice. 
This transformation, had it been accomplished, would have meant a change of 
the elites and - as a result of the redistribution of land - a radical restructuring 
of the society and the economy. The liberal principles of private property and 
political pluralism were nevertheless to be honoured and fully developed. In this 
sense, the revolution stood for continuity and for change at the same time. 
The socialist programme followed by the Hungarian Soviet Republic too had 
certain roots in the not very distant past. It resembled the conceptions of a soci-
ety without exploitation and private property, which were inherent both in the 
radical social democratic vision of the future and in the messianistic egalitarian-
ism of some agrarian socialists. However, these Utopias which had sprung from 
the same sources did not merge into a consistent political agenda before the end 
of 1918, and their influence was very limited. All in all, 21 March 1919 repre-
sented a much greater break in the continuity of Hungarian history than 31 Oc-
tober 1918 had. 
Following the Soviet-Russian example, the old administrative system was 
replaced by a network of workers', soldiers' and peasants' councils, while a 
body dubbed the Revolutionary Governing Council fulfilled the functions of the 
government. The traditional elites had no representation in these councils, and 
even the bourgeosie and the bourgeois intelligentsia were all but excluded. 
Sixty-five to seventy percent of the posts of people's comissars and deputy-
comissars were held by men of Jewish origin, while in the country-side young 
workers and peasants often assumed important administrative positions. To en-
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sure that these trends would not change, the "capitalists" - meaning estate own-
ers, industrialists and the greater part of the upper classes - were denied the right 
to vote, and all candidates for the April elections had to be nominated by the 
Socialist Party. 
The radicalism and the lack of an organic approach which characterized the 
attitude of the Soviet Republic became most apparent in its handling of the agrar-
ian question. The fact that the size of the estates that were to be expropriated was 
reduced to 75 yokes (105 acres) caused distress among wealthier peasants, as well. 
But the greatest miscalculation and political error turned out to be the attempt at 
establishing cooperatives and state-owned farms, rather than distributing the ex-
propriated lands. While this corresponded to socialist doctrines, together with 
other similarly radical measures, such as alcohol prohibition and anti-religious 
decrees, it alienated even the initial supporters of the Soviet Republic. 
The nationality question was not even considered by the bolshevik leader-
ship, as their ideology recognized only the common interests of the international 
proletariat, regardless of race, colour and language. They believed instead in a 
brotherly alliance of soviets uniting the whole of Europe. The naivity and un-
founded optimism of the concept needed no theoretical proof after fighting with 
Czech and Romanian troops broke out, forcing the more realistic leaders of the 
Soviet Republic to face their initial delusion. 
3. Policies of the Horthy-Regime 
The fall of the Soviet Republic on 1 August, 1919 was followed by a few 
chaotic months. In the end it was the conservatives who emerged triumphant 
from the feuding political factions. They held on to power from 1920-21 to 
1944, while trying to address the inherited social troubles in a manner very dif-
ferent from that of the preceding two years. 
The conflict of the pro-Compromise and pro-1848 parties lived on in that of 
pro-Hapsburg legitimists and those favouring the eleciton of a new ruler. Some 
aristocrats regarded the return of Charles as a guarantee of the full restoration of 
their prewar power and influence. Parts of the officer corps and the Christian 
middle classes hoped that his ascension might lead to the resurrection of historic 
Hungary and of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Legitimism on the part of 
some liberals expressed, more than anything else, their reservations vis-à-vis 
Miklós Horthy, who had been elected temporary head of state in 1920 by the 
Parliament. Their opponents, the free electors, were composed of the Protestant 
members of the aristocracy who had never favoured Vienna, as well as the larger 
part of the officer corps under the influence of Horthy and, perhaps most im-
portantly, of members of the Smallholders Party who sympathized with the 1848 
revolutionary tradition. 
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The struggle of the two camps was decided by the determined anti-Hapsburg 
stance both of the neighbouring countries and the Great Powers. The international 
opposition thus rendered restoration impossible. Hungary remained a kingdom, 
though, until 1945, but was not allowed to invite either Charles or Otto, his son, to 
the throne. In the 1930s, when both the Anglo-Saxon powers and France were 
inclined to lend support to Otto in an attempt to set up some framework of re-
gional cooperation, the declared interests of Nazi Germany still prevented a return 
of the Hapsburgs. With no pretender able to realize his claim to the throne, Horthy 
could stay in power as regent for a quarter of a century, and no referendum on his 
primacy or the general question of the form of state was held. 
The antinomy between gentry and Jewry further escalated during the inter-
war years, with anti-semitic tendencies sometimes receding, but never disap-
pearing from government politics. The first official act was the law of numerus 
clausus passed in 1920. It decreed that among university students the "racial 
groups" of Hungary had to be represented according to their share in the popu-
lation. Jewish students who had made up 34 percent of the student body before 
the war were limited to 5 percent by the law. In reality, they continued to make 
up about 8 to 12 percent. This policy was coupled with conscious support for the 
university education of children of public and state officials. This course too was 
codified by a 1927 law. As a result of such concentrated efforts, children of in-
dustrialists, estate owners and intellectuals made up 65 percent of all university 
and college students around the middle of the 1930s. This even surpassed the 
already high prewar figure of 57-58 percent. At the same time the children of 
small tradesmen and businessmen, fifty percent of whom were Jewish, ac-
counted for only 6 percent, as opposed to 12 percent before the war. The very 
low representation of the other categories, including the urban working classes 
and the peasantry, did not change considerably. 
The relative economic and social boom of the second half of the 1920s led to 
a loss of momentum in Hungarian anti-Semitism. The trend was reversed, how-
ever, by the Great Depression, which coincided with radical changes in the in-
ternational environment. Before the depression, Hungarian anti-Semitism was 
held at bay partly by international factors. This changed radically when Nazi 
Germany started to lend overt support to it, using its prestige as Hungary's most 
important diplomatic partner. The coincidence of internal and foreign events 
eventually led to the enactment of a series of heavily discriminatory bills against 
Jewish citizens between 1938 and 1941. These imposed drastic control on their 
representation in the intellectual life of the country, as well as in trade and in-
dustry, and in the end virtually excluded them from the body of the Hungarian 
nation. The 1941 law forbade marriage between Jews and non-Jewish Hungari-
ans and declaimed extramarital relationships as "debasement of the race," mak-
ing them criminal acts. In spite of such discriminatory legislation, the lives of 
Hungarian Jews were not endangered until 1944. This changed, however, after 
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the German occupation of the country in March 1944. During the following 
months, almost halfa million Jews and, after the Arrowcross putsch in October, 
further tens of thousands were deported, facing almost certain death. More than 
two-thirds of Hungarian Jews perished, with hardly more than one hundred 
thousand surviving the Holocaust. The strife between the two great social 
groups of the middle classes in Hungary continued after the second World War, 
although under radically different circumstances, and many observers of con-
temporary Hungary claim that it is in fact still going on today. 
In the handling of the agrarian question, the conservative regime had two 
main priorities: protecting large and middle-sized estates to the greatest possible 
extent, and peacefully containing the agrarian proletariat, which was always 
prone to unrest. To reconcile these two policies, the 1920 land reform law dis-
tributed about one million yokes (one million and five hundred thousand acres) 
of arable land in the form of extremely small plots, with the average size of the 
new parcels around 1.7 yokes (2.5 acres). The share of estates over 100 yokes 
(140 acres) thus decreased only minimally, from 53.5 to 48 percent, with halfa 
million landless or sublanded peasants receiving acreage. Including family 
members, the law touched the lives of approximately two million people. The 
moderate land reform did reduce the number of peasants without property by 
over two hundred thousand, but the small size of the plots also meant that the 
new landowners could still not live off their land, and the one-sidedness of the 
distribution of the land was not corrected. 
The unaltered situation and continuing agony of the agrarian proletariat pro-
vided a fertile soil for the different sects which experienced an upsurge during 
and after the Great Depression, as their message of otherwordly happiness ap-
pealed to those in need and suffering in their lives. Radical egalitarian ism reap-
peared too, although this time in a form closer to national socialism than to 
communism. In the thirties, the members of the "scythe-cross movement," as 
they called themselves, were preparing to move against Budapest and other cit-
ies and do justice by distributing the wealth of the rich. These apparent signs of 
a nearing social cataclism prompted the enactment of two further reform bills 
after 1935, which promised to provide land for the poorest stratum of the peas-
antry. Their scope, however, was even more limited than that of the 1920 law, 
and until 1941 only 230,000 yokes (325,000 acres) were distributed, partly as 
private property and partly as lease. In addition, many of the estates that were 
divided up had been owned by Jews. As a result of such half-hearted actions, the 
agrarian question emerged immediately after the Second World War as a prob-
lem that was no less acute than it had been after the First World War. 
In terms of political rights, the fourth great antinomy, the conservative lead-
ership of the interwar years held fast to its antidemocratic, elitist principles. 
Their policy rested on the thesis that a country's natural leaders were the social 
groups which possessed a "well-developed and strong sense of national identity 
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and sentiment." They claimed that the political alternative, the rule of "the 
masses smelling of beer and onions" would bring about the end of the country.5 
The secret and quasi-universal suffrage of 1919 which gave 40 percent of the 
total population the right to vote, was limited by a government decree of 1922. 
As a result of the restrictions, the share of voters fell to 28 percent, and open 
ballotting was reintroduced everywhere but in large municipalities. The percent-
age of the population possessing the right to vote still conformed to European 
standards, as it was similar to the situation in France and Switzerland, but the 
practice of open ballot was unprecedented in other parliamentary systems. The 
effects of the restrictions soon became visible. The proportion of middle-sized 
and large estate owners rose from 15 to 20 percent after the 1922 elections, and 
peaked at 23 percent in 1927. The share of peasant representatives decreased 
from 15 to 7 percent, and in 1927 to 3 percent, resembling prewar conditions. At 
the same time, aristocrats, who had made up 15 percent of the assembly before 
the war, but only 5 percent in 1920, reclaimed a good part of their influence and 
occupied 10 percent of the seats after 1922. The gentry gained in strength too, as 
their ranks climbed from 25 percent in 1920/21 to no less than 34 percent in 
1927. These numbers are proof of the effectiveness of the suffrage system, 
which served the purpose of ensuring the position of those in power and stabi-
lizing the existing social order. The only significant change affected was the re-
turn to secret ballotting in 1938. But in the given situation this reform was ex-
ploited most by the fascist extreme right, whose radicalism and demagogy could 
not be matched by the democratic parties. 
After 1945 the Horthy-regime was routinely described in Hungarian historiog-
raphy as fascism. Later it was referred to as semi-fascism or fascistoid dictator-
ship. These labels are obviously unfounded. Horthyist Hungary exhibited none of 
the most important characteristics of national socialist totalitarianism. But it is no 
less obvious that it cannot be tenned a parliamentary democracy either, as it ex-
cluded large segments of the population from effective participation in the politi-
cal life of the country. In general, the interwar Hungarian state and government is 
probably best described as a subtype of authoritarian political regimes. 
The fifth great antinomy of prewar Hungary was addressed radically in the 
Treaty of Trianon signed in 1920. The peace agreement fundamentally changed 
the character of the previously multi-ethnic country, turning it into a virtual na-
tion-state. The share of non-Hungarian speakers decreased form 46 to 10 per-
cent. The trend, although much slowed down, continued during the interwar 
years, and by 1930 non-Hungarians made up only 8 percent of the population. 
The greatest ethnic group were the Germans who accounted for 7 and 5 percent 
of the populace respectively, but lived dispersed all over Hungary. The number 
of Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats and Ruthenes became insignificant. In 
general, it can be safely said that the nationality question ceased to be one of the 
principal and acute problems of Hungarian society. It was, however, replaced by 
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a diplomatic dilemma, which assumed equally great dimensions. It centred 
around the fate and future of the three million Hungarians who found them­
selves in a minority and separated from their mother country after 1920. The 
dismemberment of the nation, as it was perceived by the political elite, the soci­
ety, and the minorities themselves, was looked upon as a temporary situation, 
which could and had to be remedied. 
The considerable success of Hungarian revisionism between 1938 and 1941 
led to four consecutive border changes. Not counting Croatia, more than half of 
the territories lost in 1920 were reclaimed in the process. The country grew from 
93,000 square kilometers to 172,000. Its population increased from 9 to 14.6 
million. Approximately half of the five million new citizens were ethnic Hun­
garians, while Romanians made up 20, Ruthenes 10 and South Slavs 8 or 9 per­
cent. The rest were composed of Germans and Slovaks. The reacquisiton of mi­
norities along with the territories raised the nationality question anew. The alter­
native remained the same, and the central question was whether the Hungarian 
majority should pursue a policy of assimilation or taken a more conciliatory 
course by either recognizing the other ethnic groups as state-forming nations or 
at least offering them territorial autonomy. The ruling elite was divided over the 
question, and no substantial steps were made before the end of the Second 
World War. No steps were necessary after the war, as the 1947 peace treaty re­
stored the borders of 1920. With this, the nationality question was once again 
turned into a diplomatic affair. 
Evaluating the series of attempts at conflict management in the first half of 
the twentieth century, we have to conclude that only one of the five great social 
or sociopolitical problems of pre-Trianon Hungary - the antagonism between 
the pro-compromise and the pro-1848 parties - had been solved by the end of 
Second World War. The rest survived - either in its old or in a new form - and 
were still awaiting answer. 
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JONAS SELON BABITS OU LA TRAHISON DES 
CLERCS 
JÁNOS SZÁVAI 
Université de Paris-Sorbonne Paris IV, Paris, 
France 
Je commencerais par l'explication du titre qui peut paraître, à première vue, 
énigmatique. Mon titre fait simplemlent allusion à deux textes de l'écrivain 
Mihály Babits: à un texte poétique, Le livre de Jonas1, en hongrois Jónás 
könyve, poème épique de 1938, poème qui est une paraphrase d'un livre de 
l'Ancien Testament portant le même titre; et deuxièmement à un essai, írás-
tudók árulása (en français La trahison de scribes), datant de 1928, essai qui 
peut être considéré également comme une praphrase: celui du célèbre livre de 
Julien Benda, La trahison des clercs, paru en 1927 et dont Babits a repris le titre 
en traduction hongroise. 
J'ajouterai aussi, en guise d'introduction, que le personnage du prophète 
Jonas est curieusement très présent dans la poésie hongroise contemporain, etje 
pense que ce n'est point dû au hasard, ainsi, par exemple, chez l'excellente poé-
tesse Magda Székely dont l'oeuvre, extrêmement bref et concentré, est une 
tentative désespérée pour trouver une explication, avec l'aide justement de 
l'Ancien Testament, au phénomène de l'Holocauste; ou alors, tout récemment, 
dans l'importante oeuvre de György Rába (grand spécialiste d'ailleurs de Babits 
auquel il avait consacré deux monographies) qui a donné comme titre à un ré-
cent recueil, A vonakodó cethal, c'est-à-dire La baleine récalcitrante, faisant 
parler pour une fois non pas Jonas, prisonnier de la baleine, mais le grand pois-
son lui-même.3 
Le choix de ma part de ses deux textes n'est point innocent. Non pas seu-
lement à cause des accointances françaises de Babits qui - quoiqu'il ne soit 
jamais venu en France, a publié dans son premier recueil un magnifique poème 
intitulé Paris', qui était l'un des artisans du Baudelaire hongrois de 1923; qui 
était un fervent, dans sa jeunesse, de Henri Bergson, puis plus tard, un 
admirateur inconditionnel de Marcel Proust5. J'ai fait ce choix plutôt parce que 
le cheminement de Babits caractérise merveilleusement le dilemme des écri-
vains de l'Europe centrale, écartelés entre deux exigeances, également puissan-
tes: celle de la littérature, cela va de soi, et celle de la prophétie, ce qui ne va 
pas de soi, deux exigeances dont témoignent justement les deux textes en 
question. 
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Le cas de Babits est d'autant plus curieux et saisissant qu'il n'est point de la 
race des hommes publiques, comme il y en a eu plusieurs, à l'instar des Lamar-
tine, des Chateaubriand, des Constant, dans la Hongrie du XIXe siècle où les 
penseurs politiques les plus importants sont deux romanciers, József Eötvös et 
Zsigmond Kemény, et le premier, en plus, est un grand ministre de l'Éducation 
nationale! où le grand poète Ferenc Kölcsey est député de la Diète et y tient en 
plus des discours politiques d'une très grande importance. Non, Babits, timide 
dans sa vie privée, commence une carrière poétique qu'on pourrait presque qua-
lifier de parnassienne. Ainsi, se plaint-il, dans un de ses premiers poèmes, un 
sonnet qui porte le titre de A lírikus epilógja {Epilogue dans la traduction de 
Jean Rousselot): Je suis mon seul héros, de poème en poème, / Sur moi de clôt 
mon chant ainsi qu 'il s'est ouvert. / Je voudrais enfermer le monde dans mes 
vers, / Mais ne parviens pas à sortir de mon thème. Un des vers du même 
poème — Noix aveugle en sa coque recluse /J'attends qu 'on me le casse i est la 
reprise d'un des mots les plus énigmatiques de Hamlet: O, God, I could be 
bounded in a nutshell and count myself King at infinite space. Hamlet est-il fou 
quand il prononce ces mots? Ou exprime-t-il le désir de tout créateur, c'est-à-
dire le désir de posséder dans son petit royaume le Tout, l'Immensité? Cette 
deuxième interprétation qui est aussi celle de Jorge Luis Borges, était certaine-
ment celle de Babits qui se considère comme incapable d'atteindre le grand but: 
poète, il ne réussit que parler de soi-même, au lieu de pouvoir parler, tout en 
parlant de soi-même, de l'espace infinie. 
Ecrivain raffiné et sophistiqué, Babits est pourtant touché dès 1912, lors 
d'une grande manifestation durement réprimée par la police, puis vers 1916, au 
beau milieu de la Grande Guerre, par l'actualité du moment.9 Des poèmes, par-
fois par trop déclamatoires, et didactiques en portent témoignage. Et quoiqu'il 
reste un féru de la Forme, dans tous les sens de ce terme, il cédera de nouveau à 
la tentation à partir de 1920; il chante alors dans plusieurs poésie son désespoir 
de Hongrois après le traité de Trianon qu'il considère, lui, l'occidentaliste, 
l'amoureux des formes classiques et des vertus classiques dont surtout de la 
mesure, comme une calamité, comme un acte honteux de la part de ceux qui 
l'ont conçu.10 
Mais ces rencontres avec l'actualité ne forment qu'une petite clairière dans 
l'immense paysage que réussit à créer Babits, un domaine en contradiction 
totale avec la philosophie qui se dégage de ses écrits. Cette philosophie va être 
explicitée de la façon la plus articulée dans son très beau livre, Histoire de la 
littérature européenne11. Babits y esquisse une Europe idéale dont la littérature, 
justement, est un des plus beaux fleurons, une Europe fondé sur les idées de 
l'exigeance, de la justice, de la personne, de la révolte, une Europe dont les 
traits unificateurs dominent les particularités. Les grands de cette histoire de la 
littérature européenne, les vrais grands de l'Europe devraient être donc ces 
kings of infinite space dont parle 1'Hamlet de Shakespeare. 
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Mais quand Babits écrit ces textes dont je parle, en 1928, en 1939, le 
paysage européen qui l'entoure est un paysage tourmenté, le poète se sent très 
loin de l'idéal, de l'Europe qui est la sienne. L'écrivain qu'il est se sent 
responsable et cherche à se positionner, à trouver le juste mot car il croit 
toujours fermement à la devise qui est à la source de notre civilisation: Au 
commencement était le Verbe. 
Le dilemme est cruelle car Babits est un poète dans le sens classique. "Or la 
poésie - comme le dit Paul Ricœur ne veut rien prouver de tout; son projet est 
mimétique - sa visée est de composer une représentation essentielle des actions 
humaines; son mode propre est de dire la vérité par le moyen de la fiction, de la 
fable, du mythos tragique. La triade poiesis-mimesis-catharsis dépeint de ma-
nière exclusive le monde de la poésie, sans confusion possible avec la triade 
rhétorique-preuve-persuasion.,"12 
Evidemment le poète peut changer parfois de registre, et remplacer le 
discours du mythos par celui de la rhétorique, d'autres, pour ne citer qu'un con-
temporain qui est de la même mouture que Babits, T. S. Eliot, ou alors le polo-
nais Czeslaw Milosz, l'ont fait également. Pour Babits le détonateur est donc 
Julien Benda dont la Trahison des clercs est un immense pavé dans la vie 
intellectuelle à la fin des années 1920. Le livre de Benda, ce pamphlet de haut 
vol, pose avec acuité la problématique toujours d'actualité, des rapports entre 
pensée et action. Le verdict de Julien Benda, concernant ses contemporains, est 
sévère: il considère que le savant, le poète, le philosophe trahissent leur 
fonction s'ils prétendent jouer un rôle dans la vie de la cité. Ils la trahissent car 
au lieu de proclamer que leur royaume n'est pa de ce monde, ils laissent entrer 
ainsi dans leur monde des passions destructrices: la race, la classe, la nation. Ils 
détruisent ainsi l'image de l'ordre des clercs, et laissent champ libre aux réalis-
tes, aux pragmatiques qui libèrent, à leur tour, les forces destrucrices. 
Dans l'optique de Babits le grand mérite de Benda est d'avoir ramené la 
discussion qui s'éternisait sur le terrain de la pratique, de l'économique, de la 
philosophie, de l'histoire, d'avoir ramener donc la discussion sur le terrain de la 
morale. "On a toujours connu le Verbe qui allume des actions. Oui, mais celui 
qui allume la Lumière!"13 Et Babits retourne, comme il l'a déjà fait en 1918 
qund il a traduit en hongrois le petit opuscule de Kant sur La Paix éternelle, 
vers la morale kantienne.14 La Morale et la Justice, dit-il, doivent être au-dessus 
de tout. "Nous ne devons pas aimer notre communauté davantage que la Morale 
et la Justice."15 Et il reprend la célèbre image kantienne de la préface de La 
critique de la Raison pratique, la métaphore de l'astre, en la croisant avec une 
autre image, non moins célèbre, celle de Dante tout au début de la Commedia. 
Babits parle d'abord de l'homme ordinaire. "Il est comme un pauvre marcheur 
au milieu de la foret vierge: il tombe, se relève, essaie passer d'abord à gauche, 
puis à droite, comme il peut, essaie de survivre; mais jamais d'après l'astre 
inaccessible, et tant mieux pour lui car il se casserait la figure." 
62 JÁNOS SZÁVAI 
"Mais le clerc - continue-t-il - a par définition le devoir de suivre l'Astre. Il 
sait que l'astre est inaccessible. Pourtant sur les chemins terrestres il n'y a que 
l'astre qui puisse montrer la direction à suivre. Celui qui le suit directement, se 
casse la figure et meurt. Celui qui ne le regarde jamais, se perd et se noie 
définitivement dans la masse sans but." Et en conclusion: "Le pied non, mais le 
doigt oui. " 
Tout en fustigeant, à l'image de Julien Benda, les scribes de son époque qui 
sont obnubilés par l'utile, et par conséquent ont renoncé à l'essentiel, Babits 
évoque le rôle des prêtres et des prophètes qui avaient, autrefois pour devoir de 
veiller à ce que la Justice et la Morale soient toujours visibles pour la multitude, 
de rappeler la Vérité lorsqu'elle était cachée par le quotidien. Comme s'il avait 
la nostalgie du Moyen-âge deu XIe siècle, de ce geste de Canossa où en 1077 
l'empereur Henri IV s'est senti obligé de se prosterner devant le pape Grégoire 
VII, où donc le pouvoir spirituel s'est montré, au moins provisoirement, plus 
fort que le pouvoir des armes. 
Mais comment concilier ce devoir dont il parle - là c'est moi qui pose la 
question - le devoir lié autrefois à la révélation divine, avec les temps modernes 
qui sont dominé par l'adoration des faits, par un discours plat et ultralogique? 
Dans l'essai en question nous percevons bien les hésitations de Babits. D'un 
côté il est fortement attiré par le discours kantien, terriblement rationnel et 
prêchant en même temps l'exigeance morale. Dès 1918, au moment de la publi-
cation de sa traduction de l'opuscule de Kant, Babits déclare qu'il a fait ce 
travail "difficile et ingrat" car il est complètement d'accord avec l'affirmation 
du philosophe allemand selon laquelle, "la notion de la morale est incontour-
nable en politique ". 
D'un autre côté il a tendance à accepter l'idée qu'il y a de la place pour des 
prophète^ modernes et que ces prophètes sont justement les scribes, les 
écrivains. Le prophète (du grec prophètes, et du latin ecclésiastique propheta) 
est bien celui qui parle au nom de Dieu, "prétend révéler des vérités au nom 
d'un dieu dont il se dit inspiré".18 Historiquement le temps des prophètes est 
bien défini. Northrop Frye dans son livre The Great Code affirme que la pro-
fétie est un des septs grans thèmes de la Bible, après la Genèse, la Révolution, 
la Loi, la Sagesse, et avant l'élan révolutionnaire, et il souligne, ce qui est bien 
connu par tous, que le message prophétique est toujours impopulaire, que les 
prophètes représentent un pouvoir que la plupart des société ont beaucoup de 
difficultés à accepter}9 
Au Moyen-âge il n'y en a pas. Mais les temps modernes inventent le 
prophète laïque, le prophète de l'époque démotique. Pour Frye c'est John Mil-
ton lui-même qui invente ce rôle en 1644 dans son célèbre Areopagitica (oratio) 
adressée au Parlement pour "la liberté d'imprimer sans autorisation ni censure." 
Ce texte est la défense passionné de la liberté d'impression et de la liberté 
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d'expression, d'une fundamental liberty qui est due, affïrme-t-il, au scribe qui 
est désormais le détenteur de la Vérité.20 
Oui, mais si l'on ne croit pas à la révélation divine, comment accéder à cette 
Vérité? Et si l'on y accède quand même, de quelle façon, à l'aide de quel 
discours l'exprimer? Ce sont les questions qui vont se poser à Babits. A peu 
près au même moment, en décembre 1930, Ludwig Wittgenstein - qui avait déjà 
posé dans son Tractatus que "il ne peut y avoir de propositions éthiques car 
dans le monde toutes choses sont comme elle sont et se produisent comme elles 
se produisent; il n'y a pas en lui de valeur et s'il y en avait une, elle n'aurait pas 
de valeur (en soi)"21 - déclare à Cambridge à ses élèves que "l'essence du Bien 
n'a rien à voir avec les faits, et que par conséquent aucune proposition ne peut 
l'expliquer." Et à l'agnostique et pessimiste philosophe critique du langage à 
ajouter: "Bien est ce que Dieu ordonne."22 
Mais revenons à La trahison des scribes de Babits. Avec du recul, et non 
seulement vu d'aujourd'hui, mais aussi vu par Babits lui-même, à quelques 
années de distance, cet essai ne peut paraître qu'essentiellement incantatoire. 
Déjà le mode de discours de cet essai est le mode que Paul Ricœur appelle le 
discours prescriptif22\ mode qui peut paraître totalement déplacé en notre 
siècle, époque complètement dominé par le discours utile, le discours descriptif 
ou démotique. D'un autre côté est-ce à Babits, écrivain, certes, respecté dans le 
cercle des littérateurs, mais frileusement cantonné dans son domaine privé, à 
jouer le rôle du prophète moderne? 
Il y répond donc bien des années plus tard, en 1938, avec un court poème 
épique en quatre parties, Livre de Jonas, Babits y reprend la structure du récit 
biblique du prophète Jonas, rédigé également en quatre parties, en suivant 
fidèlement la structure de la narration. 
Pourquoi avoir choisi justement le récit de Jonas? Probablement parce que 
cette histoire qui a, évidemment, plusieurs lectures possible, a certainement un 
côté franchement comique. Jonas, messager de la Vérité, se montre lâche au 
début de l'histoire, vindicatif et colérique à la fin, en contradiction totale avec le 
rôle qu'il doit assumer auprès des habitants de Ninivé. On voit donc déjà là 
cette disharmonie qui est, selon Henri Bergson à l'origine du rire.24 Autre dis-
harmonie entre l'importance et la solennité de la mission de Jonas, et les situa-
tions humiliantes où il se retrouve, d'abord dans le ventre du poisson, puis sous 
les feuilles complètement desséchées du ricin, exposé au cruel soleil. 
Babits, dans son poème reprend et grossit même ces traits, en y ajoutant 
d'autres. Il évoque l'intérieur, visqueux, puant, dégoûtant de l'estomac de la 
baleine; en plus, contrairement au récit biblique, le Jonas du poème de Babits 
n'est point bien reçu et entendu par les habitants de Ninivé qui se moquent de 
lui, l'humilient et n'ont aucune intention de changer leurs habitudes. Point de 
repentance, point de metanoia dans le poème de 1938 dont le Jonas a quelques 
raison d'être furieux car la parole de Dieu ou ce qu'il croyait être la parole de 
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Dieu, la prophétie qu'il proclamait de jour en jour: Encore quarante jours et 
Ninive est détruite, ne s'accomplit point. 
Ainsi la puisante symbolique de l'histoire originale disparaît complètement. 
En effet la baleine, chez Babits prison visqueuse et puante de Jonas, est dans 
plusieurs grandes traditions, ainsi premièrement dans la tradition chrétienne et 
dans la tradition islamique, le lieu ou va s'accomplir la deuxième naissance, la 
résurrection. Jonas vomi par la baleine préfigure, il en est fait expressément 
mention chez Mathieu, la descente et la résurrection du Christ; tandis que pour 
l'islam la baleine est également un symbole de première importance: la lettre 
nun signifie gros poisson, en plus, par sa forme, évoque l'Arche de Noé, arche 
équivalant ici baleine, donc le lieu mouvant dans lequel l'espèce humaine se 
conserve, prête à une nouvelle naissance, à une nouvelle vie. Etape intermé-
diaire, cerceuil, si l'on veut, mais cercueil qui a une ouverture et qui rendra 
possible la transformation de l'ancien en nouveau. 
Babits choisit donc un mode de discours ironique qui annihile l'effet, ou les 
effets, de l'histoire originale. Ce mode utilisé par le poète est d'ailleurs assez 
curieux car si d'un côté les vers rimes donnent un certain sérieux au texte, les 
traits humouristiques répétés contrebalancent constamment ce sérieux. On 
pourrait penser à Baudelaire pour qui "le rire est lié à l'accident d'une chute 
ancienne, une dégradation physique et morale". 
Fidèle au règles du genre du poème épique, Babits va donner la conclusion 
dans le texte même. Mais fidèle aussi à l'approche ironique, il en donnera deux 
qui sont, à première vue, plutôt contradictoires. Dans un vers célèbre, très sou-
vent cité, Jonas déclare: "Celui qui parmi les criminels, reste muet, devient leur 
complice." Mais dans un deuxième temps, Dieu, en faisant leçon à Jonas, le ré-
calcitrant, dit ceci: "Le verbe est à toi, l'arme est à moi. / Toi, Jonas, prêche, 
moi, j'agis. "21 
Jonas, dans le poème, ne réplique point. On dirait que le prophète accepte le 
verdict, il n'y a plus de corrélation entre sa parole et l'acte, le Verbe, au moins 
celui du prophète n'a plus de prise sur l'acte. Néanmoins son affirmation précé-
dente reste valable: il ne doit pas rester muet. 
Dans un court poème qui est une espèce d'épilogue à Livre de Jonas et qui 
porte le titre de Jónás imája (La Prière de Jonas), Babits confirme, je pense, 
cette interprétation. "Les mots me seraient-ils devenus infidèles " — commence-
t-il, pour ajouter un peu plus tard: "O, Maître, je voudrais que tu creuse le lit / 
de ma rivière, afin que je fusse conduit / Par des sentiers certains vers la mer. 
Si les rimes / Sans faille étaient issus de ton coeur magnanime... 
Le poète, l'écrivain des temps moderne est-il, peut-il être prophète? Il est 
tenté de le devenir, on voudrait qu'il le devienne. J'ai indiqué trois étapes dans 
la carrière du poète: dans Epilogue, il confesse son désir et en même temps son 
incapacité de résumer, de concentrer tout l'univers dans le Livre, son Livre. Une 
vingtaine d'années plus tard, il s'insurge contre les scribes qui se font chantres 
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des intérêts particuliers et désigne le devoir du prophète moderne: indiquer non 
pas le chemin, mais l'astre, c'est-à-dire des systèmes de valeur à suivre. Encore 
dix ans, et Babits nous montre l'inefficacité des efforts du prophète moderne 
qui doit, pourtant, continuer à parler. 
Nous voilà donc de retour à la pensée de Paul Ricœur qui fait, d'après 
Aristote, une distinction nette entre littérature et rhétorique. Si l'écrivain, le 
prophète moderne selon Milton, n'arrive pas à la persuasion, ce n'est pas de sa 
faute, simplement, ce n'est pas sa mission. Il en a une autre. 
Quant au problème moral, dire et comment dire la Justice ou la Vérité, je 
pense que Babits arrive à la même conclusion que Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein 
dit, lors d'une entretien, en parlant de Platon que le grand philosophe grec 
pensait qu'il fallait éviter le relatif à tour prix, étant donné qu'il détruirait ce 
qu'il y a d'impératif dans la moralité. Pour éviter le relatif, il y a plusieurs 
façon, ainsi Wittgenstein commente le mot de Goering qui disait: "Recht ist 
das, was uns gefällt"29, mot qui a l'avantage de la clarté, tout comme le mot de 
Lénine pour qui "moral est ce qui est utile à la lutte des classes ". 
On est donc à l'utile, mot qui faisait justement horreur à Babits. Mais pour 
dépasser l'alternative utile-relatif, il lui faut choisir entre les deux fondements 
possibles d'une morale de la Justice. Une première fois il opte pour l'impératif 
catégorique d'Immanuel Kant. La deuxième fois il est plus incertain, il fait 
intervenir le rire, puis implore l'aide du Maître. "Le Bien est ce que Dieu ordon-
ne" dit Ludwig Wittgenstein. Mais il ne croit guère qu'il y a quelqu'un pour 
l'ordonner, le Bien pour lui disparaît donc derrière les faits. 
Le poète, par contre, ne veut pas se dispenser du Bien. Il ne lui reste donc 
d'autre soulution que d'essayer de croire en ce qui ferait son fondement. Y 
arrive-t-il? Le Livre de Jonas et La prière de Jonas, justement parce que ce 
n'est pas de rhétorique, mais de la poésie, laissent la question ouverte. 
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DENIS DE R O U G E M O N T ET LA HONGRIE 
ÉVA MARTONYI 
Université Catholique Pázmány Péter de Piliscsaba, 
Hongrie 
I. Introduction 
En guise d'introduction, je propose quelques réflexions sur la littérature 
européenne en générale, puis je parlerai de la relation amicale de deux intellec-
tuels "européens", en m'appuyant sur des textes publiés en partie pendant des 
années 1930, en partie au cours des années 1970. Les premiers ont été rédigés 
"sur le vif, par deux jeunes gens, au début de leur carrière d'écrivain et d'es-
sayiste. Le dernier texte, paru dans un volume regroupant les études et les té-
moignages, date de plus de cinquante années plus tard, raconte des souvenirs, 
évoque l'histoire de leur relation amicale. Cette histoire - de nature personnelle 
d'abord - rejoint celle de l'Europe, en illustre les destins sinon typiques du 
moins possibles, des citoyens de la "république des lettres". Les deux parcours 
sont différents mais en même temps, ils ont quelques points communs, ce qui 
me permettra de tirer quelques conclusions non seulement sur la nature de cette 
relation, mais aussi sur le sujet du coloque: La Hongrie, l'Europe Centrale et 
l'Europe. 
Pour mon premier point, j 'ai pris comme point de départ un volume paru en 
1992, intitulé "Histoire de la littérature européenne",1 réalisé à l'aide d'un assez 
grand nombre de collaborateurs. Paru à la maison d'édition Hachette Éducation, 
il est donc destiné principalement aux étudiants, aux futures enseignants et par 
conséquence à ceux qui vivront dans quelques dizaines d'années dans un con-
texte européen dont nous sommes, maintenant, en train de construire les fonde-
ments plus ou moins solides, théoriques et réels. 
Or, pour les collaborateurs de ce volume, la notion même de la littérature 
européenne semble aller de soi, concept dont les racines remontent à une époque 
lointaine. Mais dans la préface, les auteurs soulèvent quand-même quelques 
problèmes qui montrent bien la complexité de la question: 
"Qu'en est-il aujourd'hui de l'identité européenne? Fragmentée par les 
nationalismes du XIXe siècle issus de la Révolution française, elle est toujours 
de plus en plus mondialisée depuis le début du XXe siècle. La cohérence 
culturelle de l'Europe se donne pourtant à entendre, à toucher, à voir dans les 
domaines de la musique, des arts plastiques, de la peinture (...) Le catalogue de 
tous les musées des Beaux-Arts est international. Mais - et c'est la question qui 
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nous préoccupe aujourd'hui davantage - est celle des "lettres européennes". 
"Comment sont ces catalogues de la littérature que sont les histoires littéraires? 
Nationaux, surtout nationaux, hélas!" - constatent les rédacteurs de ce volume," 
en souhaitant donc de traiter les histoires littéraires des différents pays non pas 
juxtaposées mais ensemble. Leur ambition est faire apparaître les convergences 
existant entre les littératures au fil de quatorze chapitres qui font la synthèse de 
la production littéraire d'une époque dans toute l'Europe. 
Or, l'Europe sera définie, au départ, par ce qui n'y appartient pas. Avant 
d'aborder la genèse des lettres européennes, quelques chapitres traitent les "héri-
tages", notamment l'héritage extra-européen, l'héritage gréco-latin, l'héritage 
judéo-chrétien et l'héritage byzantin. La question n'étant pas alors très simple, la 
définition de la littérature européenne commence par Fénumération des élé-
ments qui n'en font pas forcément partie, ou qui n'y appartiennent pas d'une 
façon précise. Mais ce sont peut-être justement ces éléments d'un héritage com-
mun qui permettent de saisir l'essentiel et qui pourront être illustrés par des 
exemples singuliers. 
Car, au-delà des réflexions abstraites, la littérature existe, et au-delà des 
théories parfois très bien construites, il y a des personnes réelles, des hommes de 
lettres qui mènent leur vie et leurs activités dans un contexte parfois plus ou 
moins différent, parfois plus ou moins similaires. Souvent, ce sont des recontres 
mémorables, "des moments privilégiés" qui leur permettent de passer du niveau 
individuel au niveau collectif, de dépasser le singulier pour arriver à l'universel, 
ce qui sera - dans ce cas-là — l'universel européen, par rapport au singulier 
national. 
IL Deux intellectuels européens 
/. Le Paysan du Danube 
Pour illustrer par un exemple ces "recontres mémorables" et ces "moments 
privilégiées", j 'ai choisi celte d'un Hongrois, Albert Gyergyai et d'un écrivain 
français, plus précisément d'un écivain originaire de la Suisse romande, Denis 
de Rougemont. Le premier, Albert Gyergyai, né en 1893 et mort en 1981, était 
un excellent traducteur d'un nombre remarquable d'écrivains français de toutes 
les époques, auteur de nombreuses études et de livres savants, professeur de la 
littérature française, titulaire de la Chaire de français de l'Université de Buda-
pest pendant plus de vingt ans. Denis de Rougemont, né en 1906 et mort en 
1985, est devenu célèbre surtout grâce à son livre intitulé L'Amour et l'Occi-
dent, mais aussi grâce à ces nombreux écrits consacrés à la cause européenne. 11 
était sans doute un des meilleurs propagateurs de l'idée de l'Europe fédéraliste, 
surtout à partir des années 1950. 
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Les souvenirs de leurs rencontres sont évoqués dans quelques textes qui se-
ront présentés brièvement par ce qui suit. Pour commoncer, voici donc quelques 
passages parus dans le journal de voyage de Denis de Rougemont, "Le Paysan 
du Danube".3 Ce livre, dont le titre rappelle une fable de La Fontaine, n'a rien de 
grotesque ou d'une morale facile. L'ouvrage, d'une soixantaine de pages, a été 
rédigé en 1929, puis repris en 1931. Il comprend une introduction, sous le titre 
"Le sentiment de l'Europe centrale", une première partie, intitulée "L Paysan du 
Danube" - avec les chapitres suivants: Une tasse de thé au palais C, Voyage en 
Hongrie et Le balcon sur l'eau, puis une deuxième partie sous le titre "La lenteur 
des choses", comprenant également trois chapitres: Château en Prusse, La Tour 
de Hölderlin et Petit journal de Souabe. 
Le récit de son voyage effectué en Hongrie ne comprend donc pas plus d'une 
trentaine de pages. Il est dédié à Albert Gyergyai qui lui a servi de guide et qui 
était certainement parmi les premiers à évoquer sa curiosité pour entreprendre 
cette visite à partir de Vienne, où il était étudiant à cette époque-là. Toutes ses 
impressions sont donc condensées en un texte relativement court, mais qui est 
beaucoup plus qu'un simple journal de bord. 
Les premières pages sont l'évocation de son arrivée à Budapest, par le 
bateau et sa première nuit à "un Collège célèbre". Puis, il parle de ses visites -
aujourd'hui on dirait "touristiques" - au tombeau de Gui-Baba, d'un défilé des 
membres de la Chambre des Magnats, lors de l'élection d'un des quatre gardiens 
de la couronne de Saint-Étienne, de sa visite à plusieurs villes, Esztergom et 
Debrecen, des „eaux fades du Balaton", de la chanson et de la danse hongroises, 
etc. Le genre adopté par le jeune Rougemont est un genre mixte, récit de voyage 
et journal intime, fragmentaire, mais donnant quand-même l'impression d'un 
volume composé. 
Dans cet ensemble d'évocation de souvenirs divers, le récit de sa visite chez 
Mihály Babits, poète eminent de l'époque de l'entre-deux-guerres, prend une 
place considérable. La description de cette visite sera précédée par quelques 
réflexions concernant la littérature hongroise - sa source d'information étant de 
toute certitude Albert Gyergyai. Voici donc, ce que le jeune Denis de Rouge-
mont dit à propos de la littérature hongroise de l'époque: "...l'expression la plus 
libre et la plus vivante du génie littéraire de cette race me paraît bien avoir été 
donnée par le groupe important du Nyugat (l'Occident), revue fondée par ces 
deux grands poètes: André Ady et Michel Babits. Ady, le sombre et pathétique 
est mort à trente cinq ans, mais sa ferveur anime encore des écrivains profondé-
ment magyars de sensibilité, bien que souvent européens de goûts et de curio-
sités, et dont Michel Babits est aujourd'hui le chef de file."4 
"Des amis m'emmènent le voir à Esztergom, où il passe ses étés. Esztergom 
est la plus vieille capitale de la Hongrie. Attila, me dit-on, y régna. Au-dessus du 
palais de l'archevêché, sur une colline que le Danube contourne, la Basilique 
élève une coupole d'ocre éclatant, immense et froide, dominant cette plaine 
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onduleuse dont les vagues se perdent dans une poussière violacée à l'horizon -
chez les Tchèques déjà."5 
"Nous allons aux bains, car c'est dans la piscine que nous devons rencontrer 
le poète. Cheveux noirs d'aigle collés sur un large front, belle carrure ruisse-
lante, il nous sourit, dans l'eau jusqu'à mi-corps, mythologique. Nous sortons 
ensemble de la petite ville aux rues de terre brûlante, aux maisons jaunes basses, 
ville sans ombre, sans arbres, et nous montons vers la maison du poète, sur un 
coteau de vignes."6 
Ce qui nous frappe dans cette description, c'est - outre le ton poétique que 
l'auteur abadonnera plus tard au profit d'une clarté et d'une précision de 
l'argumentation - la façon exacte dont il parle de notre littérature, de nos poètes. 
C'est la grande curiosité intellectuelle du jeune Rougemont qui se manifeste ici, 
une curiosité sincère et pleine de bonne volonté, l'expression d'une sympathie 
qui semble s'installer d'emblée dans son âme, au moment où il entreprend le 
voyage en Hongrie. 
Denis de Rougemont ce fils de pasteur, né près de Neuchâtel n'a que 23 ans 
quand il écrit ces lignes. Il fait ses études d'abord à Neuchâtel,7 puis à l'univer-
sité de Vienne, avant d'être reçu à la licence es lettres. Il a une formation très va-
riée, français, allemand, latin, histoire, psychologie et philosophie, ce qui lui 
permettera de devenir un des essayistes le plus célèbre et le plus grand propa-
gateur de l'idée européenne. Mais avant d'y arriver il devra encore parcourir un 
long chemin. D'abord directeur de la revue au titre significatif "Je sers", puis 
"intellectuel en chômage", vivant avec sa femme à Pile de Ré, il finira par 
s'installer à Paris, où il sera condamné à quinze jours de prison pour avoir dé-
nigré Hitler dans un de ses articles. Parmi les jalons de sa vie, il faut encore 
mentionner son départ pour les États-Unis, d'où il ne reviendra qu'en 1947, son 
installation à Ferney-Voltaire, où il restera jusqu'à la fin de sa vie. C'est à ce 
moment-là qu'il commence à militer pour une Europe fédéraliste, non seulement 
sur le plan économique, mais aussi et surtout, sur le plan culturel. 
Cet intellectuel "engagé" qui ne pense qu'à servir une cause, celle de l'Euro-
pe fédéraliste, parcourt donc une partie de ses contrées pour s'informer, pour 
recontrer des gens célèbres, mais aussi des gens tout à fait ordinaires, pour voir 
de ses propres yeux le paysages et les habitats, mais aussi pour "vivre des 
moments privilégiés", pour effectuer une véritable quête spirituelle, philosophi-
que et métaphysique, à la recherche de l'Objet - comme il dira dans la conclu-
sion du livre. 
Mais retenons d'abord surtout sa première impression, lors de sa recontre 
avec Babits. Notre poète et homme littéraire, lui donne l'impression d'un dieu 
paien, dans l'eau jusqu'à mi-corps, ruisselant, beau et souriant. Or, Babits venait 
de franchir une étape difficile de sa vie, et commence juste à avoir un peu de 
tranquillité après être sinon persécuté, du moins mis à l'écart du à sa partici-
pation indirecte de la direction culturelle de l'éphémère république des conseils. 
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Il commence à avoir la possibilité de déployer son immense talent et d'avoir 
autour de lui un cercle important d'amis, surtout de jeunes poètes et écrivains, 
hommes de lettres étrangers et hongrois. Parmi ces derniers il faut compter 
Albert Gyergyai, qui évoquera aussi, de son côté, les souvenirs de Babits, entre 
autres dans son article intitulé "À l'ombre de la revue Nyugat".8 
Mais voici la suite des souvenirs de voyage de Rougemont. Il donne une 
description vivante et pittoresque de la maison du poète hongrois: "Trois 
chambres boisées entourées d'une large galerie d'où l'on voit le Danube gris-
jaune, brillant, sans rides, la petite ville juste au-dessous de soi, et la Basilique 
sur son rocher. Fraîches, sentant bon, avec des livres sur des divans aux riches 
couleurs, des boissons préparées, l'ombre dormante, - trois petites chambres et 
un pan de toit par-dessus, cela fait une baraque à peine visible dans les vignes, à 
peine détachée du flanc de la colline pour que les vents ne l'emportent pas, un 
beau nid de poète: car demeurer ici, c'est demeurer vraiment en "pleine nature", 
un peu au-dessus de la plaine, pas tout à fait dans le ciel, là où doivent vivre 
ceux qui "chantent".9 
Dans cet environnement idyllique l'après-midi se passe agréablement. "Nous 
buvons des vins dorés et doux que nous verse Ilonka Babits (elle est aussi poète 
et très belle), nous inscrivons nos noms au charbon sur le mur chaulé, Gachot 
prend des photos, Gyergyai fouille la plaine à la longue-vue et rêve qu'il y est, je 
grimpe au cerisier sauvage, derrière la maison, un peintre tout en blanc arrive 
par les vignes, ah! qu'il fait beau temps, l'horizont est aussi lointain qu'on ima-
gine, tout a de belles couleurs, le poète sourit en lui-même, il y a une enfance 
dans l'air."10 
Les sujets de conversation ne sont pas mentionnés. Pourtant, Denis de Rou-
gemont est très sensible, malgré son jeune âge, aux grands problèmes de son 
époque. Il sait très bien qu'il se trouve dans un pays "multilé", ayant subi un 
énorme choc après le traité de Trianon. Il sait aussi combien les relations avec 
les habitants des pays successeurs sont devenues difficiles et délicates. La 
deuxième partie de son récit de voyage est non moins chargé d'ailleurs de réfle-
xions sur les problèmes pressentis plus que constatés à propos de la Prusse 
orientale. 
Après le chapitre consacré à sa visite chez Babits, il suivent encore quelques 
souvenirs non moins enthousisastes de son voyage en Hongrie. En dehors des 
sujets déjà mentionnés, il évoque les soirées d'ivresse - ce qui aboutit à la 
composition de toute une théorie sur l'ivresse - à 1'enumeration de celles qui ne 
sont pas forcément provoquées par le vin: "Toute l'échelle des ivresses -
comme il précisera - ivresses de la faim, de l'alcool, de la foule, de la solitude, 
de l'extase".11 Parfois il s'attardera sur la beauté des femmes, sur l'étrangeté de 
quelques paysages et de quelques villes, etc. 
Parfois, il fait allusion aux artistes contemporains, à Richard Strauss, à Hugo 
von Hoffmannsthal, le train lui rappelle la musique de Stravinsky, etc. Parfois il 
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évoque ses écrivains-prédécesseurs, voyageurs érudits, tel Goethe, voyageurs en 
Orient, tel Nerval, ou voyageurs cosmopolites, par exemple sous le fameux nom 
de Barnabooth, etc. 
Mais le voyage, c'est surtout et avant tout "un état d'âme (...) On ne voyage 
jamais que dans son propre sens. Mais il faut voyager pour découvrir ce sens!" 
Ce texte est à lire donc à deux niveaux: à un niveau superficiel, concret, c'est 
l'évocation de quelques sites et rencontres mémorables, mais à un niveau plus 
profond, métaphysique, c'est l'expression de sa quête, personnelle et spirituelle, 
dont le passage qui clot la partie sur la Hongrie donne la quintessence. 
"Ainsi je quitte la Hongrie. Serait-ce là tout ce quelle m'a donné? Cette no-
tion plus vive de l'univers, où la présence de l'Objet deviendrait plus probable? 
Ou bien n'ai-je su voir autre chose que la Hongrie de mes rêves, ma Hongrie 
intérieure? Il est vrai que l'on connaît depuis toujours ce qu'une fois on l'aime-
ra. Et les uns disent qu'il faut connaître pour aimer; les autres: aimer pour con-
naître. Débat qui se résout dans une synthèse, comme toujours: au point de per-
fection aimer et connaître sont un seul et même acte." 
2. A l'ombre de l'Occident: le pendant et la suite de l'histoire d'une amitié 
littéraire 
Albert Gyergyai, dont le nom se trouve évoqué à plusieurs reprises dans le 
récit de voyage de Denis de Rougemont rédige, en 1933, un compte rendu sur le 
Paysan du Danube. Ce texte sera repris plus tard, dans son volume d'essais paru 
en 1979, sous le titre "Plaidoyer pour les essais".14 Il est évident que Gyergyai 
connaît bien le jeune Suisse, par conséquence, il est un peu étonnant qui'il l'ap-
pelle "jeune écrivain français". Rougemont est présenté d'ailleurs comme colla-
borateur de la revue Nyugat, où il venait de publier un article sur Ramuz. Gyer-
gyai le présente comme un poète, en train de devenir peut-être un grand roman-
cier. Mais nous savons aujourd'hui que par la suite Denis de Rougemont 
choisira une autre forme d'expression, celle de l'essai et du pamphlet. Néan-
moins, Gyergyai est déjà frappé par le ton de ses écrits, dans lesquels il "détruit 
les superstitions tenaces de l'âme contemporaine". L'auteur hongrois décrit avec 
une sensibilité et une précision extraordinaires ce récit de voyage, en insistant 
sur le mélange des genres qui y est pratiqué par l'auteur: poésie, théorie, 
souvenir personnel, évocation de paysage et sociologie, rêve et réalité, etc. Mais 
il constate avant tout la nouveauté des idées formulées, les efforts de ce jeune 
écrivain européen pour pouvoir "briser les vieux carcans, pour se libérer des 
contraintes sentimentales et spirituelles („kitörni az érzelmi és szellemi 
vámfalak közül"). Gyergyai comprend parfaitement que les souvenirs de 
voyages ne servent que de prétextes pour parler d'autres choses, de tout ce qui le 
préoccupent pour le moment et qui sont les manifestations d'un grand talent et 
des signes précurseurs d'une grande carrière d'écrivain. 
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Or, il ne s'agit pas du tout d'un éloge touchant aux registres personnels ou 
d'un hommage quasi obligatoire rendu par un ami intime. Gyergyai se présente 
comme un critique sérieux et la lecture de son texte superposé aujourd'hui à 
celui de Rougemont - dont j 'ai évoqué quelques passages pour en illustrer le 
style et la facture - peut nous convaincre de l'importance de cette relation, de la 
nature mémorable d'un recontre et de l'existence d'un "moment privilégié", 
sous le signe du bonheur, et en dépassant le niveau individuel, pour accéder à un 
niveau plus général, celui de la jeune génération européenne de l'époque d'entre 
deux guerres. 
il n'y a pas lieu ici de tracer des biographies parallèles de ces deux intellec-
tuels à travers les années qui suivent ces premiers moments de "bonheur". Cha-
cun des deux connaîtra aussi des moments difficiles. Le titre de l'essai de Gyer-
gyai, "À l'ombre de l'Occident" servira de métaphore de la traversée du désert 
qui était le sort de maints intellectuelles avant les mêmes origines et les mêmes 
prétentions que Gyergyai. Il réussira quand-même de rester en contact avec les 
milieux littéraires et de "survivre" en tant que porte-parole et médiateur, profes-
seur et traducteur. 
Quarante ans plus tard, une rencontre spirituelle marque encore cette amitié, 
à travers l'évocation des souvenirs, avec la participation de Gyergyai au volume 
édité pour le soixante-dixième anniversaire de Denis de Rougemont, à Neuchâ-
tel en 1976.15 Parmi les collaborateurs du volume nous trouvons beaucoup de 
noms illustres: Lawrence Durrell, Eugène Ionesco, Michel Tournier, etc. qui ont 
composé des essais, des témoignages, des messages. Les noms de Yves Bonne-
foy, de Pierre Emmanuel et de Jean Starobinski figurent parmi ceux qui ont 
offert des essais littéraires et historiques. Plusieurs autres auteurs parlent de 
l'Europe et de questions de l'actualité politiques et culturelles. 
Albert Gyergyai et le seul Hongrois qui figure parmi les auteurs. Il évoque 
en quelques pages la figure de Denis de Rougemont et il retrace l'histoire de 
leurs amitié, qui romonte - comme il le dit à cette époque-là - à plus de cin-
quante ans. „...depuis notre première rencontre à la Bibliothèque de Neuchâtel 
jusqu'à notre dernière entrevie à Genève" (...). "Je peux donc constater avec un 
certain droit que, chez lui, cette évolution s'est faite en double sens: d'une part, 
dans sa jeunesse d'étudiant, il voulait embrasser l'univers, il pensait "Planétaire-
ment", (...) D'autre part, surtout dans les dernières décades, il s'occupe de plus 
en plus intensément de ce petit monde intime, de cette Europe en miniature 
qu'est à ses yeux son pays natal, la Suisse..." 
Il est évident que l'évocation de son voyage ou plutôt de ces deux voyages, 
d'après le témoignage de Gyergyai, appartient à la première période. Rougemont 
veut connaître le monde entier, non seulement penser "planétairement", mais 
aussi voyager "planétairement". Gyergyai: "Il se déplaçait souvent, pour m'éc-
rire une fois des confins de l'Europe (...) et une autre fois de l'Amérique, du 
Nord ou du Sud. (...) toujours et partout en touriste d'idées, non seulement pour 
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voir et se distraire des différences des peuples et des pays, du fameux "exotis-
me" si cher aux romantiques, mais surtout pour réfléchir à l'homme, à la person-
ne et à son destin". 
Puis il évoque le jeune Denis de Rougemont qui "paraissait irrésistible, à 
cause de son génie qui rayonnait dans ses yeux, sa parole claire, bien articulé, 
son air souriant et qui respirait la joie de vivre et de penser et une certaine géné-
rosité confiante qui se répandait sur ses amis, sur ses environs, sur le monde en-
tier. Nous parlions naturellement de littérature..." (N. B. Ils partagent le même 
enthousiasme pour Marcel Proust et André Gide.) 
En chroniqueur fidèle, Gyergyai se souvient de tout. "A Paris où, quelques 
années plus tard, je l'ai revu, M. de Rougemont était déjà un jeune écrivain 
brillant et célèbre. (...) En Suisse, je l'ai vu même chez ses parents, au presbytère 
du village d'Areuse où il me montrait les sources de leur "rivière", vive et 
disciplinée à la fois" (...) 
Il suivent les années difficiles, mais ils se retrouvent quand-même: "Après la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, après un long séjour en Amérique, je l'ai revu plu-
sieurs fois à Genève, à propos des Rencontres à Ferney, dans l'ancienne grange 
de Voltaire, où sa carrière semblait s'arrêter pour quelque temps mais bien loin 
de finir." 
"La dernière fois que je l'ai revu c'était en l'été 1972, au bord du lac, dans 
un restaurant, où avec lui et sa femme nous avons parlé de nos souvenirs et de 
nos espoirs et j'admirais, comme toujours, son esprit jeune et toujours en travail, 
ses yeux brûlants et scrutateurs en même temps, (...) Son compatriote Rousseau 
et notre contemporain Proust, parlent des moments privilégiés de l'existence: 
c'est un de ces rares moments que je croyais vivre alors dans l'un des plus beaux 
paysages du monde, en sirotant un cru de la côte, en conversation animée avec 
les Rougemont, et j'étais heureux..."17 
III. Conclusion 
Les "moments privilégiés de l'existence", le bonheur, "l'enfance dans l'air", 
ce sont les jalons d'une relation amicale dont les étapes géographiques sont Lau-
sanne et Neuchâtel, puis Budapest et Esztergom, finalement Genève. Le boucle 
est bouclé, l'Europe des intellectuels - réalisée au moins dans l'imagination, 
dans le domaine de l'estprit - assure cet état d'âme, elle en est le grant. Tout 
ceci se passe au delà des frontières, au-delà de la réalité et du parcours indivi-
duel de ces deux hommes exceptionnels, parcours qui était d'ailleurs jalonné 
d'épreuves et non pas des moindres, dans les deux cas. 
Au début, j 'ai mentionné quelques similitudes de ces deux parcours. Elles se 
trouvent dans le même enthousiasme qu'ils partagent pour les choses de l'esprit, 
de l'art, de la littérature avant tout. En ême temps, ils renoncent aux carrières de 
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poète voire de romancier, afin de se consacrer à un rôle de propagateur, de por-
te-parole. Gyergyai conservera jusqu'à la fin de sa vie une véritable passion 
pour la littérature française. Rougemont se consacrera à l'élaboration et à la pro-
pagation d'un système de pensées autour de la construction de l'Europe fédé-
raliste. Passion et obsession, dans les deux cas, sentiment d'un besoin d'accom-
plir une mission, de servir une cause, de s'engager pour quelque chose - et ceci 
non pas dans le sens sartrien du mot, mais plutôt dans le sens de "servir". 
Puis, il y a encore quelque chose de commun dans l'itinéraire de ces deux 
intellectuels. Leur parcours suit la même formule: au début, départ et sensibilité 
planétaire, pour revenir enfin vers son propre pays, vers le lieu intime de ses 
proches. Rougemont finit par reconnaître l'importence de son histoire familiale, 
"sa lignée" et il choisit comme son lieu privilégié la Suisse, petit pays modèle du 
fédéralisme. Gyergyai, après avoir parcouru mentalement tous les paysages de la 
littérature française, après avoir effectué des voyages imaginaires dans l'espace 
et dans le temps, retrouve, vers la fin de sa vie, son village natal et sa mère, dont 
il évoquera le souvenir dans une oeuvre autobiographique. 
C'est le moment de revenir au début, au problème soulevé par l'Histoire de 
la littérature européenne: est-ce vraiment dommage d'arriver au nationalisme 
des catalogues littéraires? Or, serait-il possible de trouver une solution dans le 
dilemme posé par la tendance de la mondialisation, ressentie aujourd'hui un peu 
partout dans le monde et celui du pays, de sa région natal, du petit monde d'où 
on est sorti et dont chacun de nous porte en soi-même les souvenirs et les tradi-
tions? Je pense que la possibilité d'une telle relation, comme celle qui existait et 
survivait entre Denis de Rougemont et Albert Gyergyai - malgré toutes les 
vicissitudes de notre histoire européenne en est la preuve et l'illustration con-
vainquante. 
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KOSZTOLÁNYI ET LA TRADITION STOÏQUE 
MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁK 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IND 
U.S.A 
Dezső Kosztolányi (1885-1936), romancier, nouvelliste, poète, traducteur et 
essayiste, est apprécié aujourd'hui comme l'écrivain hongrois le plus eminent 
du début du vingtième siècle. Dans les années 1920 il publie Néron, le poète 
sanglant (1920), roman historique influencé par les oeuvres de Sénèque, et 
Marc-Aurèle (1929), poème écrit à l'occasion d'un voyage à Rome. 
Traduit en allemand et préfacé par Thomas Mann, Néron inspirera en 1936 
son Falsche Nero à Lion Feuchtwanger, livre stigmatisant Hitler. Le roman 
hongrois est un bon exemple de ce que Gérard Genette nomme hypertextualité, 
entendant par là une relation unissant un texte à des textes antérieurs sur les-
quels "il se greffe d'une manière qui n'est pas celle du commentaire". Dans ce 
cas les textes préexistants sont les Annales de Tacite, la biographie de Néron 
dans le recueil de Suétone, intitulé De vita duodecim caesarum et les Consola-
tions de Sénèque. C'est effectivement en se souvenant très consciemment de ces 
textes que Kosztolányi a écrit son livre. Néanmoins, il y a un clivage presque 
total entre le roman et les oeuvres de Tacite et Suétone: le Néron de l'écrivain 
hongrois n'est pas l'Antéchrist, accusé d'avoir incendié Rome, mais la victime 
d'une situation démoniaque. Il n'y a que Britannicus, l'artiste intègre qui refuse 
l'action, pour adopter les valeurs transcendantales qui peuvent être détruites par 
un système totalitaire. Lorsque Koszolányi commença à réfléchir à ce livre, il 
hésita longuement, partagé entre plusieurs tentations. Pourquoi ne pas con-
fronter systématiquement ses prises de position au cours des années 1914-1920 
avec ses jugements sur la première guerre mondiale et les révolutions? Selon 
l'auteur du roman Néron, le poète sanglant il y eut d'incroyables retournements 
de veste, en Hongrie par exemple, au point qu'il n'est peut-être pas illégitime de 
se demander si, ici et là, le mensonge ne continuait pas à sévir, sous la forme de 
la dénonciation du mensonge, qui était la dernière ruse du mal. 
Dans Néron le dictateur veut prendre naturellement la place des écrivains et 
des artistes. L'écrivain s'efforce de montrer que les valeurs esthétiques sont 
plus fondamentales que valeurs éthiques, mais le passage à la morale reste in-
dispensable. La question serait plutôt de savoir si la construction d'un système 
politique inspiré par une idéologie messianique n'est pas un cul-de-sac. 
Le destin de Sénèque suggère qu'un vrai artiste ne connaît que la motivation 
propre à son art et ne cède point à des impératifs extérieurs à son art: plaire au 
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tyran, illustrer la révolution. Avant de mourir, Sénèque livre dans un long mo-
nologue son testament spirituel: "J'étais poète et philosophe. Indifférent comme 
la nature. Je n'avais d'opinion que sur les choses éternelles. (...) Dans l'âme du 
poète tout a place côte à côte, le bien et le mal, l'or et la fange. Malheureuse-
ment, je dus prendre parti. Ce ne fut guère difficile. Toute vérité a deux aspects 
que je voyais simultanément. (...) Mon tort ne fut pas d'avoir changé d'avis et 
d'avoir été plein de contradictions, mais d'avoir pris parti en général. Les sages 
doivent s'abstenir de parler et d'agir." 
Ce testament, fait dans une situation cruelle, est plein d'âme et d'éloquence: 
le beau génie du philosophe s'y montre tout entier, et, sans le souvenir importun 
de quelques traits de la vie de Sénèque, on pourrait croire que le coeur le plus 
tendre et le plus sensible a conduit ses phrases; mais le lecteur du roman sait 
trop sur le précepteur de Néron, pour se laisser surprendre à l'expansion factice 
d'une sensibilité qu'on chercherait vainement dans sa conduite. Qui pourrait, en 
effet, se persuader que celui qui, sous Néron, trempa dans le meurtre d'Agrip-
pine, qui ensuite en fit l'apologie officielle, fut un bon fils? Ce sont, dans une 
vie, des tâches indélébiles. 
Dans son monologue Sénèque souligne la nécessité d'allonger la traversée 
entre métaphysique et morale. Son but est d'accomplir un pas décisif en direc-
tion de l'éthique à l'occasion des réflexions sur la promesse comme modèle du 
maintien de soi. Il ne cache pas qu'il est bien difficile de distinguer entre la pro-
messe et l'obligation morale de tenir ses promesses. Il veut croire qu'il ne paraît 
pas exact de dire que la signification de la promesse, en tant qu'elle lie celui qui 
la prononce, implique en tant que telle, l'obligation de la tenir. Sénèque consta-
te qu'une promesse non tenue reste une promesse. La possiblilité de trahir sa 
propre parole implique un acte supplémentaire qui s'exprime dans l'obligation 
de tenir parole. Il faut alors faire intervenir l'injonction qui combine le respect 
de soi, le respect de l'autre qui compte sur moi, enfin le respect de l'institution 
même du langage. Selon le poète-philosophe, c'est finalement l'acte de tenir 
effectivement parole qui constitue l'opérateur actuel de la transition entre le 
versant métaphysique et le versant moral du maintien de soi. 
Sénèque n'a jamais fait consister le vrai bien dans les objets auxquels tous 
les mortels aspirent; au contraire, il n'y a trouvé que du vide, que des dehors 
spéciaux, qu'un vernis séduisant. Le monologue de Sénèque s'inspire du texte 
de l'écrivain stoïque connu sous le titre Consolation à Helvie. Helvie, mère de 
Sénèque, avait été frappée de tous les coups qui peuvent briser le coeur d'une 
femme sensible et tendre. Dans l'espace de quelques mois, elle avait perdu un 
ocle qu'elle chérissait, puis son mari, puis trois de ses petits-fils; enfin, vingt 
jours s'étaient écoulés depuis les funérailles du fils de Sénèque, lorsque le phi-
losophe, mêlé dans une intrigue de cour au commencement du règne de Claude, 
fut séparé d'elle par exil. Sénèque, apprenant, du fond de la Corse, que sa mère 
était inconsolable de sa disgrâce, lui écrivit une consolation, dans laquelle il a 
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rassemblé tout ce que les raisonnements stoïques ont de plus fort contre la 
douleur. "Tel est l'arrêt du destin, dit-il, il n'est rien dont la fortune soit irrévo-
cablement fixée." 
Le dernier roman de Kosztolányi, Anna Édes (1926, paru en français sous le 
titre Absolve Domine) est le récit de la Commune en Hongrie. Ce livre parle du 
désespoir des Hongrois qui assistent impuissants à l'envahissement progressif 
des marches millénaires de leurs pays et des méthodes tyranniques des bolche-
viks arrivés au pouvoir. L'influence de la tradition stoïque continue dans les 
nouvelles écrites dans les dernières années de la vie de Kosztolányi. Dans son 
recueil, L'oeil-de-mer, paru en 1936, il a regroupé quatre nouvelles: Pauline et 
Silus, écrites en 1929, Aurelius et Caligula, composées respectivement en 1931 
et 1934. Ces quatre "Profils latins" sont des oeuvres paraboliques. Pauline et 
Silus, la servante injustement accusée de vol et l'esclave qui subit en quelques 
heures une accumulation de coups du destin, sont des personnages victimes, 
tandis que Marc-Aurèle, le penseur stoïque, et Caligula, le tyran obsédé de sa 
volonté subjective, sont des empereurs dont le pouvoir sur leur environnement 
est illimité. Dans le poème Marc-Aurèle (1929), l'empereur incarne l'union im-
possible des valeurs éthiques et esthétiques, dans la nouvelle Aurelius, il est 
confronté à une bavure policière qui aboutit à la mort d'un enfant. Au lieu de 
châtier le coupable, il fait preuve de clémence. 
La nature des relations entre les valeurs éthiques et esthétiques chez Koszto-
lányi est un thème ajourd'hui trop bien établi dans l'histoire littéraire pour qu'il 
soit nécessaire de s'y attarder. La seule originalité qui pourrait être proposée 
serait de mettre en couple la problématique du soi avec l'analyse de la promesse 
comme performatif d'un certain type, susceptible de description dans une théo-
rie des actes de discours. L'auto-critique de Sénèque est le point de départ de 
l'argument de Marc-Aurèle. L'examen de conscience, héritage stoïque, a pour 
premier seuil la reconnaissance de la ligne de partage entre les choses qui dé-
pendent de nous et celles qui ne dépendent pas de nous. Des premières seules 
nous sommes responsables. Mise en examen, dit l'empereur, ne veut pas encore 
dire inculpation. C'est sur ce fond relativement neutre que se détache la bonne 
et la mauvaise conscience. La question posée par Marc-Aurèle est la suivante: 
Qu'y a-t-il, qui ne puisse être acheté ou vendu? Entre autres, le talent artistique, 
la santé, le pouvoir. C'est dans cette perspective qu'il convient de critiquer les 
valeurs liées à l'économie de marché. Selon la thèse de l'empereur les événe-
ments esthétiques diffèrent radicalement des événements éthiques. Apprendre, 
conclure, reconnaître la forme: voilà la source du plaisir esthétique. Et pourtant, 
l'homme esthétique ne saurait rompre tout lien avec l'homme moral. 
Les stoïciens définissent la tradition par un accord de nous-mêmes à nous-
mêmes, un accord entre les esprits plutôt que par un accord de notre discours 
avec ce que les penseurs dogmatiques appellent la réalité. Dans les oeuvres de 
Kosztolányi, sous l'influence des stoïciens s'est affirmé une tendance à refouler 
so MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁK 
la notion d'événements, à laquelle l'auteur de Néron a préféré celle de con-
joncture, de structure, à savoir des composantes beaucoup plus lentes, plus stab-
les et plus durables que celle de la révolution. Cela marque un effacement du 
politique au bénéfice de l'esthétique. Ce qui se passe sous nos yeux dans les 
romans et les nouvelles de Kosztolányi révèle un véritable renversement de 
priorité: c'est l'échec des systèmes politiques qui conduit au bouleversement. 
Dans le dernier chapitre d'Anna Édes un des personnages s'appelle Kosztolányi. 
L'historien fait partie de l'histoire. Selon l'écrivain hongrois l'histoire est fidèle 
à son étymologie: c'est une "recherche". Divisé en fragments, le cycle Kornél 
Esti affirme que le sens même de la causalité dont use le romancier reste naïf, 
précritique, oscillant entre le déterminisme et la probabilité. Se dire qu'on peut 
considérer l'histoire comme un progrès à travers recommencements et ruptures, 
c'est là, selon Esti, l'illusion des romanciers. Il considère la conception linéaire 
du progrès comme bête et méchante. C'est pourquoi la rencontre en histoire est 
un dialogue, car la condition première du dialogue c'est que l'autre réponde. 
Dans ma contribution au colloque franco-hongrois "Regards sur Kosztolá-
nyi", organisé en 1985, j 'ai cité quelques phrases du premier chapitre de Kornél 
Esti. Au cours de leur dialogue, le narrateur anonyme propose une collaboration 
à son ami de jeunesse Kornél, qui formule une conception de l'antiroman qui 
rappelle la critique des conventions romanesques formulée par Valéry et citée 
par Breton: "Tu ne vas pas me conglutiner ça avec une intrigue idiote. Que tout 
reste digne d'un poète: fragmentaire." Selon Esti la composition de l'intrigue 
est enracinée dans une fausse pré-compréhension de l'existence, de ses structu-
res et de son caractère temporel. Cette illusion réduit le monde aux dimensions 
d'une préoccupation logocentrique. 
Esti introduit l'idée que les récits téléologiques peuvent viser non à éclaircir 
mais à obscurcir et à dissimuler. Pour lui, le monde est l'ensemble des référen-
ces ouvertes. Sa thèse repose sur l'assertion d'un lien de dérivation par lequel le 
savoir procède de la compréhension des dicontinuités de la vie. Cette critique de 
la narration objective est opposée au préjugé du passé en soi. L'histoire sociale, 
celles des classes, c'est l'histoire la plus superficielle. L'histoire profonde, c'est 
l'histoire de la dimension de l'individu, à oscillations brèves, rapides, nerveuses 
et inattendues. Marc-Aurèle se heurte au côté insensé de l'histoire, à savoir que 
les actions explicables en termes de raisons produisent des effets non voulus, 
non souhaités, voire des effets adverses. Sous l'influence des stoïciens, Kosz-
tolányi procède d'une analyse causale et sélective vers l'éclipsé du récit. La 
différence avec la conception aristotélienne serait certainement à chercher du 
côté du facteur subjectif. Dans ses essais sur la littérature Kosztolányi souligne 
l'importance de la réception. 
La grandeur des stoïciens, selon Esti, c'est d'avoir refusé la pensée systé-
matique. Il y a une humanité sous l'angle du progrès; il y a des humanités sous 
l'angle de la tradition stoïque. Le philosophe, c'est celui qui ouvre la voie à de 
KOSZTOLÁNYI ET LA TRADITION STOÏQUE 81 
nouveaux questionnements. Chaque philosophie est légitime en tant qu'elle 
répond à la constellation des problèmes qu'elle a posés. L'erreur des penseurs 
systématiques consiste à faire paraître concordante la discordance de la vie. 
Ainsi une doctrine universaliste, à travers le prisme de l'autorité et du pouvoir, 
peut être aussi tyrannique qu'une doctrine raciste, si elle comprend comme son 
devoir d'unifier. Ce n'est pas le mensonge, mais la vérité qui est légion, c'est 
l'idée de l'unité du vrai qui nous déçoit. Une culture avance par pluralisation et 
complications des tâches plutôt que par approche d'une unité organique. La 
fonction de l'art, c'est d'être en débat avec d'autres manières d'exister et ainsi 
d'être limité par elles, et la fonction de la parole est de contester la validité 
d'autres manières de parler. 
Dans la nouvelle intitulée "Le pharmacien et lui", Esti fait la déclaration 
suivante: "Puisque aussi bien je ne saurais plus me consoler moi-même, autant 
maintenant que j 'en console d'autres." Ce qui caractérise Esti, c'est une critique 
du messianisme. "Ne te méprends pas sur mes paroles. Je n'éprouvais pas de 
haine personnellement envers les gens. Je les considérais seulement avec tris-
tesse et résignation, je sentais etje sens toujours l'inutilité de la vie, et le statut 
relatif de toute chose. (...) Camarade, je ne suis pas né pour sauver cette huma-
nité qui, quand les incendies, les inondations et les épidémies ne l'accablent 
pas, organise des guerres et provoque artificiellement des incendies, des inonda-
tions et des épidémies." 
L'ironie, le scepticisme et la contemplation sont autant de façons pour Esti 
de maintenir ouverte l'interprétation de ses histoires, lesquelles proclament la 
relativité des valeurs. "L'autre jour, nous étions entre amis, quelqu'un a déclaré 
que jamais il ne voyagerait dans un pays dont il ne parle pas la langue. Etje lui 
ai donné raison. (...) Ce développement à peine achevé, il m'est venu à l'esprit 
que le contraire était tout aussi valable, comme pour toute chose en ce monde." 
Marquant les distances à l'égard du messianisme, Esti n'en reste pas moins 
attaché à une certaine figure de dépassement, qui espère trouver à la fin, grâce 
au travail de la médiation (qui est épreuve et mort), ce qui fut perdu ou quitté au 
commencement Le regard en arrière, certes, n'est pas récusé: œuvres littéraires, 
musicales ou picturales, ainsi que langues appellent la médiation et l'écoute, 
mais pour orienter l'esprit vers ce qui est encore inconnu. La proche attente de 
la mort est devenue, dans la réflexion de Kornél Esti, un motif constant. Son 
ambition est de suivre le conseil de Sénèque: "Regarder votre dernier jour, non 
comme un châtiment, mais comme une loi de nature; et nulle terreur n'osera 
s'introduire dans un coeur dont vous aurez banni la crainte de la mort." L'at-
tente est l'analogue de la mémoire, comme chez Saint Augustin. Dans les ro-
mans et les nouvelles de Kosztolányi il y a une hiérarchie de niveaux de tempo-
ralisation: il faut penser l'antécédence comme supériorité. 
Sénèque sut supporter l'exil, qui ne changea rien à son caractère. Dans ses 
écrits il considère la mort comme un autre changement de lieu. Il ne s'aperçoit 
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de la perte de ses richesses que par l'absence des embarras. À son avis c'est 
l'âme qui fait la richesse. Vertige de l'aube, poème de Kosztolányi composé en 
1933, est un commentaire sur la neuvième section de la Consolation à Helvie: 
"Parcourons tous les pays; en est-il un seul dans l'univers entier qui soit 
étranger à l'homme? Sur tous les points de la terre c'est de la même distance 
que nos regards se dirigent vers les cieux; partout le séjour des humains est 
séparé par le même intervalle de la demeure des immortels." Uniquement avide 
de comprendre l'existence, en s'élevant à la contemplation de lui-même et des 
astres, le poète jouit du spectacle des sphères, et, se rappelant la trivialité de sa 
vie par rapport à celle des étoiles, il conclut par une suggestion d'une essence 
supérieure. 
"Le seul thème que j 'ai depuis toujours, c'est la mort", écrit Kosztolányi en 
1933 dans son journal. Le cycle de poèmes Plaintes d'un pauvre petit enfant 
(1910) et Chant sur le Néant (1933) suggèrent que le non-vivant est antérieur au 
vivant. Ce que l'on mesure, ce ne sont pas les choses futures ou passées, mais 
leur attente et leur souvenir: 
"Le Néant est plus archaique que ce qui est, 
Il m'est plus familier, même à moi." 




Bis zum heutigen Datum dauert die Diskussion an, ob Fotografie nun Kunst 
sei oder nicht. Es ist eine Diskussion, die László Moholy-Nagy nur wenig inte-
ressiert hätte, ging es ihm doch darum, die spezifischen Eigenarten traditioneller 
Gestaltungsmittel (Malerei, Bildhauerei) und neuer Medien (Fotografie, Film) 
sowohl zu bestimmen als auch kreativ zu nutzen und nicht ihren Anspruch auf 
das Prädikat „Kunst" zu untersuchen. Für ihn war jedes Medium ein künstleri-
sches, solange es auf seine besondere Weise dazu beitrug, das Leben in einer 
von Technik und Weissenschaft geprägten Welt sinnvoll und menschengerecht 
zu gestalten. Auch die Fotografie konnte seiner Ansicht nach ihren Beitrag zur 
Verbesserung der Lebensumstände leisten, vorausgesetzt sie würde ihren spezi-
fischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten entsprechend eingesetzt. Der Weg zum Verständnis 
der medienspezifischen Eigenschaften der Fotografie verlief für Moholy-Nagy 
über das Fotogramm, d.h. die Fotografie ohne Kamera, die in der Abgeschie-
denheit des Labors entsteht, für Moholy-M agy jedoch wesentliche Aspekte der 
modernen Wirklichkeit in sich vereinigte. 
Auf welche Weise sowohl das Fotogramm als auch alle anderen künstle-
rische Medien positiv auf die Gestaltung des Lebens einwirken konnten, läßt 
sich kaum verstehen, ist man nicht mit Moholy-Nagys Konzept des „Biolo-
gischen" vertraut. Für dieses lieferte er zwar nie eine genaue Definition, aus 
seinen verschiedenen Äußerungen läßt sich jedoch schließen, daß er damit die 
biologische Grundkonstellation des Menschen meinte, d.h. seine physiologi-
schen Anlagen und Bedürfnisse, die wiederum Einfluß auf sein psychologischen 
Befinden haben. So schreibt er schon 1922 in seinem Artikel „Produktion -
Reproduktion". 
Der Aufbau des Menschen ist die Synthese aller seiner Funktionsappa-
rate, d.h. daß der Mensch in seiner Periode dann der vollkommenste ist, 
wenn die ihn ausmachenden Funktionsaparate - die Zellen ebenso wie 
die kompliziertesten Organe - biz zur Grenze ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit 
bewußt bzw. ausgebildet sind. 
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Mit Funktionsapparaten meinte Moholy-Nagy vor allem die Sinnesorgane, 
deren Weiterentwicklung er als Voraussetzung fur die Erlebnis- und Überle-
bensfahigkeit des Menschen sah. Die Stärkung und Verbesserung der Sinnesor-
gane sah er jedoch innerhalb der modernen Umwelt, besonders innerhalb des 
zunehmend spezialisierten und technisierten Arbeitswelt gefährdet. So beklagte 
er die Entwicklung des Individuums zum „sektorenhaften menschen"," der „Un-
ter der verflachung seiner instinkte, unter der nivellierung seiner biologischen 
Spannungen leidet".3 Ähnlich wie Marx machte er die fabrikmäßige Produktion 
mitverantwortlich für diesen Prozeß der Abstumphung, in dem „der mensch zur 
maschine umgewandelt wird".4 Hier nun waren seiner Ansicht nach die vershie-
denen künstlerischen Gestaltungsmittel herausgefordert, der fortschreitenden 
Verkümmerung der Sinne entgegenzuwirken und diese zu aktivieren, damit sich 
das Individuum vor der Überwältigung durch die Vielfalt der Umweltreize 
schützen und sogar die Fähigkeit entwickelt könnte, diese Stimuli als reizvoll 
und bereichernd zu erleben. Diese Funktion konnte die Kunst jedoch nur 
erfüllen, wenn „sie zwischen den bekannten und den noch unbekannten opti-
schen, akustischen und anderen funktionellen Erscheinungen weitgehendste 
neue Beziehungen herzustellen versucht und deren Aufnahme von den Funkti-
konsapparaten erzingt."5 Die Herstellung „neuer Beziehungen" ist, was für 
Moholy-Nagy den „produktiven" Aspekt der künstlerischer Gestaltungsmittel 
ausmachte. Ihn galt es seiner Ansicht nach gegenüber der rein „reproduktiven" 
Funktion von Kunst („Wiederholung bereits existierender Relationen")6 zu för-
dern. Damit erteilte Moholy-Nagy der reinen Realitätsnachbildung eine deut-
liche Absage und lenkte die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Auseinandersetzung mit 
den besonderen Qualitäten der verschiedenen Gestaltungsmittel. 
Für die Fototheorie war Moholy-Nagys Grenzziehungen zwischen den ver-
schiedenen Medien ein Glücksfall, trieb sie doch die bis dahin nur ansatzweise 
vollzogene Loslösung der Fotografie vom Vorbild der Malerei ein ganzes Stück 
voran, was nicht zuletzt seinem uneingeschränkten Enthusiasmus für dieses Me-
dium zuzuschreiben ist, der sich in der großen Anzahl von Aufsätzen zu diesem 
Thema widerspiegelt. Dabei ist jedoch nicht zu vergessen, daß die Besinnung 
auf das Spezifische des Mediums eine typische Forderung des Modernismus 
war. Auf dem Gebiet der Fotografie hatten sich zudem schon vor Moholy-Nagy 
verschiedene Fotografen Gedanken über die Besonderheiten ihres Mediums 
gemacht. Dies geschah vor allem als Reaktion auf die Kunstfotografie, die zum 
Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in Europa und in den USA immer stärkere 
Verbreitung fand. Entstanden war sie aus dem Bestreben, der Fotografie Aner-
kennung als künstlerisches Ausdruckmittel zu verschaffen und sie von dem Vor-
wurf zu befreien, sie sei nur ein mechanisches Abbildungsverfahren bar jeg-
lichen kreativen Potentials. Um ihren künstlerischen Anspruch geltend zu ma-
chen, übernahm sie sowohl Motive als auch Kompositionsschemata der Male-
rei. Schließlich imitierte sie sogar die Qualität von Zeichenstift und Pinsel-
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faktur, was durch die Anwendung verschiedener Edeldruckverfahren möglich 
wurde. Diese erlaubten dem Fotografen, auch am Positiv Veränderungen 
vorzunehmen und es so mit dem Qualitätssiegel individueller Gestaltung zu 
versehen. 
Neben dem dominanten Trend der Kunstfotografie konnten jedoch auch 
einige Fotografen bestehen, die die Verwendung von Edeldruckverfahren ab-
lehnten. So verfaßte schon 1900 der Engländer Frederick Evans (1853-1943) 
eine „Apologie der reinen Fotografie", in der es als sein wesentliches Interesse 
beschreibt: „ehrliche, einfache, unverfälschte Fotografien zu machen und, so 
gut und so leicht es geht, die Helldunkel-Effekte wiederzugeben, die mich so 
sehr fesseln."8 Die Gleichgültigkeit anderer Fotografen gegenüber den „Hell-
dunkel-Effekten" bedauerte er: „Obwohl die Monochromie derzeit unser 
einziges Ausdrucksmittel ist, erstaunt es einen doch, wie wenig wirkliches, in-
stinktives Gefühl für die Werte und Qualitäten des Schwarz-Weißen der nor-
male Fotograf hat.9 Die besondere Bedeutung, die er der genauen Kontrastwie-
dergabe beimaß, ergab sich aus seiner Vorliebe für das Fotografieren von Ka-
thedralen, wobei es ihm darauf ankam, das Zusammenwirken von Licht und 
Raum einzufangen. Die Fotografie mit ihrer Möglichkeit, Helligkeitswerte in 
eine kontinuierliche Skala von Grauwerten umzusetzen war für ihn daher das 
ideale Medium. Diese Qualität der Fotografie war es auch, die 1917 der ameri-
kanische Fotograf Paul Strand (1890-1976), in seinem Aufsatz „Fotografie" 
herausstrich.10 Wirklich medienspezifisch war für Strand jedoch vor allem die 
Objektivität, d.h. Abbildungstreue der Fotografie, die „über das Nachahmungs-
vermögen der menschlichen Hand hinausgeht."11 Bei Moholy-Nagy wurde aus 
der objektiven Abbildung ein „objektives Sehen" mittels der Kamera.12 Wenn es 
um „Reproduktion" ging, hielt auch er die Fotografie für das überlegene 
Medium. Im Gegensatz zu Evans und Strand, versuchte er jedoch auf die 
„produktiven" Möglichkeiten der Fotografie auszuloten, worfur die „Hell-
Dunkelwerte", wie Evans sie nannte, von größerer Relevanz waren. 
Diese „Hell-Dunkelwerte" waren entscheidend für das „abstrakte Sehen", 
eine von 8 Arten des Sehens, die Moholy-Nagy in dem 1933 veröffentlichten 
Artikel „A fotográfia: napjaink objektív látási formája" (A New Instrument of 
Vision) definiert. Seine Typologie der Seharten umfaßt z.B. das „schnelle 
Sehen", das den die Bewegung stoppenden Schnappschuß ermöglicht, oder das 
„durchdringende Sehen", zu dem die Röntgenfotografle Gelegenheit bietet. Das 
„verzerrte Sehen" erlaubt die neue Wahrnehmung bekannter Dinge, die mittels 
eines Spiegels, eines Prismas oder chemischer Manipulationen verfremdet wur-
den. Hier ließen sich auch die für Moholy-Nagys Kamerafotografie und das 
„Neue Sehen" der 20iger Jahre typischen Frosch- und Vogelperspektiven ein-
ordnen, was Moholy-Nagy jedoch selbst nicht tut. Alle Arten des Sehens sind 
auf verschiedenen kameraverwandte Apparate angewiesen, mit einer Aus-
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nähme, der des „abstrakten Sehens", das allein durch das Fotogramm ermög-
licht wird: 
Abstract seeing by means of direct records of forms produced by light: 
the photogramme which captures the most delicate gradations of light 
values, both chiaroscuro and coloured. 
Indem das Fotogramm von der Abbildung der Wirklichkeit befreit war, 
konnte es Moholy-Nagy zufolge ganz und gar der Aufzeichnung von Hellig-
keitswerten dienen und somit das Spezifische der Fotografie, das schon Evans 
und Strand erkannt hatten, am unmittelbarsten zum Ausdruck bringen: 
The photogramme, or camera-less record of forms produced by light, 
which embodies the unique nature of the photographic process, is the 
real key to photography. It allows us to capture the patterned interplay 
of light on a sheet of sensitised paper without recourse to any appa-
ratus. 
Mit der Hervorhebung des Fotogramms als Schlüssel zur Fotografie ver-
lagerte er die Aufmerksamkeit von der Kameraoptik und -mechanik auf die licht-
empfindliche Schicht, auf den Anteil der Chemie am fotografischen Prozeß, 
Darin liegt Moholy-Nagys besonderer Beitrag zur Reflektion über das Medium. 
Er war jedoch nicht der erste, der Fotogramme herstellte. Die Ursprünge des Fo-
togramms liegen noch vor der eigentlichen Erfindung der Fotografie,15 ihre 
konsequente künstlerische Anwendung erfahren hat es aber erst bei dem 
deutschen Maler und Graphiker Christian Schad und besonders bei dem 
amerikanischen Künstler Man Ray. 
Schon 1918 legte Schad, damals Mitglied der Züricher Dada-Gruppe, flache 
Materialien wie Stoff, Papier und Federn auf Fotopapier, belichtete es und be-
zeichnete die so entstandenen Arbeiten in Anlehnung an seinen eigenen Namen 
und an das englische Wort „shadowgraphs" als „Schadographien".16 Drei Jahre 
später, jedoch unabhängig von Schad, schuf Man Ray seine „Rayographien", 
die sich von Schads Arbeiten durch die Plazierung dreidimensionaler Gegen-
stände auf das Fotopapier unterschieden.17 Die Bezeichnungen, die Schad und 
Ray für ihre Entdeckungen wählten, verweisen auf Qualitäten des Fotogramms, 
die für Moholy-Nagy von besonderer Bedeutung waren. So spielt der Begriff 
„Schadographien" auf die Immaterialitât und die gegenseitigen Überlagerungen 
von Helligkeitswerten an, während der Name „Rayograph" die Einwirkung von 
„rays", von Lichtstrahlen, und damit den „Lichtspielcharakter" von Fotogram-
men aufgreift. 
Neben Man Ray und Christian Schad war es jedoch vor allem der aus Bos-
ton stammende Maler und Fotograf Alvin Langdon Coburn (1882-1966), der 
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mit dem „patterned interplay of light on a sheet of paper" experimentierte und 
von den Effekten ebenso fasziniert war wie Moholy-Nagy: 
Pause for a moment and consider the mysterious quality of light regis-
tering itself in sensitized gelatine - all the scientific poetry in the words 
„latent image". 
Seine Begeisterung für die Wirkung des Lichts auf die lichtempfindliche 
Schicht inspirierte Coburn allerdings zu einem Verfahren, das anders als das 
Fotogramm nicht auf Apparate verzichten konnte. Das Ergebnis dieses von Co-
burn entwickelten Prozesses waren die 1917 zum ersten Mal ausgestellten „Vor-
tographs", die Moholy-Nagy Forderung nach einer abstrakten Komposition von 
sich gegenseitig durchdringenden Helligkeitswerten auf ihre sehr eigene Art 
schon erfüllten. Hervorgerufen wurden diese oftmals kristallin wirkenden Licht-
erscheinungen durch das Fotografien von vorwiegend gläsernen Gegenständen 
durch das „Vortoskop", wie Ezra Pound, damals Mitglied der englischen Vorti-
zismus-Gruppe, diesen kaleidoskopartigen Apparat nannte.19 Er bestand aus drei 
Spiegeln, die so miteinander verbunden wurden, daß sie ein Dreieck bildeten, 
das auf eine Glasplatte gestellt wurde, auf dem die zu fotografierenden Gegen-
stände lagen. Durch dieses Spiegeldreieck wurden die Gegenstände fotografiert, 
die auf Grund der vielfachen Spiegelungen, der so entstehenden Lichtreflexe 
und deren gegenseitigen Durchdringungen kaum oder gar nicht mehr erkennbar 
sind. Coburn setzte seine Experimente mit den „Vortographs" nicht langfristig 
fort, so daß Moholy-Nagy vorbehalten blieb, mit äußerster Konsequenz sowohl 
die Bedeutung der lichtempfindlichen Schicht als auch die Gestaltung des 
Lichts immer wieder zu betonen und zu analysieren. 
1922 beginnt Moholy-Nagy mit seinen eigenen Experimenten, die sich laut 
Lucia Moholy-Nagy direkt aus der Diskussion über das Themas Produktion-
Reproduktion entwickelten,20 aber auch auf die Beschäftigung mit dem Problem 
der Transparenz in seiner Malerei verweisen. Moholy-Nagy wählte den Begriff 
„Fotogramm" für seine Arbeiten und übernahm damit einen Terminus aus der 
naturwissenschaftlichen Fachsprache, wo er ein kameraloses Projektionsver-
fahren bezeichnet.21 Diese wissenschaftliche Benennung entsprach seiner syste-
matischen-experimentellen Vorgehensweise bei der Erfassung der Lichtphäno-
mene.22 Moholy-Nagy verstand den Fotografen allerdings nicht als Wissen-
schaftler, sondern als „Lichtbildner", der auf der „tabula rasa" der lichtempfind-
lichen Schicht „mit licht so notieren kann, wie der maier mit seinen Werk-
zeugen: pinsel und pigment, auf seiner leinwand souverän arbeitet".23 Diese 
Beschreibung macht es notwendig, den Entstehungsprozeß einer solchen Foto-
arbeit etwas näher zu betrachten und auf einen dem Fotogramm innewohnenden 
Widerspruch hinzuweisen.24 Da Moholy-Nagy diesen Prozeß als Schreiben mit 
Licht bezeichnete, liegt die Vorstellung nahe, der vom Künstler geführte Licht-
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strahl hinterließe helle Lichtspuren auf der schwarzen Fläche des Fotogramms 
(ähnlich dem Holzschneidemesser beim Holzschnitt). Tatsächlich treten die 
hellen Stellen des Fotogramms aber nur dort auf, wo besonders wenig Licht auf 
die fotosensitive Schicht fällt. Der Lichtstrahl schafft keine hellen Lichtspuren, 
sondern schluckt mit zunehmender Belichtung immer mehr von dem Weiß der 
anfangs unbelichteten Schicht und hinterläßt in Wirklichkeit graue bis schwarze 
Spuren. Trotzdem bleibt das Licht das aktiv gestaltende Element, da es erst 
durch die Schwärzung der Schicht die hellen Stellen formt und in Erscheinung 
treten läßt. So wird der Eindruck von Licht, wenn auch nur indirekt, durch Licht 
hervorgerufen. Für den Betrachter erscheinen die hellen Flächen jedoch als 
direkte Folgen der Lichteinwirkung, zumal gerade bei Moholy-Nagys, aber auch 
bei Man Rays Fotogrammen oftmals der größte Teil der Fläche schwarz ist, 
während die hellen Stellen tatsächlich wie in diese Fläche gesetzte Lichterschei-
nungen wirken. 
Bei der Gestaltung der Fotogramme war für Moholy-Nagy die Wirkung auf 
den Betrachter ein wichtiges Kriterium, was auf seine Vertrautheit mit wahr-
nehmungspsychologischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten schließen läßt. So betonte er z.B. 
beim Verhältnis von Hell und Dunkel die aktive Wirkung des Weiß, das, auch 
wenn es nur auf kleine Flächen beschränkt ist, wesentlich größere schwarze und 
daher passivere Bereiche im Gleichgewicht halten kann, wobei „es weniger auf 
die formbildung als auf die menge, richtung und lagebeziehungen der einzelnen 
lichterscheinungen" ankäme.25 Diese Beobachtung hat Moholy-Nagy wahr-
scheinlich erst bei seine etwas späteren Fotogrammen gemacht, denn die ersten 
Arbeiten auf diesem Gebiet von 1922 weisen fast gar kein tiefes Schwarz auf, 
das hellen Stellen zu einer richtigen Leuchtkraft verhelfen würde. Dagegen ist 
in einem Fotogramm, welches zwischen 1925 und 1927 entstanden ist, der 
größte Teil der Gesamtfläche tiefschwarz (Abb 14.) Von links unter nach rechst 
oben verläuft ein feines, graues zum Teil kaum erkennbares Liniengerüst. 
Während dieses Gerüst nach rechts oben tendiert, zieht die in ein Oval ein-
geschriebene Lichtform, welche vom Mittelpunkt fort nach links oben verlagert 
ist, in die linke obere Ecke. Unterstütz wird diese Bewegung von Lichtpunkten 
auf dem Gerüst, die zwei lückenhafte Linien andeuten, dies liegen im rechten 
Winkel zur Hauptrichtung des Liniengerüsts und weisen ebenfalls in die obere 
linke Ecke. Die Lichtform wirkt strahlend, weil ihre Ränder nicht überall scharf 
sind und somit der Eindruck entsteht, das Licht reiche über die eigentliche Form 
hinaus. Durch ihre Helligkeit und Geschlossenheit zieht diese Lichtform immer 
wieder den Blick auf sich und dominiert die gesamte Komposition. Wie die 
Mehrzahl von Moholy-Nagys Fotogrammen weist auch dieses keine Beziehung 
zu realen Gegenständen auf, so daß dem Betrachter noch nicht einmal Spiel-
raum für Assoziationen gegeben wird. Er muß sich ganz auf die Spannungen 
zwischen den Formen und Helligkeitswerten konzentrieren, zu deren Aufnahme 
sein „optischer Apparat"26 in erster Linie befähigt ist: 
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Sie üben durch ihre Existenz auf einen jeden, in seinen optischen Orga-
nismus gesunden Menschen auch dann ihre im Biologischen begrün-
dete Wirkung aus, wenn sie nicht Abbilder von Personen, Gegenstän-
den, Handlungen usw. sind." 
Moholy-Nagys Wahrnehmungstheorie zufolge ist es durch den richtigen 
Einsatz der Hell-Dunkelwerte möglich, beim Betrachter ein „unmittelbares op-
tisches Erlebnis auszulösen".28 Indem das Fotogramm dies leistet, erfüllt es die 
Aufgabe künstlerischer Gestaltungsmittel, zur Ausbildung der menschlichen 
Funktionsapparate und der Steigerung der Erlebnisfáhigkeit beizutragen. Dies 
gilt für den Betrachter wie für den Schöpfer des Fotogramms selbst. Durch die 
experimentelle Erarbeitung der für das Fotogramm spezifischen Eigenarten 
gewinnt der Lichtbildner, so Moholy-Nagy „die Gefuhlssicherheit gegenüber 
den Erscheinungen des Lichts."29 Es ist diese „Gefühlsicherheit", die der 
Mensch braucht, um die Reizüberflutung in der modernen Großstadt auszu-
halten. 
Vor allem die nächtliche Großstadt mit ihrer sich rasch entwickelnden 
„Lichtkultur", ist deren Wahrnehmung durch das Fotogramm vorbereitet und 
zugleich reflektiert. Für Moholy-Nagy scheint die nächtliche Stadt selbst zum 
Lichtgestalter geworden zu sein. So wie der Künstler bei der Erstellung des 
Fotogramms mit Licht schreibt, hat die nächtliche Großstadt auch ihre eigene 
Handschrift gefunden. Eine nächtliche Zeitaufnahme in einer Stadt bezeichnet 
er aid „Diagramm der lichtbewegungen, herrührend von lichtreklamen, 
Straßenlaternen und vorbeifahrenden wagen". Darunter setz er das Schlagwort 
„die neue schrift der großstadt".30 Diese Licht-Nacht-Aufnahme gehört zu einer 
ganzen Anzahl von Fotografien der urbanen Umwelt bei Nacht, die Moholy-
Nagy in „Malerei Fotografie Film" und vor allem in „Vom Material zur 
Architektur" reproduziert, um das Vordringen der modernen Lichtkultur zu il-
lustrieren. 
doch ist das großstädtische nachtleben ohne das vielfältige spiel der 
lichtreklame, der nächtliche flugzeugverkehr ohne die scharfen lichtzei-
chen der funktüme nicht mehr vorsellbar. die reflektorén und neon-
röhren der reklamebeleuchtungen, die sich drehenden leuchtbuchstaben 
der firmenschilder, die rotierenden mechanismen aus farbigen glühbir-
nen, das breite band der lichtwanderschrift sind demente eines neuen 
ausddrucksgebietes, das auf seinen gestalter wahrscheinlich nicht mehr 
lange zu warten braucht. 
Was Moholy-Nagy an der modernen Lichtkultur fasziniert, ist ihre entmate-
rialisierende Wirkung, „starkes licht zerstört das detail, zerfrißt unnötiges bei-
werk und zeigt - wenn es mit dieser absieht, also richtig verwendet wird - nicht 
die fassade, sondern nur raumbeziehungen."32 Gemeint ist hier die Auflösung 
der sich im Raum ausdehnender Materie in rein „virtuelle Volumen", die allein 
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durch die Verteilung des Lichts im Raum definiert werden. Die Arikulation von 
Raum durch Licht ist eine Variation des durch Bewegung hervorgerufenen „vir-
tuellen Volumens", dessen Konzept Moholy-Nagy in „Vom Material zur Archi-
tektur" entwickelt, um die Entwicklung der Skulptur vom geschlossenen Block 
zur kinetischen, d.h. bewegten Plastik zu beschreiben. Bei der kinetischen Plas-
tik ist das Material auf ein Minimum reduziert. Indem es in Bewegung gesetzt 
wird, artikuliert es den Raum, ohne ihn als Masse auszufüllen. Es markiert nur 
noch räumliche Ausdehnung, ohne selbst im Raum ausgedehnt zu sein. Dieses 
Konzept geht auf das „Realistische Manifest" der Brüder Naum Gabo und An-
toine Pevsner aus dem Jahre 1920 zurück. In diesem Manifest, aus dem Mo-
holy-Nagy in „Vom Material zur Architektur" zitiert, 33 sprechen sich die Brü-
der gegen die Masse als plastisches Element aus, da es ihrer Ansicht nach die 
Ausdehnung des Raumes nicht veranschaulichen kann. Für die Brüder Pevsner 
ist „die tiefe die einzige ausdrucksform des raumes". Indem die kinetische 
Plastik Raum markiert und sichtbar macht anstatt ihn auszufüllen, ist sie der 
geeignete Träger dieser „ausdrucksform" Tiefe. Während die kinetische Plastik 
jedoch nicht völlig auf Materie verzichten kann, um eine räumliche Wirkung zu 
erzielen, schaffen die Lichterscheinungen der nächtlichen Großstadt Moholy-
Nagys Vorstellung nach „raumbeziehungen" auf einer rein immateriellen Basis. 
Dies veranschaulicht er z.B. anhand einer Zeitaufnahme von einem Karussell, 
auf der die über mehrere Sekunden festgehaltenen Spuren der Karussellbeleuch-
tung ein völlig immateriell wirkendes trichterförmiges Gebilde entstehen lassen, 
während das Karussell selbst sich aufgelöst zu haben scheint. 
Diese Auflösung von Materie und ihre Umwandlung in „virtuelle" bzw. 
nunmehr „visuelle" Volumina sah Moholy-Nagy auch im Fotogramm verwirk-
licht. Die kompakten Dinge, die auf das Fotopapier gelegt werden, wandeln sich 
durch die Belichtung und anschließende Entwicklung in immaterielle Lichter-
scheinungen um, die nun jenseits der fotografischen Schicht neue räumliche 
Gebilde zu schaffen scheinen: 
The photogram for the first time produces space without existing space 
structure only by articulation on the plane with advancing and with the 
radiating power of their contrasts and their sublime gradations." 
Die hellen, strahlenden Partien treten in den Vordergrund, während sich die 
dunkleren Stellen zurückziehen. Die allmähliche Übergänge vom Hellen zum 
Dunkeln, „the sublime gradations", schaffen, wie alle Beleuchtungsgefälle, eine 
räumliche Wirkung.35 Erscheinen somit die Formlichtgebilde dreidimensional, 
wird das sie umgebende und durchdringende Schwarz zu einem unbestimmten, 
geheimnisvollen Raum, aus dem die Formen hinaus ins Licht zu treten scheinen, 
um an anderer Stelle von dunklen Raum wieder verschluckt zu werden. Dieser 
Eindruck ist besonders stark, wenn die Gebilde den Bildrand gar nicht berühren, 
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folglich keinerlei Vebindung zur Fläche herstellen. Sind diese Gebilde ganz 
vom Dunkel umschlossen, wirkt ein solches Fotogramm fast wie eine Foto von 
einer schwebenden Plastik (Abb. 226), von denen Moholy-Nagy schreibt, daß 
sie, im Gegensatz zu einer auf dem Boden stehenden und auf die Erde bezo-
genen Plastik, ihre „material-bzw. volumenbeziehungen und alle zugehörigen 
attribute nur in bezug auf das eigene system aufzeigt".36 So ist auch nicht 
vorgeschrieben, von welchem Standort man die Plastiken betrachten muß. Das 
gilt für die hermetisch in sich abgeschlossenen Gebilde in den Fotogrammen 
nur bedingt. Zwar kann man die Fotogramme drehen, da sie an keine Dar-
stellung gebunden sind, aber das Gleichgewicht der Helligkeitswerte könnte 
beeinflußt werden. 
Letztlich sind Fotogramme rein statische Gebilde, deren räumliche Wirkung 
auf einer Illusion beruht, womit es Moholy-Nagy als Ausdruck der modernen 
Umwelt und als Vorbereitung auf ihre Reizfulle nicht genügen konnte: 
wechselnde Lichtintensitäten und Lichttempi, Bewegungsvariationen 
des Raumes durch Licht, Erlöschen und Aufblitzen des ganzen Bewe-
gungsorganismen, Auslösen latenter Funktionsgeladenheit in uns, in 
unserem Gehirn. Hell-Dunkel. Lichtgreifbarkeit, Lichtbewegung. Licht-
ferne und Lichtnähe. Durchdringende und aufbauende Strahlung." 
Beeinflußt wurde Moholy-Nagy in dieser Hinsicht von den „Reflektorischen 
Farbenlichtspielen" von Hirschfeld-Mack und von anderen Filmexperimenten 
am Bauhaus. Ihn selbst veranlaßten diese Gedanken über das Licht und die 
Reaktionen, die es im Menschen auslöst, zu Projekten, die schließlich weit über 
das Fotogramm hinausgehen, es sozusagen in den Raum und in Bewegung 
setzen. 1930 stellte er bei der Werkbundausstellung in Paris zum ersten mal sein 
„Lichtrequisit fur eine elektrische Bühne" (Abb. 18) aus, eine kinetische Plastik 
aus Metalldraht, Plastik und Glas, mit deren Entwurf Moholy-Nagy sich schon 
seit 1922 beschäftigte. Er konnte sie jedoch erst nach seinem Weggang vom 
Bauhaus zusammen mit dem Techniker Stefan Sebök verwirklichen. Als kine-
tische Plastik ist sie eine späte Verwirklichung des Konzepts des „dynamisch 
konstruktiven Kraftsystems", das Moholy-Nagy zusammen mit Alfred Kemény 
schon 1922 ganz im Geste des Konstruktivismus proklamiert hatte.38 
Die ursprünglich in einem kubischen Kasten eingebaute Plastik wurde von 
bunten Glühbirnen innerhalb des Kastens beleuchtet. Nicht nur die Bewegung 
der Plastik und ihr sich ständig wandelndes Aussehen im Licht machten die 
Wirkung aus, sonder auch die Schatten, die sie auf die Wände des Kastens oder 
nach Entfernung der Rückwand auf einen beliebig großen Projektionsschirm 
warf.39 
Moholy-Nagy hält sowohl die Plastik selber als auch ihre Projektionen in 
einem Film dem Titel „Lichtspiel Schwarz Weiß Grau" von 1930 fest. Die 
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anfangliche Konzeption des Films war allerdings umfangreicher. Dem Skript 
zufolge sollten dem Erscheinen des Requisits drei andere Teile vorausgehen.40 
Im ersten Teil sollten wiederum künstlich hervorgerufene Lichterscheinungen 
vom Streichholz und der Kerze über die Gaslampe bis zum elektrischen Licht, 
repräsentiert durch Suchscheinwerfer, Flugzeug und Autolichter, gezeigt wer-
den. Im zweiten Teil sollten ein Stahlwerk, glühendes Metall und Funken, aber 
auch ein erleuchtetes Karussell und bestrahlte Springbrunnen erscheinen. Nach 
dem dritten Teil, der Beleuchtungsapparaturen im Theater, das Kino, ein Film-
studio und das Fotogramm präsentieren sollte, war die Darstellung der allmäh-
lichen Entstehung des Lichtrequisits geplant. Darauf folgte die Vorbereitung 
des Zuschauers auf die Bewegung des Requisits durch das Filmen verschiedener 
beweglichen Elemente. Das Skript beschreibt somit nicht nur die Entstehung 
des Requisits quasi als Summe aller technischen Errungenschaften, die Licht 
und Bewegung hervorgebracht und die moderne Umwelt verändert haben. Es 
zeigt auch die Entwicklung von der rein reproduktiven Anwendung des Films zu 
einer produktiven, das Fotogramm noch übertreffenden Gestaltung der Hell-
Dunkelwerte in ihrer, der Zeit entsprechenden Bewegtheit auf. Stärker noch als 
das Fotogramm kann der Film das abstrakte Sehen durch die Schaffung nun 
bewegter Beziehungen schulen. 
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1. The Start of The Hungarian Quarterly 
The Great Depression in the 1930s transformed the European power struc-
ture that had been arranged by the peace treaties after the First World War. 
Germany, which remained intact and potentially the strongest power of Europe 
both economically and militarily, started to catch up with France and Britain, 
threatening French continental hegemony and with this the entire post-war set-
tlement. For France safety seemed to lie in the enforcement of the Treaty of 
Versailles while British policy tended to seek reconciliation with Germany 
through a mild application or a revision of the treaty. 
The main object of Britain's and France's political activity in 1933 and 
1934 was an agreement on disarmament. The impulse for this came from Brit-
ain, which was reluctant to participate in a renewed arms race, when the revival 
of militant German policy made this task urgent. Though disarmament negoti-
ations had many disadvantages for France, the existing power structure could no 
longer be imposed on Germany except by force, which France could not use 
without British support. 
The call for the revision of treaties meant, primarily, territorial readjustment 
of the Polish-German border and the frontiers of Hungary. The two victorious 
powers, which offered smaller or greater diplomatic support for Hungary during 
the interwar period, were Britain and Italy, and for fear of being isolated, France 
did not refuse to co-operate. Thus, in the spring of 1933 all three victors agreed 
that a certain improvement in the post-war settlement was desirable, and all 
were inclined to reconsider it. 
Concerning the four power negotiations, Foreign Office documents show a 
surprising degree of British interest towards Hungary in 1933 and 1934; these 
sources help to explain the otherwise exaggerated Hungarian propaganda in 
Britain. At this time even Count István Bethlen himself paid a visit to Britain 
and gave lectures on the Hungarian question. His speeches were the first de-
tailed, though unofficial, description of Hungarian territorial claims and Hun-
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garian plans for the revision of the peace treaties. Bethlen and the Hungarian 
claims were refused; the Foreign Office did not find any changes to represent a 
better solution than the status quo established after the First World War. 
There were also other reasons for Beth len's failure. These primarily con-
cerned the changes in international policy and fear of the events in Germany. 
The British government expected him to declare moderate claims in the ques-
tion of frontier revision,1 in accordance with "commonsense," by which they 
meant demands reflecting the real power conditions of the moment and in 
agreement with the sense of justice and fairness of the British public. 
Aware of the expectations, the Hungarian politician tried to refer to the eth-
nic principle and the right of self-determination. But he always backed these 
accepted arguments with unaccepted ones by referring to the historic mission of 
Hungary in the region, justified by Magyar administrational and cultural superi-
ority. Despite knowing perfectly well that the British would only affirm, a re-
adjustment based on ethnic principle, Bethlen made claims for the restoration of 
Magyar supremacy, which implied the intention of an integral restoration of the 
borders of historic Hungary. 
After brief hesitation, the Foreign Office decided not to receive Bethlen and 
not to deal with the question of frontier readjustment in the British Parliament. 
Austin Chamberlain, former foreign secretary, warned the government in a 
speech to be careful and not to support ambiguous aspirations.2 The pro-
Hungarian parliamentary deputies, supported by governmental policy, could not 
make a commitment to Bethlen's exaggerated claims and they proposed only to 
return those territories to the Hungarian Kingdom that had a definite Magyar 
majority. 
Bethlen was well aware of the failure of his lecture tour. Despite the "great 
politeness in personal relations" and except for a few friends "willing to treat 
Hungary fairly," there were no signs that Britain wanted to pursue a strategic 
policy aimed at the revision of the treaties. He also affirmed after his return that 
there was no hope for territorial revision on the basis of the historic right to re-
store "natural borders."3 Two choices remained after the failure of the lecture 
tour: to reduce Hungarian claims according to the expectations of British and 
international policy, or to elaborate new propaganda and intensify its activity. 
Bethlen chose the latter, and this resulted logically from the political credo of 
the Magyar ruling elite. 
If the neighbouring Czechoslovakia and Romania could gain the support of 
the victorious great powers for their ambitions within the framework of a non-
functioning security structure that would soon collapse, the Magyar ruling elite, 
possessing a much better geopolitical position and representing 12 million peo-
ple in the middle of the region, was supposed to have the same, or even better 
chances of being favoured in the next rearrangement. The claim for supremacy 
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and historic borders was not only a strategic aim of Hungarian foreign policy. 
As already mentioned, from tactical considerations it also demarcated itself 
from readjustment on ethnic principles in order to create a better ground for fu-
ture negotiations. 
Returning from London, Bethlen decided to organize a periodical that would 
deal constantly with questions of "Hungarian justice" and with the aim of pre-
paring the English speaking public in case British and international policy 
would renew efforts for the revision of the peace treaties. Judging from the idea 
of establishing The Hungarian Quarterly, Bethlen was convinced that an inten-
sified, better prepared and more widespread propaganda would create a more 
favourable image of Hungary and sufficiently strong support from public opin-
ion to promote considerably the case of territorial revision in favour of Hungary 
against her neighbours. With a similar goal the bimonthly Nouvelle Revue de 
Hongrie had been already functioning since 1932; Bethlen was a co-chairman 
of the editorial board. The authors, who published in the periodical for French 
speaking readers and later in the new organ for the English speaking ones, were 
leading conservative intellectuals, centered around the Magyar Szemle Társaság 
(Hungarian Review Society). The editorial staff of that periodical had been es-
tablished to a certain extent on the initiative of Bethlen in 1927, at a time when 
the prime minister was at the peak of his political carrier and success. Magyar 
Szemle was considered to be a semiofficial organ of the Bethlen administration, 
representing in the spirit of Hungarian cultural superiority the values of the 
post-war conservative, rightwing and anti-revolutionary Magyar political elite.4 
At a meeting organized for the establishment of The Hungarian Quarterly in 
July 1934 Bethlen explained that the new periodical would serve the same aim 
in the Anglo-Saxon world as the Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie in the Latin-French 
one: the introduction of Hungary and the questions of Hungarian policy. The 
other duties of the new organ were to win important figures in British public life 
by soliciting articles and studies (with handsome fees) and to provoke debates 
in the British press about problems concerning Hungary.5 
The chairman was Count István Bethlen himself. While the editor and sec-
retary general of The Society of the Hungarian Quarterly was József Balogh, a 
member of the Hungarian Review Society, acknowledged scholar, philologist 
and expert on patristic studies with excellent British and American connections. 
The joint chairmen were Prince György Festetics and Gyula Kornis, Tibor Eck-
hardt and György Ottlik. Bethlen ensured the financial support of the organ by 
using his connections with the economic elite and the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. He also instructed the editorial staff in political and financial questions. 
Each number of the Quarterly opened with two or three studies on important 
questions of international policy. These were followed by articles on other, less 
urgent political or economic problems, and in every issue articles on living or 
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historic figures of public life. Then came items of more general interest, such as 
tourism, hunting adventures, music, art history and Hungarian literature. With-
out exception, each number closed with the column called Danubian Chronicle, 
a chronology of the political events of the last months. Although this produced 
rather dry reading with uncomfortably small print, it always contained more 
open and courageous statements, quoted from politicians, than the representa-
tive, carefully written studies on the first pages. 
The first number appeared in spring 1936. The opening article was written 
by Bethlen who emphasized that The Hungarian Quarterly had "no intention of 
indulging in propaganda on behalf of anybody or anything; on the contrary, it 
was resolved to refrain from any activity of that kind, and its main purpose was 
to promote mutual acquaintance and mutual understanding."6 The editor also 
stressed and demonstrated the editorial independence of the Quarterly by print-
ing a statement in each number that the editorial staff of The Hungarian Quar-
terly took "no responsibility for the views of the contributors" and did not agree 
with the opinions expressed in their articles.7 Anyone who knew Bethlen, the 
chairman of the editorial staff and the able coordinator of Magyar propaganda, 
naturally did not believe these declarations. They were no more than necessary 
gestures in the language of diplomacy and expressed the unofficial character of 
the periodical. 
The Quarterly was an organic continuation of the unoffical propaganda ac-
tivity of the late 1920s and early 1930s represented by Justice for Hungary and 
Bethlen's lectures in Britain.8 Its creators and directors were the best represen-
tatives of Hungarian political thought, who, playing by the rules of international 
politics, always controlled which aspects of their program to promote an official 
policy, and which to keep for unofficial publications, like The Hungarian 
Quarterly. 
2. The Attempt to Keep British Interest Alive for "Hungarian Justice" 
In the period from the Rheinland question to the Anschluss and the Munich 
Agreement in 1938, the British pursued a policy of appeasement towards Ger-
many. Based on the German national minorities beyond Germany's Eastern 
borders, the British, with the aim of preserving European peace, acknowledged 
its just claims for rearmament and political influence. 
During this time Hungarian propaganda in Britain tried to connect the Ma-
gyar endeavour with the precedents achieved by Germany in the revision of 
some important aspects of the post-war peace treaties. There was "really no rea-
son why the Treaty of Trianon should be regarded as more sacrosanct than the 
Treaty of Versailles."9 By that time the general criticism of the post-war treaties 
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that "balkanized a great part of Europe" was also accepted in international 
diplomacy. There was "a general agreement that the peace settlement made at 
the close of the war was in many ways not only imperfect, but also unjust and 
vindicative,"11 because the authors of the Treaty of Versailles had been "think-
ing not in terms of permanent peace, in economic cooperation, and social prog-
ress, but rather in war and its prevention." The "Danubian Chronicle" quoted 
Bethlen on this question in the second number of the Quarterly, stating that the 
"removal of the injustices" of the Treaty of Versailles would "automatically 
involve the removal of similar injustices perpetrated by the other treaties."13 
The most often discussed political subject in this first period of the Quar-
terly was the possible reformation and reorganization of the Leauge of Nations. 
The Autumn 1936 issue of the Quarterly had already published replies and re-
actions to the articles of the previous two numbers on the topic.14 In the Winter 
issue three studies dealt with the reformation of the League.15 The behaviour of 
Italy in the Ethiopian crisis and particularly that of Germany during the Rhine-
land crisis demonstrated again the impotence of the international organization. 
Its failures worked in the interest of Hungary. As if it had been tacitly acknowl-
edged that the post-war settlement was a false one, and the status quo should be 
changed to achieve greater political stability, and if it could not be rearranged 
with the help of the League of Nations. As Bethlen had already noted, new ways 
had to be found.1 
The organization and functioning of the League of Nations were attacked 
even more harshly. During these three years more than a dozen studies on the 
League, mostly from British and American experts, enumerated all the argu-
ments that could be listed in the interest of Hungary and were hostile to the 
League. "Nothing in the history of the previous fifteen years had justified the 
belief that the League could intervene with success in any matters in which the 
material interest of the great powers had been involved"; the League provided 
no protection for the small nations and "no redress for grievances"; it had 
brought "not collective security but collective insecurity." 7 The openly pro-
Hungarian Lord Newton voiced the strongest criticism against the League. He 
objected that although half of Europe was unsatisfied with the status quo, the 
articles seeking to promote the necessary changes designed to save the Euro-
pean peace were entirely ignored.18 
By openly focusing on the interests behind the ideals, American professor of 
international law, Edwin Borchard specified in a comprehensive study the fun-
damental mistakes of the policy for the preservation of the status quo at any 
price. His views concerning the background to the conflicts, expressed on the 
surface in the name of one or another principle, are quite similar to mine. In his 
opinion the Covenant of the League "took no account of the fitness, propriety, 
desirability and practicability of the status quo, as a political redistribution of 
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power," nor of the fact that "it constituted a plan of reinsurance for the annexa-
tion and conquest achieved by certain powers."19 It also ignored the fact that "a 
political redistribution of territory in Europe, not corresponding to the natural 
strength of peoples, would cause economic dislocation which, with the political 
and psychological hostility engendered, would undermine and poison the social 
structure of all countries and necessarily lead to dangerous Psychosis."2 
After a careful, yearlong sampling of other studies on the question, István 
Bethlen himself published an article on the Hungarian grievances in the summer 
issue of 1937.21 In fact, after emphasizing at the start that the Quarterly was 
"free from any taint of propaganda," to appear in the same or next number with 
a study on changing the status quo would obviously have been a tactical error 
from the leading figure of Hungarian propaganda. In the previous number of the 
Quarterly, within the "Danubian Chronicle," this study had already been pre-
pared by the publication of another article, written for Hungarian readers, where 
he expressed himself unambiguously in connection with the League's failures to 
protect Magyar minorities and the claim of Hungary for reasonable rearma-
ment.22 
He again summarized the faults of the existing practice of the League of 
Nations, which could not even guarantee the fulfilment of the prescriptions of 
the peace treaties, since the situation of Hungary was much worse in many re-
spects than the treaties had allowed. The former victors could force anything on 
the former losers, while the latter could not practise their fundamental rights.23 
Bethlen, sticking with admirable objectivity to the facts, enumerated the failure 
of all Hungarian claims addressed to the League during the previous eighteen 
years. In his article he accused the international organization of not only having 
"failed to serve the cause of healthy evolution, by eliminating the intolerable 
injustices of the peace treaties," but also of having contributed "passively and 
sometimes even actively to making these injustices more unbearable and bur-
densome for the defeated states," whereby it had "failed to defend the victims 
when the conquering small states perpetrated fait accomplis at the expense of 
the former."24 
Though he mentioned the injuries of Magyar minorities, the emphasis was 
rather on rearmament. His aim was primarily to convince his readers that under 
such conditions the League, unable to assist should at least not block Hungary's 
justified claims concerning a degree of rearmament necessary for her self-
defence. Germany was strong enough to realize its will, but the small loser 
states remained the victims of the small victors. If Germany was allowed to de-
velop its military strength, the same could not be denied Hungary. His argument 
was later supported by a quotation from the speech of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Kálmán Kánya in the next issue of the Quarterly.25 
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György Ottlik, vice-president of the society of the Hungarian Quarterly, 
turned back to the Leauge of Nations a year later in order to keep the interest in 
the Hungarian claims against the international organization alive.26 Ottlik's 
study reflected the changes in international policy. Although he repeated the 
claim for rearmament, by that time the Sudeten-German question had become 
more important, further emphasizing the problems of national minorities. He 
argued that "even professor Seton-Watson freely admitted the League of Na-
tions' mistakes" in connection with minority protection, the organization had 
"failed to make its minority guarantees a reality and to impose observance of 
their obligations upon the states which signed minority treaties."" Another 
study from a British author in the previous number called attention to the ques-
tion by stating "the conditions of the larger minority groups [were] probably as 
bad as they had ever been since 1918."28 To illustrate the dangers following 
from the unsolved minority problems, in the same issue of the Quarterly, the 
"Danubian Chronicle" quoted the speech of Tiso given on the twentieth anni-
versary of the Pittsburg Covenant and promising autonomy for the Slovaks de-
manding national independence,29 while the next issue published Hennlein's 
claims for the German minority in Czechoslovakia.30 Writing about all the 
negative features of the Czech minority policy and the possible solutions of the 
German-Czechoslovak question,31 the Hungarian propaganda was practically 
preparing the way for the expected dissolution of Czechoslovakia. This was also 
affirmed by a resolution of the Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League, stat-
ing that "the Magyar minority had as much right to self-determination as the 
Slovaks, Germans, Ruthenians and Poles."32 
Meanwhile the most important event influencing the immediate fate of the 
Danube Basin was the Anschluss, as a result of which Hungary became the 
neighbour of militant Germany. Bethlen again himself published a study on 
Hungary's position after the unification of Austria with Hitler's Germany. "The 
logic of history had to follow this course,"33 wrote Bethlen, characterizing the 
natural process resulting from the fundamental desire of all Germans to unite 
within the framework of a nation state. Bethlen welcomed the changes and ar-
gued that "the history of the past twenty years in the Danube Basin" had been 
equivalent to the "dictatorship of the Little Entente based on French support," 
but the rise of German in the region and the union with Austria had "once and 
for all put an end to this state of affairs."34 
The Anschluss, and soon after it the deepening Sudeten-German crisis, of-
fered a good opportunity to attract the attention of the guardians of European 
peace to the fact that the restoration of Hungarian domination in the region, by 
occupying territories in the Danube Basin before the Germans would annex 
them into their empire, would serve not only Magyar interests. As the multina-
tional, neighbouring Czechoslovakia had to fail, Hungary's chances for suprem-
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acy increased significantly. The new situation afforded "a great opportunity" for 
Hungary "to rise from the humiliation of Trianon, and once again to become an 
important factor in the Danubian Basin," if not "the most important" one.35 
Though Regent Horthy tried to calm everyone concerning the consequences 
of the union of the neighbouring Austria (and the Quarterly certainly published 
his speech for the English speaking pro-Hungarians),36 it was difficult to hide 
the fact that German expansionism directly threatened Hungary and the desired 
Magyar supremacy. Though the Magyars had a strong position among the other 
smaller nations, the power of Germany could not be compared at all with that of 
Hungary, and any further German expansionism reduced the chances of Magyar 
supremacy in the Danube Basin. The question of rearrangement, possibly with 
the arbitration of all the Western powers, became an urging problem. 
3. European Rearrangement at the Expense of Czechoslovakia 
In order to preserve European peace, the Munich Agreement in September 
1938 instructed Czechoslovakia to give its territories, where the Germans con-
stituted the majority, to Germany. The great powers had decided to sacrifice a 
peaceful, democratic, Entente-associated country. Hungarian propaganda, 
deeply interested in the shaping and consolidation of the new settlement, thor-
oughly emphasized all the reasons that could justify this significant rearrange-
ment. 
In addition, a month later in Vienna the German-Italian arbitration gave 
back to Hungary those Czechoslovakian territories that were inhabited by a 
Magyar majority. Following the important diplomatic meeting in Munich and 
Vienna, the Quarterly dealt exclusively with Czechoslovakia in the Winter is-
sue. 
The arguments in The Hungarian Quarterly started by arguing for the fair-
ness of Germany's claims, which were designed to redress the completely unfair 
peace treaties. The joint editor of the Quarterly in Britain, Professor Gooch 
pointed out why it had been evident from the beginning that the post-war ar-
rangement could not be lasting, as it deprived Germany of the whole of her co-
lonial possessions, imposed a crushing burden of reparations, forbade her to 
rearm, and demilitarised the Rhineland without time limit."'7 
In comparison with Germany, Hungary had lost even more owing to the un-
just Peace treaties, and the "Englishmen fully understood the feelings of Hun-
garians" who, while admitting that in war the loser had always had to pay, they 
had to pay "more than was fair."38 With the Munich Agreement and the Vienna 
Award "the errors of Trianon had been corrected and the Hungarian parts of 
Hungary had returned to the mother country."39 
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A much better and convincing study on Czechoslovakia, written by László 
Ottlik, focused on the inner, structural deficiencies of the multinational small 
state, owing to which it was doomed to fail.40 The basic idea of the article was 
that democracy could not be squared with the equal rights of national minori-
ties, because democracy by its nature is the rule of majority. The Czechs could 
"easily oppress all their minorities without injuring democratic laws."41 He also 
compared the treatment of liberal pre-war Hungary with the Czech policy to-
wards minorities and emphasized that despite the cultural oppression Magyar 
liberalism had not made impossible the economic existence of the national mi-
norities, as the Czechs and the other neighbours had.42 In order to assure the 
readers about the Magyar's unquestionable fairness in the future towards mi-
norities, two other articles dealt with the excellent mutual cooperation of differ-
ent nationalities in Upper Hungary throughout Hungarian history.43 
Sharp criticism, openly hostile in spirit, was published against the Czechs by 
Sir Thomas Cunninghame,44 a former British Military representative in Austria 
and Military Attaché in Prague who had been well acquainted with the conflicts 
of the successor states since the breakup of Austria-Hungary. He wrote a long 
essay on how evident the imperialistic motivation of the Czech emigration had 
been before and during the peace negotiations, and how contrary to common 
sense the exaggerated support of the Entente towards Czech ambitions was.45 
He condemned the territorial annexations that had been based on historic and 
ethnic principles at the same time, as even these two principles had proved to be 
insufficient to justify the annexations of Magyars and Ruthens. In the view of 
the author, the Czech policy therefore was guilty of its own failure.46 
The exclusive responsibility of the Czechs was further emphasized in a later 
study on Edward Benes, which considered all the misery of the Danube Basin to 
be the result of the lack of foresight in Czech policy.47 Masaryk and Benes did 
not want "to accept the necessity of a strong Central European power against 
Germany," and "made all their neighbours enemies owing to conflicts on terri-
tory."48 
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was the common decision of the British, 
French and Italian governments in order to appease Germany, and the Vienna 
Award was considered by them an additional agreement for the sake of greater 
political stability in the Danube Basin. The British government officially ac-
knowledged the readjustment of the Hungarian border as valid. The Foreign 
Office was satisfied that the conflict was settled without the participation of 
Britain and on the basis of mutual agreement between Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary.49 Therefore it was no longer necessary to continue justifying the fair-
ness of the rearrangement concerning the Hungarian-Slovakian borders with the 
exception of some confederation plans referring to this country as well.50 
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Few months later, while the Germans were creating the Czech-Moravian 
Protectorate in March 1939, another part of the former Czechoslovak state, 
Ruthenia, returned to Hungary. This event remained almost without echo in the 
subsequent issues of the Quarterly. It happened so quickly that preparation for 
reannexation by propaganda was not possible, and after the event it seemed to 
be more tactical not to mention it. Both the ethnic principle and the right of self-
determination were rudely violated, because the annexation of the Sub-
Carpathian territory was executed by military force. 
Despite the fact that Hungarian policy ignored the basic rules of territorial 
readjustment prescribed by international law, Hungary's step was accepted after 
the event by the Western governments, who considered Magyar expansionism 
more favourably than German.51 They perceived quite clearly that if Hungary 
would not have occupied its former sphere of interests, Germany would have 
done so. Ruthenia therefore was shrouded in silence; it appeared in only two or 
three studies on economic questions52 and tourism,53 and did not figure among 
the representative articles on important problems of international politics. 
4. Territorial Readjustment after the Outbreak 
of the Second World War 
After a significant part of Upper Hungary had been returned, and starting 
from the Summer issue of 1939, The Hungarian Quarterly concentrated on the 
Transylvanian question. The successful previous annexations increased the self-
confidence of the Hungarian propagandists who sharply attacked the Romanians 
with a surprisingly hostile assault. The method and tactics of reasoning were the 
same. The violations of the ethnic principle, the right of self-determination, and 
injuries to minority rights, were supported by data, statistics, facts and maps. 
The idea of Magyar cultural and administrational superiority increasingly found 
a place in the articles. As a result the tone became more and more emotional, 
intolerant and aggressive. 
An important endeavour of Magyar propaganda was the refutation of the 
Romanian theory of Daco-Romanian continuity, the myth of national origin that 
justified the firstcomers' right for the Romanians.54 In order to convince the 
readers that the Daco-Romanian theory was untrue, the studies emphasized the 
evidence for later Romanian immigration by analyzing legal traditions, the ur-
ban structure created by other nationalities,55 and also by stressing the Balkan 
mentality, culture and traditions, the orthodox religion and Greek writing of the 
Romanians.5 
The history of the Transylvanian Principality during the time of the Turkish 
occupation provided an excellent opportunity for the studies to demonstrate the 
THE HUNGARIAN QUARTERLY 1936-1941 105 
viability of the Hungarian state idea. Namely, that the Hungarian State that had 
been preserved during the partition primarily by the political culture of Transyl-
vania.57 A study was also dedicated to English-Transylvanian connections. 
These in fact had for religious reasons been far more important in the seven-
teenth century than English political relations with the Hungarian Kingdom.58 
Protestant Transylvania had not only significant cultural ties based on student 
peregrinations to English universities, but also diplomatic relations with the 
Stuarts and Cromwell. 
The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 necessarily 
brought changes to British policy toward Hungarian territorial revision. After 
the First Vienna Award, the Foreign Office did not in theory oppose the return 
of Romanian territories inhabited by a Magyar majority and acknowledged 
Hungary's right to these lands. But all further claims were considered unjust 
territorial occupation.59 
The Second Vienna Award in August 1940, which with German-Italian 
agreement annexed Northern-Transylvania to Hungary, was not accepted by 
Britain after the start of the war. Although Romania was not an ally of the Brit-
ish, this readjustment was not recognized as valid, because it resulted of bellig-
erent states, hostile to Great Britain, and "His Majesty's Government could not 
regard to be just any territorial changes executed after September 1939."60 
Although the Hungarian government had been following a rather proGerman 
policy, Prime Minister Pál Teleki, a close friend of István Bethlen and a repre-
sentative of the same political course, tried to do everything to preserve the 
good will of Britain. He emphasized geopolitical considerations, and until his 
death he remained respected as the defender and symbol of democratic values 
against the pressure of German dictatorship.61 The tacit understanding of Britain 
encouraged the Quarterly to intensify its propaganda for the justification of the 
frontier readjustment, even as official British declarations considered the an-
nexations questionable. 
Starting with the Autumn issue in 1940 The Hungarian Quarterly began to 
solicit readers in the United States. Instead of Széchenyi's journeys in England 
many studies dealt with the Hungarian officers of the American War of Inde-
pendence, Hungarian travellers in the United States, and Kossuth's popularity 
with the American public.62 The articles about the Transylvanian question were 
increasingly being directed at American readers. 
The Winter number of the periodical was dedicated completely to the rean-
nexation of Northern-Transylvania. The enthusiastic atmosphere radiating from 
this issue was much stronger than after the first readjustment of the Czechoslo-
vakian frontier. József Balogh, the editor, felt it necessary to write a foreword to 
the studies.63 His essay, like other articles, ignored the ethnic principle and the 
right of self-determination, and in a surprisingly hostile spirit towards Romania 
strongly emphasized Magyar cultural and administrational superiority. The 
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characteristic formulation of this idea could be found in a note by László Pas-
suth, which declared "numbers and ethnographic considerations were not the 
only elements" in the Transylvanian problem. One also had to consider "the 
mysterious union of historic tradition" that had made Transylvania "the Eastern 
border stronghold of European civilisation." 
An American priest examined the rights of the religious minorities. He sur-
passed even these emotional essays by stating that Romania, when it had taken 
over Transylvania, "lacked the solid, intelligent, informed middle class which 
she so needed," and the Romanians, who had "poured into the territory had the 
tradition of their own Turkish experiences."66 The "great and most difficult 
task" of combining Western and Balkan cultures was not achieved by the Ru-
manians, who had had "neither education, nor the experience which the occa-
sion demanded"; "as well might the state of California be given to Mexico!"67 
The longest article came from a leading expert on the subject, by Zsombor 
Szász, and dealt with the history of Transylvania in detail. It was filled with 
similar hostile emotions. The author refuted the theory of Daco-Romanian con-
tinuity, denied the latinity of Romanian culture, and criticised the policy of the 
Romanian national elite by constantly emphasizing the backwardness and Bal-
kan mentality of the nomadic people.68 Two other studies repeated the basic 
ideas of Szász; one by explaining the racial, religious, and linguistic aspects of 
Balkan Romanian culture,69 the other by "tracing the origin and development of 
the Romanians."70 The extraordinarily emotional approach of the Quarterly to-
wards Romanian history was most characteristically expressed by László Pas-
suth, who stated that the history of the Romanian Principalities had showed "no 
likeness to that of the Latin countries which from early medieval times onward 
had produced a whole array of Christian monarchies and civilisation." Unlike 
Hungary, "Balkan morals, hideous destitution among the lower classes, and 
perpetual compromises with the neighbouring Great Powers" had been the prin-
cipal features in the evolution of Romania.71 
In comparison with the relatively moderate start in 1936, the Quarterly, like 
the Hungarian press in general, lost its self-control under the influence of the 
quick successes by Hungarian foreign policy. Instead of facts, reasons and ar-
guments, the greatest values of the Quarterly for British eyes at the start, emo-
tions ruled its spirit. It published such opinions as: "Hungary did not have to 
demand Transylvania, as it had belonged to the Hungarians for a thousand 
years, and there was not a single Hungarian who did not know that one day it 
will return."72 This intolerant and aggressive tone was the worst type of propa-
ganda, and could never be successful in Britain. The views expressed in the 
Quarterly were not only contrary to the intentions and interests of the British 
policy, and therefore contradictory to the fundamental rule of making propa-
ganda, but also unacceptable to British taste. 
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5. Culture in Service of Political Propaganda 
From 1936 to 1941, The Hungarian Quarterly increasingly became an in-
strument of political propaganda, and the studies on literature, music, art his-
tory, and tourism proved to be no more than an attractive wrapping to give a 
more acceptable form and outlook to the primarily political message. 
However, these writings on geography, history, ethnography, or literature 
also contained, to varying degrees, ideas shared by the propagandist articles on 
international affairs. The mere intention of emphasizing culture fitted perfectly 
into the conception of Hungary's cultural superiority. Thus, the studies on Hun-
garian culture could neither hide, nor counterbalance the propagandistic impres-
sion which the Quarterly exercised on the readers. This proved to be especially 
true when its tone became more and more intolerant and aggressive after the 
Czechoslovakian crisis in 1938. 
Most of the essays on culture were historic studies, focusing on those times 
and events of Hungarian history, that could contribute to the image of Hungary 
had enjoyed before the First World War.73 Among the elements of this image 
most often were the striking similarity of British and Hungarian constitutional 
development, the traditional affinity to monarchic rule, and Hungary serving as 
the bulwark of Christianity against the invasions from the East, especially in the 
Turkish times. 
Transylvania was a good example with which to demonstrate the tolerant 
character of the Magyars and the viability of Hungarian administrative tradi-
tions. Széchenyi, who considered the English state an ideal construction and 
travelled a good deal to leam and collect experiences, was a popular figure of 
the Quarterly. Kossuth and the 1848-49 Revolution and War of Independence 
were also commonly treated subjects. Széchenyi was a suitable hero for conser-
vative readers, Kossuth for the liberals and radicals, and the events of 1848-49 
fitted into the image of a liberty-loving nation fighting for its freedom against 
oppression. Like each topic, each study on history had its function in justifying 
Magyar claims for territorial revision. 
One group of the studies on history tried to demonstrate the tradition of 
warm English-Hungarian relations and friendship.74 The Quarterly's expert on 
the question was Alexander Fest, but some pro-Hungarian British aristocrats 
also published weak or mediocre essays on the subject.75 This was not an easy 
enterprise at all, as the Magyars, quite naturally, had connections mostly with 
their neighbours: the Germans, Poles, or Italians. 
Some articles on history dealt with the nationality problem. These argued 
that historic Hungary had been a peaceful place for all the nationalities for cen-
turies,76 and that the "harmonious fusion of so many peoples of distinctly differ-
ent racial character" had been "disturbed by the French Revolution, which made 
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nationality the centre of community life, and identified it with language." The 
Magyar nobility had contributed significantly to the development of Romanian 
literacy and alphabetization by having the Bible printed in Romanian and estab-
lishing Romanian printing presses. Tolerance, and later liberalism, had charac-
terised the behaviour of Hungarians in Transylvania before the appearance of 
nationalism.78 
Together with the frequent declaration of Hungarian cultural and adminis-
trational superiority, the historic mission of Hungary was constantly empha-
sized. Some of these articles represented serious scholarly works,79 others were 
written with a somewhat romantic approach.80 A weak, rather low level study on 
Hungarian national character, focusing on the pride and liberty-loving nature of 
the Magyars, stated that a basic element of Hungarian mentality was "the con-
viction of being born to power," that the Magyar was "entitled to rule, and it 
was due because of the inherent values of his own personality."81 
In 1938, the editor József Balogh introduced King Stephen's conception of 
state to the readers through a mystic and emotional interpretation in 1938.82 It 
was quite characteristic of the Quarterly when, despite a British warning that 
the Hungarians "read more into the foundation of their realm than was origi-
nally inherent in it," the editor declared an openly imperialistic endeavour: "St. 
Stephen's conception of state, the Pax Hungarica" was an "imperial idea," 
which envisaged a wider circle than that which the Treaty of Trianon had as-
signed to the Hungarian people.83 The historic mission of Hungary was ex-
plained in a similar tone which tried to emphasize the traditional understanding 
and tolerance of the liberty-loving Magyars towards the neighbouring nations.84 
The claim for Magyar supremacy was formulated not only through the cul-
tural and admin istrational superiority that unambiguously implied the leading 
role of Hungary, which possessed a historic mission, but also through some 
analyses written by the editorial staff of the Quarterly. In a study on the injus-
tices of the post-war settlements, József Balogh had already declared openly in 
1937 that the Hungarian Kingdom "had always been, either de facto or virtually, 
a Danubian Great Power, or at least a power that carried within itself a well-
founded potentiality of greatness."85 As for the reduced post-war Hungary he 
expressed his conviction that "mutilated by Trianon, a wreck and a wraith of its 
former self, ceaselessly clamouring, beggar-wise, for 'Justice', this little Danu-
bian state is yet the kernel and promise of a regenerated Central Europe."86 
Not only historical but also literary topics were suitable for creating the nec-
essary background for political propaganda. Numerous short stories and novel-
extracts concentrated on the human tragedies resulting from Trianon, the Ro-
manian occupation, the terror at the time of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, mi-
nority oppression, and nostalgia for the prewar peace.87 In general, Hungarian 
literature was represented by competently translated publications not only from 
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popular and fashionable writers ofthat time, like Ferenc Herczeg, Lajos Zilahy 
and Zsolt Harsányi, but also from classic authors like Mór Jókai, Kálmán Mik­
száth, Zsigmond Móricz, Mihály Babits, Frigyes Karinthy and Dezső Kosz­
tolányi. Publishing the best of Hungarian literature in English, the Quarterly 
naturally did much in the interest of spreading and introducing the general val­
ues of Hungarian culture.88 The studies on the history of old and modern Hun­
garian literature, written by Antal Szerb and Dezső Keresztury represented 
scholarship of the highest level.89 
A column called "Hungarian Bookshelf was dedicated to the review of 
books in English related to Hungary and its culture. Part of the books dealt with 
political topics, like the Paris Peace Conference, the plebiscites for frontier re­
adjustment, the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, or racial and national minori­
ties. Others concentrated on history, economics, geography, ethnography, the 
arts, and most especially on literature. Two publications were analyzed in 
longer reviews: C. A. Macartney's work on Hungary and her Successors and 
the two volume edition of Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Rela­
tions of Hungary, published by the Royal Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Af­
fairs.90 
Beginning with the Spring 1944 issue the latter had already advertised in the 
Quarterly. The analysis of the document collection by Lindsay Rogers, an 
American professor of law, together with a survey of the Treaty of Trianon, 
emphasized that Hungary was the first country to publish its secret diplomatic 
documents from the time of the peace negotiations.91 This meant creating a vir­
tue from necessity, as decisions at the peace conference had been made in all 
cases to the Magyars' disadvantage. Thus naturally Hungary was interested in 
the publication of the secret documents more than any other state. 
The study by Sándor Körmendy-Ékes on C. A. Macartney's monograph was 
far more important because it provided an outstanding opportunity to examine 
The Hungarian Quarterly's views on territorial readjustment. Macartney, the 
pro-Hungarian British scholar and Fellow of All Souls College in Oxford at that 
time, also published articles in the Quarterly on Hungary's history and eco­
nomic life.92 Although the author of the review did not find Macartney's criti­
cism of the neighbouring states sufficiently vehement, he acknowledged and 
praised the British scholar's objectivity and in general appreciated his knowl­
edge and intentions, as Macartney had even learned the Hungarian language for 
the sake of his research.93 
According to Körmendy-Ékes's interpretation the British monograph aimed 
"to draw up a balance sheet" on how far the Treaty of Trianon had "improved 
the cultural and economic situation and progress of the population living in the 
territories taken away from Hungary," and tried to investigate "the justice of 
Hungary's demands for revision."94 In the British scholar's work Körmendy-
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Ékes focused on affirming that only one part of the minorities had "really felt 
oppressed" in pre-war Hungary, while others, such as the Slovaks, the Ruthens, 
the Germans and the Jews had "assimilated themselves gladly and of their own 
free will."95 
It was stressed that according to the monograph "Hungary's economic pol-
icy had been in many respects Hungarian rather than Magyar," and there had 
been "no question of impoverishing the nationalities or of placing them at an 
economic disadvantage compared with the Magyars." The rehabilitation of the 
pre-war minority policy of Hungary by Macartney was strongly emphasized, 
especially because this opinion favourable to the Magyars was based on the 
one-sidedly anti-Hungarian data collected by Seton-Watson. 
The review also focused on Macartney's opinion on the possible solution to 
the minority problems in the Danube Basin. The British expert did not believe 
in the defence of minorities by law,97 because the Central Europeans disre-
garded these laws.98 Macartney thought revision only necessary "insofar as it 
serves to unite the Hungarians living beyond the frontiers with the mother-
country." Where the ethnic principle had to be modified, he suggested trying "to 
balance out the numbers of the two minorities both sides of the frontier."99 The 
principle of "measure for measure, an eye for an eye" had already been pro-
posed by Bethlen in 1933. He considered this idea the only effective instrument 
against the Balkan disrespect for law. 
Although the British scholar acknowledged that the nationalities had "supplied 
a post-dated justification of the Treaty of Trianon" and the dismemberment of 
Hungary, he considered the ethnic principle as primary in frontier readjustment. 
Despite his favourable approach toward Hungary, Macartney obviously did not 
think in terms of the restoration of Hungarian supremacy, and most of Körmendy-
Ékes's objections concern this "deficiency." The correspondent of the Quarterly 
criticized the book for omitting references to such advantages of pre-war historic 
Hungary as personal freedom in the liberal Hungarian state and free economic 
development of nationalities.100 The reviewer also disapproved of the author's 
failure "to distinguish between Magyarization by force and becoming Magyar by 
free will." Macartney, he argued, had "not sufficiently acknowledged the aggra-
vation in the position of nationalities as compared to pre-war circumstances, the 
increase of the means of oppression, and the degeneration of fight into brutality." 
The critic felt a "constant struggle" in the evaluation of the Hungarian past "be-
tween the comparatively favourable results of Macartney's own investigation, and 
the teachings of the school of Professor Seton-Watson."101 
Based on the implicit message of the remarks, Körmendy-Ekes and the 
Quarterly would have preferred a version where historic Hungary had been de-
clared the best possible solution among the imperfect solutions for the minority 
problems of the Danube Basin. 
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Epilogue 
After Hungary's strong and apparently one-sided commitment to Germany 
(following the Second Vienna Award she had joined the Three Power pact in 
November 1940 and declared war on the Soviet Union in June 1941), the Hun­
garian political elite could not expect any further support from British policy. In 
1941 the Quarterly could appear only twice, and these became the last two pre­
war publications of the periodical. 
Prime Minister Pál Teleki, who symbolized the reduced influence of the pro-
Anglo-Saxon lobby of the Hungarian national elite, disappeared from the politi­
cal scene. Unable to accept the declaration of war on Yugoslavia, the only 
friendly ally against German pressure, he comitted suicide in April 1941. Join­
ing the German invasion against Yugoslavia meant the loss of Hungarian su­
premacy once and for all, and also all hope of restoring it, because the price of 
territorial revision became unconditional subordination to Hitler's Germany. 
Regardless of its territorial aggrandisation, Hungary ceased to function as an 
independent power. 
The Second World War did not significantly change those geographic, eco­
nomic, cultural conditions on which interwar Hungarian propaganda had relied 
as fundamental arguments to justify its endeavour for supremacy in the Car­
pathian Basin, and possibly in the Danube Basin, as well. Defeated once more, 
Hungary could not make just claims against the neighbours, who could again be 
found on the victors' side at the end of the war.102 
However, a half century later, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Czechos­
lovakia has provided further evidence that the exaggerated support of the Czech, 
Serb, and Romanian elites by the victorious Western powers, at the expense of 
dismembering Austria-Hungary, was an irretrievable mistake in 1918. They had 
presented these small, peripheric political forces with disproportionally greater 
power than their real weight and influence would have justified. Thus they be­
came inflated as political factors. Today, after their consolidation as indepen­
dent units, the chance of a lasting agreement between the centrally-positioned, 
artificially reduced Hungary, and its small, but numerous rivals for primacy in 
East-Central Europe has only decreased. 
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THE FAILED HANDSHAKE ON THE DANUBE: 
THE STORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN PLANS 
FOR THE LIBERATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 
AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
MIKLÓS LOJKÓ 
Pembroke College, Cambridge, 
UK 
The exposition of the political and military aspects of this subject was 
fraught with difficulties during the years of the Cold War. It was likely to be 
frustrated by the mysticism in which it came to be shrouded on both sides of the 
political divide. In the West, the missed opportunities and possible errors of 
Allied strategy came to be regretted with hindsight. In the East, in countries 
where the degree of openness of the régime allowed it, the same sentiments 
were expressed with the added bitterness of those entombed behind the Iron 
Curtain. Both approaches were likely to misjudge the likelihood of success of 
plans which were thwarted at the end of the war. 
The end of the Cold War has made a dispassionate approach more achiev-
able. At the same time, no study has apparently been written with the aim of 
summing up the results of the related scholarship of the past decades, including 
those on strategic deception, and examining the options available for the West 
with the eyes of an Eastern inquirer. This short paper is an attempt to fill this 
gap. 
I believe that, in the light of old debates and recently released material, two 
questions need to be addressed for an elucidation of the problem: 
1. Was there genuine desire among British and American political and mili-
tary leaders after 1942 to stage major campaigns in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
as a possible continuation of the Italian campaign, or were hints to this effect 
only part of a feint to divert German divisions from the vital battlegrounds of 
Normandy? 
2. Was such a venture feasible considering the contemporary military and 
political situation? 
These questions come naturally, and therefore, have to be formulated, at 
least initially, in this way. It will become apparent, however, that no clear-cut 
answer can be given to them, and a more thorough examination of the factors 
concerned will become necessary. 
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Operations code named TORCH (the Allied invasion of French North Af-
rica) and HUSKY (the subsequent landings in Sicily) were implemented in 
1942^13 as the only alternative to engage the Axis in active fighting. At the 
same time, they also served as the rehearsal for the decisive invasion in Nor-
mandy in mid-1944. The operations, however, evolved from an earlier British 
plan, conceived before the Soviet and American entry into the war, which 
would have accorded a more positive role to these manoeuvres, and, signifi-
cantly, as the various strands of the North African and Italian campaign devel-
oped, a new, clandestine, function came to be associated with them as well. The 
latter aspect only came to light recently as documents relating to strategic de-
ception have been partially released for public scrutiny, or published in the 
British Intelligence in the Second World War series. 
Until the Soviet and American entry into the war British strategic thinking 
concentrated on survival, rather than the means of actually winning. As far as 
there was a strategy, it consisted of a somewhat farfetched, but not inconceiv-
able, theory that the German Reich would eventually be brought down by mass 
uprisings in occupied Europe, instigated and assisted by the British. Such a plan 
required a prolonged war of attrition, resulting in the depletion of the enemy's 
resources, and a build-up of British resources, and those of the resistance in 
Europe. Large-scale bombing operations, and the creation of an ever tightening 
ring around the continent were envisaged. The centre of gravity of any military 
activity would also, by necessity, have to be the peripheries, rather than the hub, 
of the Nazi Empire. It was also essential to construct an elaborate and sophisti-
cated intelligence gathering network, and a web of agents who would "set 
Europe ablaze," to compensate for the disadvantage in matériel. As one of his 
last acts in public office on 19 July 1940, Neville Chamberlain signed a secret 
paper authorising that "a new organization shall be established forthwith to co-
ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy over-
seas... This organization will be known as the Special Operations Executive." 
A Mediterranean strategy, based on existing facilities in the Levant, and fo-
cusing on the Balkans, did not only emerge from the above stated principles by 
elimination. It made positive strategic sense as well. The loss of Romanian oil 
would have caused irreparable damage to the Germans; the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, en route to the oil installations of the Persian Gulf, was a traditional Brit-
ish sphere of interest with many personal contacts, as well as equipment in the 
Middle East, already in place. The fact that the area was held down by Italy, the 
junior partner in the Axis, made operations seem all the more practicable. Fi-
nally, strong partisan activity, both in Greece and in Yugoslavia, no doubt due 
to the fact that these peoples had developed sophisticated guerrilla tactics dur-
ing their long experience of submission under the Ottoman Empire, provided 
the British with some of their earliest continental allies. The fact, however, that 
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in May 1941, the British were ignominiously ejected from Crete by German 
intervention, was a portent of the considerable difficulties that lay ahead. 
It is arguable that a strategy based on the Eastern Mediterranean alone could 
never have won the war against Germany, and that the German attack on Russia 
was inevitable, and consequently any Russian counter-offensive would have 
clashed with British activity also aimed at establishing, or maintaining, a sphere 
of influence there. However, these considerations did not arise in this manner at 
this stage of the conflict. With Festung Europa an accomplished fact, the future 
seemed inscrutable. For a considerable period following the German attack on 
the Soviet Union, the Russians did not appear to be able resist to the onslaught. 
At this time "[a victorious counter-attack] was not the rôle for which the Rus-
sian Army was cast in the calculations of the British Chiefs of Staff."" 
The distribution of power in the conflict changed significantly with the 
American entry into the war. A Joint Chiefs of Staff was established, and 
American strategic planning, commensurate with their input into the war effort 
in matériel, gradually began to carry more weight than that of the British. US 
agreement to the "Germany First" principle was achieved with the natural con-
comitant proviso that the war had to be brought to a conclusion in Europe as 
quickly as possible. From as early as December 1941, the time of the first 
Washington Conference, the plan of a North-Western assault on the heart of 
Europe enjoyed primacy among Allied strategies. BOLERO and ROUNDUP, as 
the build-up of troops and equipment in the UK and the planned landing opera-
tions were code named initially, had to take precedence over all other commit-
ments, or had to benefit from them. If the Far East became temporarily a sub-
sidiary theatre, the Balkans, with its frightening connotations for the Americans 
of a Byzantine quagmire, did all the more so. The principle was not an "un-
European" one. Engaging the enemy at the decisive point with decisive force 
had been an old Clausewitzian approach to war. Gradually the British Chiefs of 
Staff and Churchill himself came round to accepting the idea, not least because 
it seemed to serve as a guarantee of US adherence to the "Germany First" prin-
ciple. By the time of the Teheran Conference in December 1943 no-one openly 
dissented from this main thrust of the strategy. In addition, the fact that Presi-
dent Roosevelt, and George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army, argued 
fervently for providing effective relief for the Russians in their fight against 
appalling odds on the Eastern Front as early as possible by opening a second 
front in Western Europe, and that they, among other American leaders, shared a 
propensity to suspect the British Mediterranean strategy of not being entirely 
disinterested, of being part of some kind of an imperial design, lay heavily in 
favour of an exclusively North-West European strategy. Resentment to the 
scheme was likewise flamed by the impression that, by clinging to it, Churchill 
hoped to put right, as it were, his failed policy at the Dardanelles during the 
First World War. In both cases he invoked the metaphor of attacking the "soft 
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underbelly" of a crocodile to propagate the plan. The early attachment of the 
British to action in the Eastern Mediterranean, however, died hard. 
An Allied amphibious attack on North-West Europe turned out to be logisti-
cally impossible in 1942. ironically, it was American eagerness to engage the 
Axis in 1942 which gave the impetus to reviving the old British plans for land-
ing in French North Africa, Operation GYMNAST, or TORCH as it was subse-
quently renamed. In December 1942 at Casablanca Churchill and Roosevelt 
worked out the logical continuation of the North African Allied advance, i.e. 
plans for landing on the island of Sicily. Beyond that, however, they did not 
attempt to formulate policy. Only after spectacular success in Sicily was it de-
cided that the Allies should press on to knock Italy out of the Axis. It was in the 
course of the execution of this opportunistic strategy in late 1942 and in 1943 
that the appetite of Churchill, Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, General Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East 
in 1943, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean in 1944, and of 
General Sir Harold Alexander, Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army, Supreme 
Allied Commander in Italy, came, in Sir Michael Howard's words, "en 
mangeant", to shift the emphasis onto the Mediterranean theatre more than it 
had been agreed by the combined chiefs. Though very hard fought, the cam-
paign in Italy bore fruit. Mussolini was dismissed by the King of Italy a fort-
night after the landings in Sicily. Buoyed by the events, Churchill argued: 
The flank attack may become the main attack, and the main attack a 
holding operation in the early stages. Our second front will, in fact, 
comprise both the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of Europe, and we 
can push either right-handed, left-handed, or both handed as our re-
sources and circumstances permit/ 
On 26 October, one month before the Teheran Conference, he wrote to 
President Roosevelt: 
We must not let this great Italian battle degenerate into a deadlock. At 
all costs we must win Rome and the airfields to the north of it. ... I feel 
that Eisenhower and Alexander must have what they need to win the 
battle in Italy, no matter what effect is produced on subsequent opera-
tions. 
Churchill's confidant, Field Marshal Smuts, and King George VI also joined 
in the enthusiasm for this strategy. Smuts hoped "to go on fighting" in the 
Mediterranean "and not switch over to a new front like 'Overlord.'" The King 
wrote to Churchill in October 1943: 
[...] 1 have always thought that your original idea of last year of attack-
ing the "underbelly" of the Axis was the right one [...] The present 
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situation as we know has turned out even better than we could have 
ever hoped [...] we command the Mediterranean Sea [...] Italy is at war 
with our enemy Germany; Roumania & Hungary are trying to get in 
touch with us. [...] may be we shall see the 3 great powers, Great Brit-
ain, USA & USSR fighting together on the same front. 
As 1 have discussed earlier, keeping the Eastern Mediterranean operations as 
the single line of attack was not a realistic or expedient strategy. However, it 
later became clear that the resources for pursuing Churchill's vision of two sec-
ond fronts would never be sufficient either, even though, through the activities 
of the secret deception unit, "A" Force (see below), the Germans were led to 
believe and fear the opposite. The two separate aspects of the strategy in the 
Mediterranean, ambitious plans for real strategy, and notional threats, may have 
become somewhat mixed up among the ambitions of those who wished for a 
greater emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean. 
At the third Washington Conference, held in May 1943, the British delega-
tion proposed to press ahead to exploit the achievements of the Italian campaign 
by landings eastward on the Balkans, rather than transferring these troops to the 
UK. It was argued that from the newly occupied bases the Allies could reach 
previously inaccessible parts of Central and South-Eastern Europe. If the Ger-
mans reacted strongly, so much the better, as this would also keep large num-
bers of their forces pinned down, away from both North-Western Europe and 
the Russian front. In July 1943 Churchill spoke to the Chiefs of Staff Commit-
tee about a "post-HUSKY" strategy, which had the River Po, or Vienna, among 
its possible aims, even to the detriment of OVERLORD. The Americans were 
not impressed. Correctly they argued that the British proposals contradicted 
previous agreements. At Teheran, still wishing to retain the Balkans option, 
Churchill supported the primacy of the build-up for a North-Western attack, and 
accepted a definite plan for an invasion of Southern France in the wake of the 
advance in Italy, believing that landing craft would also become available for a 
move into the Balkans. The debate, however, never had the chance to become 
significantly more than theoretical as the operations bogged down on the Pisa-
Rimini Line, and did not move much further north until the spring of 1945, by 
which time the Soviet forces came to dominate the Balkans and Central Europe, 
with the exception of Greece, in adherence to the terms of the Churchill-Stalin 
"percentage agreement" of October 1944. 
From the summer of 1944, Churchill began to see the Soviet advance as a 
threat, rather than as a relief. Backed by General Alexander, he renewed his 
plea for a diversion to the east, especially as an alternative to ANVIL, landings 
in the south of France, originally planned to coincide with, and provide dynamic 
diversionary assistance to, the D-Day operations. Plans for an Adriatic alterna-
tive were put forward on 7 June 1944 by General Alexander. Describing his 
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plans to a meeting of the British War Cabinet on 7 July, he said they repre-
sented a chance for "the historical entry into Europe."6 In his memoirs he wrote: 
"Once through the so-called Ljubljana Gap the way led to Vienna, an object of 
great political and psychological value."7 This time, however, even the British 
chiefs were opposed to the idea. Even though ANVIL was not carried out, the 
operations through the Rhône Valley, renamed as DRAGOON, started in 
August 1944, and therefore late to assist in the initial days of OVERLORD, the 
Americans were adamant that their landing craft, essential for any amphibious 
operation across the Adriatic, could only be used in DRAGOON, and not in an, 
in their view, strategically and politically dubious diversion to the east. At the 
same time, the lateness of DRAGOON was partially compensated by the 
spreading of false rumours of an attack in the region to coincide with OVER-
LORD, known to its creator in "A" Force as Operation VENDETTA. 
Churchill's support for a move to the east stemmed from political consid-
erations, which were no longer consistent with his pledges made in the percent-
age agreement. The Prime Minister and his general had to yield to the majority 
opinion, both American and British, arrayed against them. 
The greatest drawback of the plan was that Alexander never really explored 
its logistic feasibility. It envisaged the crossing, in a short space of time, of very 
difficult and hostile terrain, much of which had proved to be killing fields in the 
First World War. The vistas opened up by the plan were enticing indeed. With 
the British and the Americans in Vienna, the Danube, rather than the Elbe, 
could have been the line on which the Western and Eastern Allies finally met. 
The Ljubljana Gap, the valley of the Save, and the Klagenfurt Valley, en route 
to Vienna, however, would have held unpleasant surprises in store for a war-
weary British 8th Army. The "underbelly" may not have been so soft after all. 
Although the plans were never put to the test, it is highly doubtful that they 
could have been executed within the time frame available, given the fact that 
both the Yugoslav partisans and the Russian armies were progressing speedily 
in a similar direction. In any case, the opportunity was lost after DRAGOON 
had been staged and Soviet forces had advanced through Romania, Hungary, 
and parts of Yugoslavia from August 1944 to April 1945. At the same time, it is 
important to point out, especially in the context of the ensuing Cold War, that 
the original British pressure for a Mediterranean strategy was meant to counter 
American opinion opposed to the "Europe First" principle, and that its contin-
ued exploitation served to give immediate succour to the Soviet war effort, 
rather than to forestall it. Its last minute transformation to serve the latter pur-
pose was not a viable alternative either strategically or politically at the time. 
In the foregoing I have discussed the points raised in my original questions, 
except for the aspect of secret intelligence, which, I believe, needs to be dis-
cussed separately. 
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The hidden side of the Mediterranean strategy was strategic deception. In 
March 1941 "Advanced HQ 'A' Force" was established under a British officer, 
Lieut Col Dudley Clarke. As part of the "Double-Cross System" the British in-
telligence network of agents, double agents and their controllers, "A" Force was 
originally a "notional" Brigade of the Special Air Service, itself also initially a 
notional body. Having become the centre for strategic deception in the Middle 
East, and then in the whole Mediterranean area, its task was to create and keep 
in service notional, i.e. imaginary, agents, military formations, sometimes whole 
divisions, threats, intended to mislead and disadvantage the enemy in that thea-
tre, especially in preparation for particular planned real operations. Though 
largely independent in choosing its methods, this "rumour factory," as Sir Mi-
chael Howard has called it, worked under the loose supervision of an organisa-
tion called the London Controlling Section. The main headquarters of "A" 
Force was in Cairo and served, for most of the story covered above, to provide 
camouflage for factual operations under the command of General Alexander. 
The notional operation code named BARCLAY helped to secure the success 
of HUSKY by pinning down large numbers of German troops through implant-
ing the idea of an impending Allied attack on the Balkans via Greece in the 
early summer of 1943. The most successful of all bogus operation, code named 
MINCEMEAT, designed to confuse the Germans about future Allied opera-
tions, resulted in the German penetration of the Balkans in March-July 1943. 
ZEPPELIN, among other objectives, carried a notional plan to attack Istria and 
the Dalmatian coast by a US contingent in early 1944. "The strategic task laid 
down for 'A' Force under the overall plan, Zeppelin, was to keep German re-
serves away from the Normandy battlefields until D+25; that is until the begin-
ning of July."8 TURPITUDE comprised notional attacks on Salonica and Varna 
with Russian participation in June 1944. Another very successful bogus opera-
tion, FERDINAND, promoted in August 1944, at the time of real operation 
DRAGOON, practically concurred with the unrealistic strategy campaigned for 
by Churchill and Alexander at the time to concentrate on Italy and achieve an 
eastward diversion later. All these imaginary plans implied action in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and were ultimately designed to assist OVERLORD. The Ger-
mans proved to be remarkably susceptible to them. By the spring of 1944 the 
impression was created in some German intelligence analysts that plans for an 
Allied North-Western attack were abandoned altogether for a Dalmatian or 
Southern French assault. Accurate reports of the unfeasibility of a Balkan strat-
egy were drowned out by the "intelligence noise." By the time the credibility of 
any Eastern Mediterranean strategy to be pursued by the Western Allies dimin-
ished, the Soviets appeared on the horizon after a successful drive across the 
Ukraine, drawing ever more German formations away from the west. On 19 
March 1944, in order to protect their lines of communication, the Germans oc-
cupied Hungary, their ally, and on 15 October, by staging a fascist coup, de-
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stroyed the remnants of constitutional government there. By this time, with its 
aims accomplished, "A" Force began to close down. The illusions of an "Anglo-
Saxon" landing also vanished, both amongst the retreating Germans, and the 
amongst the liberal opposition in Central and South-Eastern Europe. 
Strategic deception is a cool and effective device. As the details of its role in 
the Mediterranean in 1942-44 began to emerge in the 1980s, at least one Cen-
tral European historian, the Hungarian Gyula Juhász, expressed his bitterness 
about its cold logic. Hungary's precarious participation in the Hitler alliance 
was a disaster from the start. Soon after the very heavy losses sustained by the 
Hungarian 2nd Army at the southern Russian front in 1942, the Prime Minister, 
Miklós Kállay, supported by the more liberal elements of the political spectrum, 
introduced policies what were meant to steer the country out of the German 
clasp. Prominent among such policies were circumventing demands for the de-
portation of Hungary's Jews by assigning them to work units assisting the Hun-
garian army, and sending peace feelers to neutral capitals to negotiate terms for 
a possible surrender. The negotiators, and through them the government, were 
lulled into believing in an active Allied policy in South-Eastern Europe, and the 
misconception that they only needed to bide their time, and change sides when 
the Western Allies came near to Hungary's borders. For historical and political 
reasons, until the very last moment, the Hungarians, like the Polish but unlike 
the Czechoslovak governments-in-exile, were very reluctant to negotiate with 
the Russians. Therefore it is not an exaggeration to say that from early 1943 till 
October 1944, the whole of Hungarian policy hinged on the expectation that 
Western troops will appear near Hungary's borders, and the country may safely 
leave the war, or change sides. What happened instead was that Hungary was 
occupied by the Nazis, its "autocratic-liberal" leadership was removed, and 
600,000 of its citizens were deported to face death or untold suffering. The va-
lidity of the policy to provide all possible buttress to OVERLORD cannot be 
questioned. It is evident that the victims of 1944-45 in Hungary were the vic-
tims of the Nazis, and not of the Allies. At the same time, acquaintance with 
local perspectives, such as the above, can only enrich the view on the workings 
of the global strategy and of deception as a part of it. 
Having demonstrated that, 
a) although there was a short-lived desire at the highest level among British 
leaders for military involvement in liberating parts of Central Europe and the 
Balkans, no agreement could be reached for its execution; and 
b) that the above was partly the result of American reluctance to be associ-
ated with such a project, and the fact that the plans were most probably logisti-
cal ly unfeasible in the available time frame. 
I would finally like to clarify a point concerning deception. When discussing 
this subject, many authors, in my view, fail to draw a firm line between deliber-
ate deception by notional threats, and the fact that certain actors were deceived 
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as a result of receiving information on factual plans subsequently not carried 
out, or as a result of factual operations, some of which may in fact have been 
intended as ruses. The overall strategy benefited from all three. As I pointed out 
earlier, in this war of both nerves and matériel, these phenomena may have 
temporarily come very close, in the field, or in the minds of the authors of strat-
egy. However, I believe that in resolving the questions I put at the beginning, it 
is important to keep them apart. By realising that the decisive majority of plans 
relating to the Eastern Mediterranean only existed in the realm of fantasy, i.e. as 
part of deception, one can understand how little chance they ever had of be-
coming an alternative to the strategy which was actually pursued by the Western 
Allies. 
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In the aftermath of the Second World War relations between the United 
Kingdom and each of the smaller states of Central Europe were in varying de-
grees conditioned by British perceptions of Soviet power and intentions. There 
was already a tendency in the Foreign Office to regard much of the area as 
having fallen within the "Soviet sphere of influence" where local Communist 
parties could be used "as direct instruments of Soviet policy."1 
Nevertheless, British officials did not exclude the possibility of continuing 
co-operation with Britain's former wartime ally. One possibility for continued 
co-operation was within the Allied Control Commissions (ACC) to be estab-
lished in the former German satellite countries such as Hungary. 
The tri-partite Allied Control Commission was set up in accordance with the 
Hungarian Armistice terms2 (signed on 20 January 1945) and was stationed in 
Hungary between January 1945 and September 1947. Its primary purpose was 
to supervise the enforcement of the armistice terms with Hungary until the con-
clusion of the peace treaty. As Hungary had been liberated by the Soviet forces, 
Russian leadership prevailed within the commission, which also implied the 
restricted scope of activity for the other two members, i.e., the British and the 
Americans. 
In early 1945 the British were committed to sending their political and mili-
tary representatives to Hungary, which had never been a British sphere of inter-
est. However, the key geographical position that Hungary occupied in the con-
text of the emerging bipolar division of Europe compelled the British to commit 
resources and attention to Hungary's future. This paper examines the changing 
British attitude towards Hungary in the early stages of the Cold War through the 
workings of the British component of the Allied Control Commission. Natu-
rally, the Hungarian context will be, from time to time, expanded to include 
great power relations in the European context. An understanding of the changes 
in British attitude towards Central Europe, and Hungary in particular, between 
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1945—47 is very relevant to pressing present day issues such as the enlargement 
of the European Union and Britain's relations with Central Europe. 
Due to the partial inaccessibility of primary sources, the workings of the 
ACC in Hungary have not been uncovered completely. This paper is still a 
working document and forms part of a larger theme to be completed in the near 
future, which is mainly based on British archival material and discusses British 
foreign policy on Central Europe. 
In late February 1945 the seventy-eight strong British Mission arrived in 
Hungary after having obtained permission from the Russians. According to the 
political directive3 issued to the members of the mission, their main task was to 
"ensure, in the closest collaboration with your Soviet and United States col-
leagues, that the terms of the annistice with Hungary are strictly carried out." It 
acknowledged the Soviet government's principal role in enforcing the annistice 
because Hungary was a Soviet theatre of war. However, any Soviet attempt to 
encroach on Hungarian sovereignty or independence, warned the directive, 
should be resisted by the British. Although the British accepted the effective 
Soviet domination in enforcing the armistice terms, there was "no question of 
abdicating our claim to have an equal share at the peace settlement and in the 
post-war period in all questions affecting Hungary." 
Hostilities had not yet ceased in the country and there was no representative 
government either. Therefore the members of the mission could not be in-
structed as to which political party or personality they should support. "Much 
will clearly depend," continued the document, "upon the Soviet attitude towards 
the present Government and regime." 
The first few meetings with the members of the Hungarian Government and 
the Russian representatives of the ACC convinced the British political repre-
sentative that as long as the Hungarians obediently fulfilled Russian "wishes," 
"the Russian policy will be one of liberality towards them." One month had 
already passed, but no meeting of the ACC occurred, and any initiative on the 
Anglo-Americans' part was obstructed by the Russians, thus causing consider-
able frustration. Therefore the British were not surprised when it was deliber-
ately and secretly leaked from Hungarian government circles that Hungarian 
officials had been warned indirectly not to have close relations with the British 
and the Americans.5 The first major conflict arose in connection with land re-
form, which was introduced by an executive decree without the consent of the 
Hungarian Provisional National Assembly. It was obvious that the reform was 
forced through by the Russians. The British argued that Marshal Voroshilov, 
the Russian Chairman of the ACC, was acting outside his remit as Chairman of 
the ACC because land reform was an internal affair for the Hungarian govern-
ment.6 Further, both the British and the Americans should have been consulted 
in advance. The number of reports giving gloomy account as to the lack of 
foodstocks and projecting unusually low production that year increased. Be-
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cause it was the Hungarian government's responsibility to feed the occupying 
Red Army, the Russian chairman often referred to Article 11 of the armistice 
and stated in no uncertain terms that the control of food supply and related 
matters no longer constituted an internal affair. The Foreign Office (FO) 
thought that the severe shortage of foodstuffs would provoke political distur-
bance in the country, which was a "breeding ground for Communism." They 
also suspected that the Hungarian situation would help intensify the impending 
famine in Europe. 
Subsequent to the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the need arose to reor-
ganize the control commissions in the ex-satellite countries. This second period 
was to last until the conclusion of the peace treaties. At the time of the Potsdam 
Conference there was a frequent exchange of letters concerning the matter. In 
his minute to Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, 
wrote the following: "We want nothing specific about Hungary at the present 
Conference, apart from the improvement of the status of our Control Commis-
sions and the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on liberated areas." In 
other minutes exchanged between senior FO officials two underlying issues 
were exhaustively discussed. One was the conclusion of peace treaties with the 
defeated countries and the replacement of "the present puppet governments". 
By holding free and unrigged elections, the will of the majority of the people 
would inaugurate a democratic government and thereby the principles under-
taken in the Yalta Declaration were to be fulfilled. 
The Russians also called for the reorganization of the control commissions. 
Their proposal differed in the case of Hungary, where directives were to be is-
sued after they had been agreed to by the British and the Americans. In Hungary 
the chairman of the commission had the right to decide on questions in connec-
tion with the entrance and exit of the members from the country. In other coun-
tries where control commissions operated, directives were to be issued after 
preliminary discussion with the British and the American representatives. After 
some deliberation, the British decided that the Hungarian position appeared to 
be most satisfactory. Eventually, the members of the wartime alliance agreed to 
the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary and accepted the Soviet proposal for Hungary 
as a basis. 
British diplomacy in Eastern Europe was usually more handicapped by a 
lack of material means and of a physical presence with which to achieve its ob-
jectives than by an absence of formal rights. This was particularly apparent in 
the case of the former German satellites, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, from 
whose Soviet-sponsored régimes the British Government continued to withhold 
diplomatic recognition as it was unable to consider them "as representative or 
democratic within the meaning of the Potsdam decisions." Nevertheless, Great 
Britain, like the United States, maintained political representatives in Sofia, Bu-
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charest and Budapest, in each of which capitals was established an Allied Con-
trol Commission. The latter, whose primary purpose was to supervise the en-
forcement of the armistice terms, provided the two Western powers with addi-
tional opportunities for influencing internal developments, and Bevin thought it 
in Britain's interest to ensure that their functions were not restricted and that if 
possible their competence should be extended to cover such matters as public 
security, control of demonstrations and censorship. At the same time, he re-
quired all three posts to be kept informed of actions taken by the others. Their 
reports left him under the impression that in Bulgaria, as also in Hungary, the 
Russians were set upon manipulating elections in order to ensure the continua-
tion of a "govemment completely subservient to Moscow" and "to show the 
world that its government is representative." J The Bulgarian elections in 
August 1945 were massively rigged by the Russians; a joint list was introduced 
in order to ensure Communist victory. Therefore the postponement of the Hun-
garian elections by two months was a much welcomed development. When in 
October municipal elections in Hungary resulted in a striking victory for the 
moderate Smallholders, the Foreign Office saw this as an encouraging sign with 
regard to the results of the general elections to be held in November 1945. This 
victory at the same time was found surprising because an obviously peasant 
dominated party could capture the majority of votes in Budapest, where the 
largest number of industrial workers and middle class population was concen-
trated. In a wider context, this was the first "encouraging sign" that the Russian 
Bear might not necessarily dig its claws into all countries it liberated, and thus 
new democracies could spring in the region. Gascoigne, the British political 
representative in Hungary, was less optimistic. Hungarian government officials 
unofficially informed him that the Russians were demanding that all parties 
should join in presenting a common electoral list. Gascoigne predicted that if 
the Smallholders refused, the Russians would "tighten the screw economically," 
that they might "possibly arrange for further widespread outbreaks of unrest," 
and that the Communist might try to stage an armed coup. He therefore cau-
tioned Bevin against accepting an unofficial Hungarian representative in Lon-
don as "it might be unwise to count our democratic chickens before they are 
hatched." In the event, however, elections held on 4 November appeared to con-
form with democratic principles, and the Smallholders won 57% of the votes 
polled. 
The Foreign Office welcomed this satisfactory development which they had 
not expected two or three months before. Hungary became the second country 
under occupation after Finland to hold fair elections. Now an unofficial Hun-
garian representative as Minister Delegate could be received in London. How-
ever, the distribution of government portfolios was a great surprise as it did not 
reflect the result of the elections. According to Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Un-
der-Secretary at the Foreign Office, the indirect Russian pressure nullified to a 
BRITISH POLITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS HUNGARY 133 
large extent the result of the elections. The Communists were allotted the Min-
istry of the Interior with full control of the police and the Ministry of Agricul-
ture. 
Gascoigne was convinced that the Soviet authorities were seeking to use the 
Communist Party to impose their political will upon Hungary. They seemed 
equally determined to take advantage of their military occupation of the country 
in order to endure their economic pre-eminence there as elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe. A Soviet-Hungarian agreement of August 1945 had provided for Rus-
sian participation in almost every sphere of the Hungarian economy, and Stuart 
of the Foreign Office's Southern Department was in little doubt that this would 
be "converted into domination." Bevin was at first reluctant to accept 
Gascoigne's similarly gloomy assessment of the implications of the agreement. 
He believed that Britain's "strongest card to play with the Hungarians [was] the 
prospect of trade with the west," and he wanted "to take no steps to make un-
necessary difficulties with Russia." But the Russians were unwilling to discuss 
the matter within the ACC, and the British eventually yielded to Soviet threats 
and ratified the agreement.16 By December it was only too apparent that in Hun-
gary the meetings of the ACC did not match the requirements of the statutes 
agreed at Potsdam, and that, as Gascoigne noted, the Russians were formulating 
policy and carrying it out without any prior reference to the representatives of 
Britain and the United States. 
The Board of Trade's interest in establishing relations with Hungary may 
have been due to the encouraging signs in Hungarian political life on the one 
hand, and the need to penetrate the East European market, which entailed mild 
political penetration, on the other hand. British views concerning possible trade 
with Hungary varied. Letters sent from the Board of Trade to the treasury em-
phasised the importance of establishing economic ties with Hungary mainly for 
two reasons. First, there were enormous stocks of British wool available for 
which they could not find a market. Second, this small amount of assistance 
would have helped Hungary to "keep a window open to the West". The For-
eign Office did not deny the political advantages in granting credit for purchase 
of wool. However, as a result of a tentative credit to Hungary, they expected 
similar requests from Yugoslavia, Greece and other countries, which "might be 
difficult to refuse."19 Another view did not rule out the possibility of helping 
Hungary in a "modest way" through the ACC, but noted that any concrete pro-
posal had so far met with frustration in every case. Hungary was not considered 
"as a suitable object for export drive." Its public credit worthiness rated at zero 
and could not offer anything that the British might want in exchange for their 
products. 
By the beginning of 1946 it was more than apparent to the Foreign Office 
that its ability to influence events in those areas of Central and South-Eastern 
Europe that were under Soviet occupation was strictly limited. This was just as 
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clear in the economic as it was in the political sphere. A paper of 12 March 
1946, the final draft of which was prepared by the Economic Relations Depart-
ment, drew attention to the way in which the Russians were seeking to exploit 
and remould the economies of the region. It was believed that the primary mo-
tive for this policy was the rapid reconstruction of the Soviet Union. They also 
thought that the Soviet Government might have a political goal in mind in so far 
as the integration of the economies of these smaller states with its own would 
reinforce its domination and make it more difficult for them to function sepa-
rately from the Russian system. But harmful though Soviet policies might be to 
British economic interests, Britain's prewar investments in, and trade with, 
these countries were relatively small. There was in any case little that Britain 
could do to prevent the Russians from establishing an economic stranglehold 
over such countries as Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and at this stage it 
seemed impractical to think of trying to enlist the financial support of the 
United States. There was "no striking panacea" which could be applied to East-
ern Europe. The Russians were too near and the memory of their overwhelming 
physical strength too recent. Governments of the area could not be expected to 
take any step that might displease Moscow, and this made it essential that any 
British counteraction be unobtrusive and of a rather generalised character. "The 
best we can do is to hold a door open - or hold enough doors open - for the 
Eastern Europeans to catch frequent glimpses of a more attractive and prosper-
ous world in the West and be encouraged, when the occasion offers, to pass 
through." 
In late March 1946 a British parliamentary delegation was sent on a study 
tour to Hungary with the explicit objective of discovering areas of co-operation 
between the two countries. ° During the ten day visit their assessment of the 
political situation was as follows: there was a sense of purpose and political 
awareness shown by almost the entire population. This was undoubtedly due to 
the new democratic opportunities provided by the recent Electoral Law [...]. 
They were convinced that there was "now established in Hungary the seeds of a 
new democracy which, given encouragement and understanding to enable it to 
surmount present difficulties and evident 'growing pains' may finally establish 
itself along Western parliamentary lines." They believed that Britain can best 
show her sympathy by contributing in such tangible ways as are possible to-
wards a just and lasting peace, not only in Hungary but in the Danubian Basin. 
Based on a careful study of the prevailing situation in March 1946 the Brit-
ish Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee issued a revised report on Russia's Strate-
gic Interests and Intentions.' It concluded that the short-term aim of Russia was 
to avoid war against the western bloc. Meanwhile, if any dangerous attempts 
were made to undermine Russia's position in the countries that had been tacitly 
recognized as part of its sphere of influence, it would use any means to retaliate. 
In areas such as the Mediterranean, Turkey and Persia, where it was likely to 
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face a strong combined Anglo-American resistance, it would extend its "pro-
tective belt." It would extend its political influence wherever it was possible, 
e.g., by promoting Communist parties in the West. Although Russia would try 
to avoid war in the near future, it was alarming that demobilisation was slow, 
and Russian forces and industry still operated on a wartime footing. "In brief," 
the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee reported, "although the intention may be 
defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Rus-
sian leaders may misjudge how far they can go without provoking war with 
America and ourselves." 
By early 1947 the so-called salami tactic by the Communists was in full 
swing. It entailed the gradual elimination of their political opponents. In mid-
1947 the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary, Ferenc Nagy, 
was forced not to return to Hungary after his holiday in Switzerland. The politi-
cal police had been using methods similar to those employed in Russia during 
the purges in the 1930s. In this atmosphere of terror Denis Healey visited Hun-
gary to attend the annual congress of the Social Democratic Party. He went as 
Labour representative with a view to helping the party to stay alive. He found 
that the "icy winter which gripped the country symbolised its politics." At a 
first glance the conference had a slight air of a Nazi rally given by the presence 
of attendants dressed sloppily in white shirts, red armbands and ties, and mili-
tary hats. Otherwise it appeared orderly and democratic - more like an English 
conference than a French or Italian one. 
He quickly perceived what the battle behind the scenes was: questions of 
power and representation. On this issues the so-called Right wing failed to hold 
the extreme Left in check. 
As regards relations with the Communist Party, he felt a considerable fric-
tion. (1) The workers disliked the agreement by which leading factory positions 
are shared equally irrespective of the strength of the two parties. [...] (2) Fusion 
was not even considered. Contrary to the general view of the British Legation, 
he thought that Russian influence did not depend mainly on the Control Com-
mission and the Occupation troops, of whom there were only about 20,000 
tucked away in a corner of Hungary. Consequently, it would not greatly dimin-
ish after the ratification of the peace treaty. Many Hungarians thought that the 
Russians might ratify and fulfil the conditions within six weeks of signing. Ac-
cording to Healey, Russian influence depended mainly on the Communist Party, 
the political and military policy, economic power, petty persecution and physi-
cal terror. 
He concluded that the Social Democratic Party was a genuine and sincere 
party of old socialists. It was moreover the only tolerable alternative to Com-
munism in Hungary. The present tension between socialists and communists 
would grow. When the crucial decision was to be made, the socialist leaders 
would be influenced by their estimate of the help which the Western parties 
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would give them morally as a party and economically as a government. Unless 
Hungary received considerable credits from the West, a Social Democratic do-
mestic policy would become impossible. 
Conclusions 
In 1945 it was not obvious that the road to Communism was already being 
systematically built by the Russians and their Hungarian "stooges." The imme-
diate pressure was mitigated by the fact that the Hungarian communists were 
eager to outdo Russian requests. They were a meticulous lot who, with a per-
fectly tailored demagogy and timing, could win the support of large multitudes 
of people. 
There was slight improvement as to the sharing of responsibility by the Rus-
sians for the work the control commission. Questions of policy remained in 
Russian hands. Both the British and the Americans hoped to conclude peace 
treaties fairly soon and therefore they lost interest in improving the status of 
their missions. 
Documentary evidence seems to suggest that by early 1946 mutual hostility 
and mistrust prevailed in Anglo-Soviet relations. The British did not underesti-
mate the possible threat that the Soviet Union posed. However, they were confi-
dent in believing that if they developed a firm political line, buttressed by 
American aid, an imminent war could be avoided and, at the cost of a lack of 
commitment to Eastern Europe, their traditional spheres of interest could be 
kept. With regard to Eastern and Central Europe, the British undertook the im-
plementation of the Yalta Declaration, which in Hungary's case was fulfilled. 
The British political representative feared that Hungary would be Sovietised 
due to the extent of direct Russian intervention into internal Hungarian affairs. 
In the Foreign Office they doubted the Russia aspirations to Sovietise Hungary 
and found the gloomy reports from Budapest exaggerated and still emphasised 
the idea of collaboration with the Russians. They wanted to conclude peace 
treaties quickly, recognized the Soviet need to build up buffer states, and thus 
accepted that Hungary, together with the countries of the region, belonged to 
the Russian sphere of interest. This was the price the British had to pay for 
keeping their traditional spheres of interest and maintaining the leadership 
within the Italian commission. Also, the British attitude was that as long as 
Germany's position was not clarified everything else could wait. 
Official FO thinking about the Soviet Union shifted substantially in 1946 
towards the views long held by the Chiefs of Staff. The result was a new FO 
Russia Committee to monitor Soviet conduct and publicity. One of the shapers 
of this policy was the late Sir Frank Roberts, then Chargé d'Affairs at the Mos-
cow Embassy. He stated that Soviet security had become hard to distinguish 
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from Soviet imperialism, and it was questionable whether there was a limit to 
Soviet expansionism. However, it was not until the creation of the Cominform 
in October 1947 that Bevin and the cabinet echoed the view of the Russia 
Committee. The aim of British policy should now be to "reinforce the physical 
barriers which still guard our Western civilisation of which we are the protago-
nists. This in my view can only be done by creating some form of union in 
Western Europe, whether of a formal or informal character, backed by America 
and the Dominions." 5 
Reports from the British Legation in Budapest became gloomier by the day 
regarding the internal political situation. S.D. Stewart, a senior member of the 
British Mission, described it as follows. "I do not know whether there can be 
such a thing as a premeditated and planned chaos. There are some who say that 
here we have the proof that there can be. But it is difficult to imagine even the 
most prolonged premeditation and the most detailed planning proving so utterly 
successful." 
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The history of Hungary in the last 150 years, and especially in the twentieth 
century, was rather stormy and fraught with seminal turning points. Looking at 
only the post-war period, we can identify at least four major landmarks, which 
fundamentally influenced social changes in Hungary: the end of World War II, 
the communist take-over in 1948-49, the 1956 revolution, and the change of 
regime between 1988 and 1990 that restored the bourgeois democratic state or-
ganization. The emergence of bourgeois society after the war was soon inter-
rupted for several decades by the communist seizure of power. The expansion 
of a Stalinist social structure, however, was itself torpedoed by the 1956 revo-
lution. Midway through the era of the Kádár regime, a precarious process of 
bourgeois development started, which then slowed and finally, prompted by the 
shift in political power, came to be rekindled at the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. In this brief discussion I want to concentrate on ex-
ploring and analyzing the sociohistorical processes, the changes in the system of 
values and social psychology that reflected the social changes in Hungary dur-
ing the last fifty years. 
Hungary suffered severe losses in military, civilian and material resources 
during World War II. As a result of the war some 800,000 to 900,000 people 
were killed and forty percent of the national wealth of 1938 was destroyed. The 
extensive migration of some 450,000 to 550,000 people between 1945 and 1948 
also greatly influenced the Hungarian population. The relocation of German 
minorities forced 170,000 to 180,000 thousand people to leave the country. At 
the same time, 60,000 to 80,000 people, who had fled from the atrocities of the 
war or were displaced by the constantly shifting boundaries, came to Hungary 
from the neighboring countries. Due to the Slovak-Hungarian exchange of citi-
zens, 90,000 Slovak citizens of Hungarian origin entered the country and 60,000 
thousand Slovaks left Hungary. 
During the decades after the war the only instance of mass migration oc-
curred as a result of the 1956 revolution. Not counting those who soon returned, 
180,000 people left Hungary. Including the refugees of the 1956 revolution, a 
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total of 420,000 to 430,000 thousand people emigrated, legally or illegally, be-
tween 1945 and 1989.1 
The population of Hungary was 9.2 million in 1949, 9.96 million in 1960, 
10.71 million in 1980, and 10.37 million according to the 1990 census. Natural 
increase started a slow decline from its maximum of 11-12 thousandth in 1953-
1954, stabilized at 2-4 thousandth by the early seventies, then after the tempo-
rary baby boom of the seventies it slipped further down. Due to the decline of 
births and the increase of deaths, during the early 1980s the natural increase of 
the Hungarian population first stopped then reverted into a natural decrease, a 
process that still continues during the 1990s. The childbirth rate stabilized at the 
European average of 11-12 thousandths in 1989-1990, while the death rate at 
13-15 thousands is on a steady rise. The mortality of middle-aged men has es-
pecially increased during the last two decades. 
The ratio of the sexes has shown some fluctuation between 1949 and 1990 
but there have always been more women than men. For every 1,000 men there 
were 1,081 women in 1949, 1,073 in 1960, 1,064 in 1980, and 1,081 in 1990. 
The age structure, however, has changed more dramatically. Those younger 
than nineteen years of age made up 31.7% of the population in 1949. This ration 
had fallen to 27.2% by 1990. Those aged twenty to fifty-nine years constituted 
55.7% of the population in 1949, but only 51.3% by 1990. Those who were 
sixty years old, or older, formed only 12.6% of the whole population in 1949 
but had increased to 21.5% by 1990. 
The ratio of the economically active population gradually increased during 
the 1950s and 1960s by an average of 3% each decade. At the middle of the 
1970s, however, this trend took a U-turn, and ever since then the percentage of 
economically active adults has been on a gradual decline. The main reason for 
this decline was the decrease of adults, who were able to work. The ratio of 
economically active adults within the whole Hungarian population fell by 4% 
and 7% during the 1980s and 1990s respectively. The latter figure can indis-
putably be attributed to the consequences of an emerging market economy. The 
number of economically active adults was 4.1 million in 1949, 5.1 million in 
1970, 4.5 million in 1980, and 3.7 million in 1994. The employment of women 
has considerably increased in Hungary over the last fifty years. Women consti-
tuted 29% of the economically active population in 1949. This proportion had 
risen to 44% by 1975 and 46% by 1990. The ratio of dependents and economi-
cally inactive to the economically active indicates a noticeable change in social 
circumstances. Between 1949 and 1970 the ratio of the economically inactive 
population was gradually declining; then from the 1970s it began rising. In 1975 
there were 107 inactive people for every 100 who were economically active, 
117 in 1985, 129 in 1990, and not less than 174 in 1994. This dramatic increase 
was at least in part due to a never-before-seen surge in unemployment. The dy-
namic transformation of the social structure is indicated by the rise in the per-
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centage of highly trained professionals and executives from 2% to 11%, and by 
the improvement in the ratio of plain white-collar workers from 5% to 22% 
between 1945 to 1990. During the same period the ratio of semi-skilled and 
skilled blue-collar workers increased from 32% to 50%. At the same time, the 
percentage of independent farmers plummeted from 32%) to 1%, and the ratio of 
self-employed tradesmen and retailers shrivelled from 8% to 4%. 
Directly after the war Hungary became a satellite state within the Soviet 
sphere. Consequently it could not escape the radical shift toward single-party 
dictatorship and the total subjugation of social, economic and political changes, 
which inflicted forced social mobility and considerably changed the status and 
environment of several social groups. 
In the view of the relevant data and considering the political and ideological 
conditions of the era, we may label the social changes in Hungary for the dec-
ades after 1948 as "precarious modernization." On the one hand living stan-
dards, the material and technological conditions of life, have continuously im-
proved in Hungary; on the other hand modernization in Hungary has meant al-
most exclusively the development of heavy industry. Due to the autocratic and 
dictatorial political climate the social and economic flexibility of Hungarian 
society considerably worsened. Although the transformation of the social 
structure in many respects was similar to that of the Western European states 
during the era, there were striking differences as well. The existing socialist 
system was able to maintain a material increase in the 1960s and 1970s, but be-
ginning in the early 1980s failed to deliver even that. All the same, general liv-
ing standards were impossible to raise. Moreover, by its very nature, primarily 
through its refusal to tolerate community initiatives outside the sphere of the 
family, the system to a considerable extent contributed to the weakening of so-
cial interaction, to the abolition of "slight solidarity," which is indispensable for 
the proper operation of a "normal" society. The serious problems in human re-
lationships are clearly indicated by the fact that certain deviancies, such as sui-
cide and alcoholism, showed most unfavorable tendencies in Hungary from the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. The modernization after 1948 was also precarious 
because for a long time it subdued genuine cultural trends that could have pro-
moted progressive values; because it failed to bring about the society's ability to 
handle and resolve conflicts; and also because it impeded the evolution of be-
havioral patterns in civil society. 
Key data support, such as the radical transformation of the employment 
structure and the soaring level of education, indicate that a process of moderni-
zation took place. For instance, the ratio of the population engaged in agricul-
ture decreased from 53.8% in 1949 to 15.4% in 1990. Yet, a 1988 survey 
showed that nearly 45% of the adult population were in one way or another in-
volved in small-scale agricultural production. This unusually high ratio is the 
result of the social, political and economic conditions of a peculiar twofold 
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structure and reveals that the quality of the modernization process was markedly 
different from that of Western Europe. 
If we examine education, we can see that from the end of the 1940s the re-
structuring of the educational system was accompanied by a steep rise in quan-
tity. By reducing the number of illiterates and increasing the ratio of skilled la-
bor and university graduates, education contributed to the lessening of the ex-
isting cultural inequalities in Hungary. This relative equalization is demon-
strated by the fact that in 1949 roughly 80% of those over fifteen had not fin-
ished elementary school, while in 1994 some 80% of the population over fifteen 
had completed at least the eight-year elementary education. In 1949 only 5.5% 
of the population finished secondary school, but by 1960 their ratio was 16.5%, 
and in 1990 it stood at 23.6%. The post-war decades brought dynamic quantita-
tive changes in Hungarian higher education as well. In comparison to 1938 the 
number of students in full-time higher education more than quadrupled by the 
end of the 1980s. Between 1950 and 1990, approximately 400,000 students had 
attended and graduated from full-time university programs, and an additional 
300,000 got their university degrees through part-time and correspondence 
courses. Consequently the number of university graduates in 1985 was six times 
the 1949 level; and the number of university teachers and professors was nine 
times that of 1938. However, despite the undoubtedly favorable statistical 
trends, Hungary still trailed behind Western European countries in the number 
of university students at the end of the 1980s. 
Another symptom of precarious social modernization was the relatively low 
level of the service industry and the noticeable slackening of social morals in 
the sixties and seventies. 
A distinguishing feature of the Hungarian social structure was also the 
fact that parallel with the "first economy" of state ownership, there ex-
isted a loosely defined "second economy"' of private enterprises and 
market forces. It all resulted in a "Janus-faced society. 
Under political pressure the transformation of the social structure in Hun-
gary was spectacularly accelerating between 1950 and 1975. Mobility in Hun-
garian society gradually became more open and intensive after 1945. However, 
the openness was seriously curtailed by the late 1970s an early 1980s. After-
wards the chances of changing one's social status gradually dwindled away. 
Apparently the ratio of the urban population grew more slowly than the number 
of job opportunities in the cities, while industrialization did not bring about the 
development of infrastructure and the extension of urbanization. 
Social transformation in Hungary in the 1950s and 1960s shows situational 
similarities with colonization, when the representatives of foreign powers and 
foreign values forced their authority on a conquered nation by any means avail-
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able. The indigenous people did not have the slightest opportunity to determine 
whether or not they wanted to accept or refuse the foreign impositions. 
The per capita national income in Hungary was $120 in 1938, or 60% of the 
European average. World War II considerably reduced the national income, and 
the 1938 level was only achieved again in 1949. The 1950s brought some nota-
ble fluctuations, but by and large as compared to 1949 national income was on 
the rise. The increase prevailed until the early 1970s. On the other hand, despite 
forced economic development, the gap between Hungary and the economically 
developed countries was further widening during the post-war decades. Moreo-
ver, Hungary's inept reaction to the 1973 oil crisis started yet another period of 
relative decline. By then it was obvious that the country was unable to maintain 
the living standards and economic improvements, which were financed with 
foreign loans. The policy of restraint in the 1980s failed to bring any noticeable 
success; then the collapse of the eastern markets was a further blow to the Hun-
garian economy. Consequently the GDP was down by 20% as compared to the 
end of the 1980s. 
Although personal consumption had been almost entirely subordinate to the 
goals of industrial development before 1956, the consistent increase of living 
standards became a pivotal aspect of the Kádár regime. As a result the follow-
ing two decades between 1957 and 1978 brought a significant and steady im-
provement of living standards. Real wages more than doubled during the period. 
Personal consumption per capita increased by 150%, more than ten times as 
many durables were purchased, and three and a half times as much household 
energy was consumed. The tide turned at the end of the 1970s. From 1979 the 
directors of economic policy tried decisively to limit wages in order to restore 
the balance in the economy. The widest strata of the Hungarian population were 
directly affected, as the reduction of real wages was all too noticeable. In com-
parison to what came afterwards at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s, the devaluation of real wages was a moderate 0.6-0.8% a year be-
tween 1979 and 1987. Individuals could make up for the lost income by moon-
lighting and working overtime. Between 1988 and 1995, however, real wages 
dropped by 3.0-3.3% every year. Real wages in 1995 were only 73% of the 
1978 level. Declining living standards became a general phenomenon, and only 
those could maintain their previous lifestyles, who were able to complement 
their income with extra work or dip into previously amassed capital. 
Although the inequalities of income generally decreased between 1948 and 
1970, the equalities demanded by the prevailing ideology were never realized. 
Moreover, due to the "second economy" the income gap between the different 
social and economic groups was again gradually widening by the end of the 
1970s. Material growth during the socialist era demanded strenuous efforts from 
the population. Although the average time spent at work was decreasing for 
both men and women between the 1960s and 1980s, the amount of time devoted 
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to small-scale agricultural production and generally to the "second economy" 
dynamically increased, especially among the male population. Considerable 
time was needed to manage household and ancillary farms. Men who were em-
ployed full-time spent on average one and a half to two hours, and pensioners 
spent four and a half hours working on the household farm. Employed women 
spent a daily two to two and a half hours on the far. More time consuming ac-
tivities were usually scheduled for the weekend. With so many hours spent 
working, obviously most people had little time left for cultural activities and 
entertainment. 
Another factor that necessitated household and ancillary farms was the per-
sistence of shortages. In the early 1970s commercial chains were so underde-
veloped and their standard of service so inept that the rural households had to 
produce their own food. Selling the small surplus also provided them with extra 
income, which was an important part of their subsistence and contributed to the 
material growth of the family. Short of capital and bound by economic regula-
tions, people could invest nothing but their individual work. As the surplus in-
come was almost impossible, or at least very difficult, to reinvest in production, 
the profit from household and ancillary farming was usually devoted to personal 
consumption. If we consider the ratio of household durables within the entire 
national wealth - between 1960 and 1974 it nearly tripled from 73.3 to 180 bil-
lion forints - the material growth resulting from the consolidation of the Kádár 
regime is obvious. The size and structure of households also changed consid-
erably. The size of the average Hungarian family was gradually getting smaller; 
and there were fewer children per family. Both in rural and urban areas there 
were considerably fewer extended families living in the same household. In the 
villages the multigeneration, cohabitant family model was replaced by a new 
trend: young couples were starting a family and life in their own household. It 
subsequently became accepted that married couples moved into their own 
homes and lived independently from their parents. 
Household work had a significant economic role in Hungary after 1945. 
From the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s Hungarian house-
holds showed an increasing tendency to alleviate the burdens of housework 
through modernization of homes and consumer services. Between the 1950s and 
1970s the costs of maintenance and general expenses more than doubled in 
household consumption. Money spent on personal travel increased tenfold be-
tween 1955 and 1975. There were also important structural changes in the pur-
chase of durable goods. Until the late 1950s the typical durables one could buy 
were furniture, bicycles, stoves and traditional fireplaces, motorcycles and ra-
dios. Starting with the 1960s electric household appliances, washing machines, 
spin-driers, refrigerators and television sets became leading consumer goods, 
while from the early 1970s the motorcar became one of the most desirable pur-
chases. The nature of household expenditure heavily depended on location as 
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well. In the 1960s and 1970s the village population spent much less on services 
and public transportation than city dwellers; on the other hand, they spent con-
siderably more on travel.' Further differences by region were manifest in the 
use of household utilities. Rural areas were usually less saturated with house-
hold amenities than city homes. This was true probably because people in the 
villages were more concerned with maintaining their small farms and acquiring 
the necessary agricultural tools than with buying general household durables. In 
urban households exactly the opposite was true. 
The most radical change of lifestyle in post-war Hungary occurred during 
the 1960s and 1970s.4 Large numbers of people moved from villages to cities 
during the 1960s and 1970s, thereby changing not only their homes but their 
lifestyles as well. Their living conditions also changed dramatically. They usu-
ally left their old belongings at home and decorated their homes according to 
the norms of their new environment. The radical change of everyday utensils 
finally swept through the villages during the 1970s. The dichotomy of innova-
tion and traditional values is evident in the fact that in most new village houses, 
which were built in the 1970s, the traditional "clean room" - decorated and al-
most never used - was preserved in a somewhat transformed version. 
As opposed to the earlier era of socialism, household and fancy articles, 
some of which represented social standing, both became attainable in the 1970s. 
Despite the difficulties of purchasing the "right" article and the "poor" choice, a 
significant proportion of Hungarian society might have thought that they could 
form their private spheres as freely as they wanted, accumulate wealth, consume 
food and drink, buy all sorts of goods and property beyond their physical needs. 
In the decoration of urban homes during the 1950s and 1960s the traditional 
concept that the home should reveal its owners' social status had been some-
what neglected. In interior design most people wanted to follow the patterns of 
their corresponding social group. The central goal of most Hungarian families 
in the 1970s was to have a home of their own; and following the example of the 
reference group, they crammed their personal space with all kinds of objects. 
Under state socialism people, following emotional impulses, organized 
their personal space in a hedonistic fashion and identified themselves 
with the citizens of twentieth-century consumer society. They did not 
follow the puritanical, practical and sensible model of the bourgeois 
home but chose instead the object-driven ideal of consumer society. 
The transformation of habitation in Hungary during this period showed the 
revision of cultural heritage and customs as well. The new lifestyle was cen-
tered around private spheres and personal space, which revealed a yearning to-
ward an identification with Western European consumer societies. Hungarian 
homes, however, had on average ver/ few rooms. Consequently it was difficult 
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to separate different activities within the house and preserve personal space for 
the individual; and this would have been the epitome of modern bourgeois 
habitation. Significant changes in this respect only happened after the end of the 
1980s. 
By confronting the country's role in and contribution to World War II, Hun-
garian social consciousness had a brief opportunity for democratic change im-
mediately after 1945. However, the political shift of 1948-49 put on hold for 
several decades the development of modern national identity and left open such 
important questions as the "identity of small nations," - repeatedly postulated 
by the 1947 Paris peace treaty - or the assimilation of the Jews. For decades 
after 1948 the value system of Hungarian society underwent major changes. The 
values most directly stemming from Marxist ideology were forced on society 
most intensively between 1948 and 1956. Collectivism was carried to the ex-
treme, along with the suppression of national feelings and an overt disdain for 
human rights. The forced "modernization" of the 1940s and 1950s in Hungary 
resulted in the strengthening of individuation, atomization and secularization, 
which created a new trend of social integration. Behavioral patterns of the pre-
war era were less and less important, while the new behavioral norms of the 
communist power elite promoted disintegration. 
The era after 1956 can be divided into two distinct periods. The first period 
lasted until the mid-1970s was characterized by the ideological neutralization of 
Hungarian society. The second period lasted from the late 1970s until the end of 
the 1980s and brought about a gradual deviation from Marxist ideology and its 
values. In the 1950s the authorities demanded of society an unconditional ac-
ceptance of, support for, and identification with the goals set by the political 
leadership. From the 1960s on the basic requirement increasingly became a si-
lent acceptance and respect for the ideological and historical taboos of the ex-
isting political system. The change of attitude was appropriately, if infamously, 
summed up by János Kádár in 1962, "Whoever is not against us, is with us." 
The new system of values - an apolitical attitude that overestimated the 
tranquillity of private life and formally aligned with the "expectations of so-
cialist power" - did not change much between the mid-1960s and late 1970s. A 
gradual departure from these values started in the early 1980s and accelerated at 
the end of the decade. An idiosyncrasy of the Hungarian value system in the 
1960s and 1970s was that several individual values remained highly stable, and 
this relative stability prevailed during the 1980s as well. Under the circum-
stances the high level of individuation in Hungarian society at the beginning of 
the 1980s was remarkable. The principal reason is that parallel with the slack-
ening ideological pressure, the values and behavioral patterns connected to ma-
terial wealth came to the fore. During the 1960s and 1970s, despite the apparent 
problems, family played an important role in everyday life. 
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Although the power structure did not change significantly after 1956, the 
method of the exercising power gradually became more sophisticated. As op-
posed to the practices of the Rákosi regime, "politics" no longer intended to 
convert society by all available means but rather tried to neutralize it. According 
to the more pragmatic approach of the Kádár era, the reconsideration of the past 
became the most important ideological question. 
The most poignant means of consolidation in order to exert an apoliti-
cal effect is dehistoricization. The new political course did not want a 
new look at the past. [...] The authorities can only prevent society from 
owning a historically articulated political consciousness by eliminating 
the picture of the past itself. 
The first step in this direction was the total eradication of the events of 
1956. Aware of its defeat and personal connections to the revolution, Hungarian 
society became a partner in this effort. Due to this suppression, however, "the 
Revolution of 1956 was not remembered by Hungarians as the eternal past 
should be remembered." As a consequence Hungarian national consciousness 
lacked a 
major political landmark that determined the following twenty-five to 
thirty years in every possible respect. Whoever casts 1956 out of his 
memory, cannot form a clear political consciousness about these thirty 
years. [...] Dehistoricising 1956 makes it impossible to have a real in-
sight into the social situation. 
The system inflated technological and economic development and offered to 
society material growth as a pragmatic vision of the future. They added a 
glimpse of a "career society" where the big steps ahead were not viable any 
more - especially after the late 1960s - but small promotions seemed to be en-
sured. Solidarity was replaced with rivalry. Human relations, mostly family ties 
and friendships, were invariably inflated and the network of connections and 
mutual help remained a practical, working system. Outside the scope of con-
nections, however, relationships were plagued by severe distrust. A possible 
reason for this could be that the political system usually tried to regulate social 
behavior with coercion, by disciplinary correction and legal penalties. At the 
same time, they prevented the forming of spontaneous behavioral patterns, self-
regulating social norms, and systems of connections that went beyond the pri-
vate sphere and operated outside the control of the authorities. One cannot dis-
regard the fact that by its very nature the system was interested in creating and 
maintaining an air of distrust. Because in this situation the members of society 
were exposed, defenseless, and never knew when those with whom they had no 
direct connections used the authorities against them. 
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From the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s the economic re-
form and the emergence of the second economy caused serious changes in so-
cial consciousness. The reform process was aimed at improving the macro con-
ditions of everyday life, while the extension of small farms resulted in the crea-
tion of a new lifestyle, a new strategy for life, and new way of thinking. By the 
late 1970s the private economy - in part legally and in part covertly - occupied 
a principal role in the life of Hungarian society. As a direct result the values it 
promoted, such as diligence, talent, inventiveness, and quick reckoning were 
considerably strengthened. From the late 1970s the values of private life had a 
share in shaping national consciousness and expressed a sense of identity inde-
pendent of the political system. A major move in this direction was the redis-
covery of Hungarian minorities living abroad. Nonetheless, the dual nature of 
the value system, the way of thinking, and the behavioral patterns did not have 
only positive effects. An obvious problem of social psychology emerged from 
the findings of a 1988 survey, which stated that 15% of the adult population 
suffered from moderate or severe neurosis. The decrease of life expectancy in-
dicated the presence of social deviation and that modernization as well as the 
consolidation after 1956 has taken their toll. A major factor in this sphere must 
be the extreme tension of everyday life, or in the words of Péter Józan, the 
"symptom of unfortunate social adjustment." The crisis in morals and values 
was more prominent in the period, while alienation became a notorious phe-
nomenon in Hungarian society. In the 1970s and 1980s the majority of the 
population felt that they could achieve only part of what they had set out to ac-
complish; and their lives depended not so much on their personal will as on the 
often inscrutable goals of the political elite. The sense of defenselessness be-
came ever stronger; and people came to feel that they were in part independent 
citizens and in part subservient subjects. From the late seventies 
intellectual values became dominant and instrumental, sometimes ex-
ceeding moral values, and almost exclusively determining the trends in 
the structure of value systems. Even though the communist party had 
started the strengthening of individuation, atomization and intellectualiza-
tion, their independence prevailed after the fall of the regime. [...] There is 
every reason to think that 1990 was not only the grave of an old regime 
and system but the cradle of a new, healthier society as well. 
The last issue that I would like to consider is the assessment of social proc-
esses during the period. Is it possible to interpret what happened in Hungarian 
society between 1945 and 1995 as an essentially steady march with smaller or 
greater digressions towards the middle class? 
I do believe that it is more sensible to say that the process of developing a 
bourgeois mentality was drastically interrupted at the end of the 1940s in Hun-
gary. From the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the rapid expansion of the 
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second economy started the wide-scale restitution of bourgeois values and 
mentality, which until the mid-1980s remained almost exclusively confined to 
the economic sphere. The Hungarian people, when working in a state firm, or 
factory, or taking part in public life, in as much as their limited rights allowed, 
were thinking and acting as humble subjects. When working in a small-scale 
agricultural farm, or from the early 1980s, in a small legal enterprize, they were 
doing their jobs, or managing their own enterprises, with a quasi-bourgeois 
sense of responsibility and proprietorship. Until the late 1980s and early 1990s 
the striving citizen could only develop his economic freedom and autonomy, if 
his limited social and political status remained unaffected. By reforming the 
political order and restructuring the economic system - a process involving se-
rious sacrifices, such as the steep fall of real wages and living standards, and the 
soaring unemployment that touched a half a million people - the new order 
made it possible for the dual society, value system and social consciousness, to 
finally become one. 
Toward the middle class - with detours? This is what I asked in the title of 
my discussion. The answer is yes. The two and a half decades of socialism after 
1948-1949 were a long and almost fatal detour in the twentieth century history 
of the Hungarian bourgeoisie. Nevertheless an overt advance towards the mid-
dle class was resumed again after 1990. 
Notes 
1. Ferenc Szászi, "Adatok a magyar kivándorlás történetéhez, 1945-1989" [Data on 
the History of Hungarian Emigration, 1945-1989], Történelmi Szemle (1993): nos 
3^1,313-338. 
2. Rudolf Andorka, "Társadalmi változások és társadalmi problémák 1940-1990" 
[Social Changes and Social Problems, 1940-1990], Statisztikai Szemle (1992): nos 
4-5,301-324. 
3. Gábor Vági, "A háztartások felszereltsége és szolgáltatás" [Household Utilities and 
Consumption of Services], Statisztikai Szemle (1993): nos 4-5, 293-315. 
4. Katalin S. Nagy, "Fogyasztás és lakáskultúra Magyarországon a hetvenes években" 
[Consumption and Habitation in Hungary during the Seventies], Replika (June 
1997): no. 26,47-52. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Miklós Szabó, "A Magyar társadalmi és nemzettudat az elmúlt harminc évben" 
[Hungarian Social and National Identity during the Last Thirty Years]. In: Arat a 
Magyar (Budapest: MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézete, 1998). 
7. Ibid. 
8. László Füstös and Árpád Szakolczai, "Értékek változásai Magyarországon 1978— 
1993" [The Changes in Values in Hungary, 1978-1993], Szociológiai Szemle 
(1994): no. 1,57-90. 
PRINTED IN HUNGARY 












Gábor TOLCSVAI NAGY 
Tibor VALUCH 
Tibor ZS. LUKÁCS 
University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada 
Miskolc University, Miskolc. Hungary 
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 
Köln, Deutschland 
Eötvös Loránd Universität, Budapest, Ungarn 
Pembroke College, Cambridge, UK 
Université Catholique Pázmány Péter, Piliscsaba, Hongrie 
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 
Université de Paris-Sorbonne Paris IV, Paris, France 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IND, U.S.A. 
Department of Finno-Ugrian Studies, Helsinki, Finland 
Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 
Budapest, Hungary 
Central European University, Budapest, and Eötvös Loránd 
University, Budapest, Hungary 
Guidelines for Submission of Manuscripts 
Manuscripts should be sent to the Editor. Texts should be double-spaced 
with wide margins. Quotations longer than three lines should be indented and 
single-spaced. Whenever possible please also include a copy on diskette. Foot-
notes or endnotes should be numbered consecutively. Hungarian Studies will 
follow the forms recommended by The Chicago Manual of Style (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1982); or Kate L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers of 
Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987). In preparing their manuscripts and footnotes, all contributors are urged to 
follow the system in these two guidebooks. 
From the Contents of Forthcoming Issues 
Richard Aczel: "The Day Before Yesterday" - The Representation of the 1950s in 
Hungarian Cinema in the 1980s 
Árpád Bemáth-Károly Csúri: Die Socialistische Avantgarde und der Problemkomplex 
„Postmoderne" 
István Dobos: Die religiöse Horizont in den Romanen Péter Esterházys 
Péter Szirák: Sprache, Erzählung, Phantasie 
